

Communities First

A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Movement Against Violent Extremism



BY ERIC ROSAND



The Prevention Project
Organizing Against Violent Extremism

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ERIC ROSAND is the Director of The Prevention Project and a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Program, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. Until March 2016, he was a senior official in the U.S. Department of State working on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE), most recently serving as the department's policy coordinator for the 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism and follow-on process. From 2006 to 2010, he was a codirector of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (now the Global Center on Cooperative Security) and served as

a Non-Resident Fellow at New York University's Center for International Cooperation. Prior to that, he served in the State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor and the United States Mission to the United Nations. He is the author of a number of reports and articles on international counterterrorism and CVE cooperation and coauthor, with Alistair Millar, of *Allied Against Terrorism: What's Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment* (2006). He holds a BA in history from Haverford College, a JD from Columbia University School of Law, and an LLM (Hons) in international law from Cambridge University.

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ACRONYMS

AML/CFT	anti–money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism
CVE	countering violent extremism
FTF	foreign terrorist fighter
GCERF	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PVE	preventing violent extremism
P/CVE	preventing and countering violent extremism
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

INTRODUCTION

The threat of violent extremism is more geographically dispersed and more localized than ever, yet the security-focused and other responses of national governments and multilateral institutions have not been and will not be sufficient to counter and prevent its spread. A more comprehensive and strategic approach that empowers local actors and focuses more attention on community-led interventions to address underlying drivers of the phenomenon is required. This involves, *inter alia*, the development and deployment of a more dynamic and complete set of policies and programs and the involvement of a more diverse set of actors, particularly at the local level, such as public health, mental health, or social services providers; parents; researchers; teachers; businesses; and women's, religious, and youth leaders. In addition, this group includes police and corrections officials, actors that also have roles to play, albeit different ones, in the "hard" response to terrorism. This approach requires a sustainable global network of these stakeholders that can have impact at the local level and a voice at the global level. It requires leveraging, although not co-opting, a wide array of efforts, including development, peacebuilding, good governance, and public health, that can contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)¹ by helping address some of the grievances that fuel the spread of violent extremism. Furthermore, it requires leveraging existing

knowledge of which P/CVE and related interventions have and have not worked to improve the effectiveness of efforts to address the threat.

Perhaps most importantly, this new approach requires recognizing that how governments treat their citizens really matters when it comes to P/CVE. In many respects, the broader aims of strengthening the relationship between the state and its citizens and building trust between all levels of government and local communities lie at the heart of the P/CVE agenda. Thus, effective implementation of this agenda requires addressing the marginalization and alienation, poor governance, and state-sponsored violence that damage the government-citizen relationship and are among the most prevalent drivers of violent extremism. Yet, all too often, national governments are reluctant to acknowledge that their behavior matters when it comes to P/CVE, let alone change it so as to mitigate some of the drivers that can fuel violent extremism.

The Prevention Project was launched in March 2016 to gather from, develop with, and disseminate to the ever-expanding group of P/CVE stakeholders practical guidance on overcoming these challenges and allowing for the development and implementation of the community-focused solutions required to prevent the spread of violent extremism. The actionable

1 The terms "countering violent extremism" (CVE) and "preventing violent extremism" (PVE) are increasingly used interchangeably, with the former now being interpreted to include a heavy dose of preventative measures. This report uses P/CVE, an amalgamation of the terms, in order to highlight the centrality of prevention, while avoiding a terminological debate between CVE and PVE advocates. There is no internationally agreed definition of CVE or PVE, let alone "violent extremism." Yet, in both instances, the terms are intended to capture nonkinetic and proactive measures to prevent and counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific social, political, and economic, often local, drivers or conditions that facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence. Although there is no single cause or pathway into violent extremism, researchers have identified a number of "push" and "pull" factors that can make individuals or communities more susceptible to recruitment and radicalization to violence. According to a 2016 EU Radicalisation Awareness Network issue paper, "push" factors involve "social, political and economic grievances; a sense of injustice and discrimination; personal crisis and tragedies; frustration; alienation; a fascination with violence; searching for answers to the meaning of life; an identity crisis; social exclusion; alienation; marginalisation; disappointment with democratic processes; [and] polarization." The "pull" factors "are a personal quest, a sense of belonging to a cause, ideology or social network; power and control; a sense of loyalty and commitment; a sense of excitement and adventure; a romanticised view of ideology and cause; the possibility of heroism, [and] personal redemption." Magnus Ranstorp, "The Root Causes of Violent Extremism," *RAN Issue Paper*, 4 January 2016, p. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf.

recommendations contained in this report² draw on the experiences and expertise of a wide range of policymakers, practitioners, and civil society leaders and have been informed by a series of consultations, roundtables, and workshops organized by or involving The Prevention Project team and engaging a diversity of stakeholders.³

The recommendations are organized around a number of themes. These include

- moving from rhetoric to action, with a particular emphasis on resource mobilization;
- ensuring greater coherence between counterterrorism and P/CVE policies and objectives;
- moving from a national-level and security-centric approach to a local-level and community-centric approach;
- empowering cities and civil society;
- securing more strategic donor engagement;
- integrating to a greater extent countermessaging and other communications efforts to dissuade potential recruits and delegitimize violent extremist organizations into broader P/CVE efforts and devoting a higher proportion of those efforts to interventions that address the underlying drivers of violent extremism and provide positive alternative activities;
- expanding “off-ramp” programs; and
- making the international architecture fit for purpose.

2 A number of recent reports contain thoughtful, policy-relevant recommendations linked to one or more elements of the global P/CVE effort and should be seen as complementary to those contained in this report. See Arthur Boutellis and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” International Peace Institute, October 2016, pp. 24–34, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/1610_Waging-Peace.pdf; Alistair Millar and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Blue Sky III: Taking UN Counterterrorism Efforts in the Next Decade From Plans to Action,” Global Center on Cooperative Security (Global Center), September 2016, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Blue-Sky-III_low-res.pdf; Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sara Zeiger, and Rafia Bhulai, eds., “A Man’s World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” Hedayah and Global Center, 2016, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULLL.pdf.

3 For summaries of these events, see The Prevention Project, “Publications and Event Summaries,” n.d., <http://www.organizingagainste.org/#events-target> (accessed 9 November 2016).

THE CURRENT CONTEXT

The current state of global P/CVE efforts is mixed. Although the terrorism threat is more global and heightened than ever since September 2001, there is at least a growing convergence among practitioners and policymakers around the most appropriate responses and the need for comprehensive approaches that empower local actors and focus more attention on community-led interventions to address underlying drivers of the phenomenon. Growing recognition of this need is reflected in the “whole of society” approaches to P/CVE recently articulated in the UN Secretary-General’s plan of action on preventing violent extremism (PVE)⁴ and an increasing number of national and regional P/CVE strategies. This convergence in strategic thinking around P/CVE is promising, but a number of resource, coordination, political, and strategic challenges to operationalizing and sustaining the P/CVE agenda remain. These will need to be overcome if the rhetoric around this agenda is to be translated into action and ultimately impact.

The Glass ‘Half-Full’

In this context and particularly since the 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism and the Secretary-General’s PVE plan of action that

was rolled out less than a year later, P/CVE efforts have received increased attention. National P/CVE strategies and action plans continue to be elaborated in a growing number of countries, including Finland,⁵ Jordan,⁶ Kenya,⁷ and Somalia.⁸ Norway has developed a national plan and several municipal-level variations.⁹ Switzerland¹⁰ and the United States¹¹ are among those countries that have developed international P/CVE action plans or strategies that underscore the importance of using traditional development tools to help communities identify early signs of and intervene against radicalization before it becomes violent. Switzerland is developing a domestic strategy, and the United States recently updated its domestic, community-focused plan.¹²

Within the European Union, a European Commission June 2016 communication focused on enhancing support for EU member states’ efforts to prevent radicalization in a number of areas.¹³ These include countering online radicalization, addressing radicalization to violent extremism in prisons, promoting inclusive education, boosting research and networking, and promoting inclusive and open societies at home. This communication, which emphasizes the importance the EU places on reaching beyond law enforcement and

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- 4 UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674*, 24 December 2015, pp. 16–19.
 - 5 Finnish Ministry of the Interior, “National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism,” no. 17/2016, 13 May 2016, https://www.intermin.fi/download/67992_julkaisu_172016.pdf?385cc67a36a7d388.
 - 6 UN Development Programme (UNDP), “National Strategy on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan (P/CVE),” 17 May 2016, <http://www.jo.undp.org/content/jordan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/05/17/national-strategy-on-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-in-jordan-P/CVE-.html>.
 - 7 Kenyan Presidential Strategic Communications Unit, “President Kenyatta Launches Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism,” 7 September 2016, <http://www.mfa.go.ke/president-kenyatta-launches-strategy-countering-violent-extremism/>.
 - 8 RBC Radio, “Somalia: President Mohamud Launches National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE),” 12 September 2016, <http://www.raxanreeb.com/2016/09/somalia-president-mohamud-launches-national-strategy-for-countering-violent-extremism-cve/>.
 - 9 Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, “Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism,” no. G-0433 E, 2014, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/6d84d5d6c6df47b38f5e2b989347fc49/action-plan-against-radicalisation-and-violent-extremism_2014.pdf.
 - 10 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Switzerland’s Foreign Policy Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism,” 2016, <https://www.news.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/43587.pdf>.
 - 11 U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism,” May 2016, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257913.pdf>.
 - 12 Executive Office of the President of the United States, “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,” October 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2016_strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf.
 - 13 European Commission, “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism,” COM(2016) 379 final, 14 June 2016.

security actors, builds on more than a decade of EU work in this area. This work commenced when the EU identified prevention as one of the four pillars of its 2005 counterterrorism strategy,¹⁴ which was updated in 2014 to reflect the “changing nature of the threat and the need to prevent people from becoming radicalized, being radicalized and being recruited to terrorism and to prevent a new generation of terrorists from emerging.”¹⁵ The June 2016 communication, much like the above-mentioned national strategies and plans, complements and reinforces the call in the UN Secretary-General’s PVE plan of action for a whole-of-society approach to prevent violent extremism.

While national-level policy and planning on P/CVE continues to expand, so too does the number of local and community-led programs to prevent and counter violent extremism. Civil society groups, often operating in dangerous environments, are increasingly demonstrating the unique role they can play in building community resilience and PVE from taking hold among their constituencies. International donors are starting to invest more resources in this work, which comes in all shapes and sizes, with the EU’s Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) program perhaps at the vanguard of this movement to empower civil society.¹⁶

In Jordan, for example, civil society groups are bringing together local authorities, community leaders, the private sector, and family members in vulnerable

communities to respond to the risk of youth radicalization through youth-focused programs and services addressing their needs.¹⁷ They are working with Koranic schools in northern Mali to promote critical thinking.¹⁸ They are providing much needed psychosocial support to allow for the reintegration of those who have been rescued from Boko Haram back into their communities.¹⁹ They are working with mothers in Pakistan to sensitize them to the risk of radicalization, its impact on their lives, and the role they can play in countering it.²⁰ In Sri Lanka, psychologists and other civil society experts are playing key roles in rehabilitation and reintegration efforts.²¹

Civil society organizations in a number of European countries have developed multidisciplinary programs for those wishing to leave far-right and other violent extremist groups.²² In Germany, drawing on successful experience with extreme right-wing recruitment to violence, they have launched emergency hotlines for families and peers of those being targeted by violent extremist recruitment and are working with mosques and Muslim communities to help them to identify individuals who might be at risk of radicalization to violence, including those fleeing conflict zones.²³ They are working with local authorities in Mombasa, as well as community leaders and local police, to develop a subnational strategy to address violent extremism and promote human rights, peace, and security.²⁴ They are finding innovative ways to engage young people from marginalized communities near Tunis that are targets

14 Council of the European Union, “The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 14469/4/05 REV 4, 30 November 2005.

15 Council of the European Union, “Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism,” 9956/14, 19 May 2014, p. 3.

16 The STRIVE program represents the first EU-funded effort to implement P/CVE-specific activities outside of Europe. The Horn of Africa program aims to understand the drivers of violent extremism through evidence-based analysis, develop best practices around P/CVE programming in the region based on short pilot activities, and provide recommendations allowing for increased impact and more focused interventions. Running from January 2014 to January 2017, the program’s thematic priorities are Youth Engagement, Investing in Women, and Capacity-Building. European Commission, “STRIVE for Development: Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism,” 2015, pp. 18–21, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/strive-brochure-20150617_en.pdf.

17 Mercy Corps, “From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria’s Violent Extremist Groups,” *Mercy Corps Policy Brief*, n.d., pp. 2–9, https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/From%20Jordan%20to%20Jihad_0.pdf.

18 Fatouma Harber, “Rebuilding Timbuktu’s Cultural Diversity, One eReader at a Time,” trans. Lova Rakotomalala, *Global Voices*, 8 December 2014, <https://globalvoices.org/2014/12/08/rebuilding-timbuktus-cultural-diversity-one-ereader-at-a-time/>.

19 Victims Support Fund, “Our Programs,” n.d., <http://victimssupportfundng.org/causes/programs/> (accessed 8 November 2016).

20 See PAIMAN Alumni Trust, <http://paimantrust.org/> (accessed 8 November 2016).

21 Malkanthi Hettiarachchi, “Sri Lanka’s Rehabilitation Program: The Humanitarian Mission Two,” February 2014, p. 13, <http://www.sinhalanet.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Sri-Lankas-Rehabilitation-Program.pdf>.

22 EU Radicalization Awareness Network, “Exit Strategies,” n.d., http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies.pdf.

23 See Violence Prevention Network, <http://www.violence-prevention-network.de/en/> (accessed 9 November 2016).

24 See HAKI Africa, <http://www.hakiafrica.or.ke/index.php/en/> (accessed 9 November 2016).

for terrorist recruitment.²⁵ They are also working to develop positive relationships between the youth and the local authorities, where the broken relationship between these two constituencies is believed to be one of the principal grievances utilized by violent extremist groups (table A-1).

Beyond the many specifically targeted but largely “one-off” civil society projects, new initiatives now connect, network, and seek to grow the community of local leaders and activists who are stepping forward to contribute. The Kofi Annan Foundation brought together young leaders across the globe with proven track records in P/CVE in their communities to pool ideas and share experiences.²⁶ A new network is uniting some 650 youth activists, artists, and technology entrepreneurs from 100 countries, with Facebook providing a safe space for an ongoing international exchange of practices, and more broadly is fostering collaboration and cocreation between its members.²⁷ A June 2016 youth symposium in Djibouti convened dozens of civil society actors from across East Africa to understand and address the specific issues facing youth in the context of violent extremism.²⁸ The U.S. Department of State handed out its inaugural Emerging Young Leaders Award to 10 people creating positive social change in challenging environments.²⁹ In September 2016 the Club de Madrid launched a project titled “Preventing Violent Extremism: Leaders Telling a Different Story,” which will draw on the experience and political leverage of its members—all

former democratically elected presidents and prime ministers—and other policymakers and practitioners to strengthen multidimensional efforts to counter violent extremism narratives.³⁰ This project builds upon the “Policy Dialogue on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” implemented last year by the Club de Madrid.

A small but growing number of cities and other local authorities are realizing that they have an essential role to play in P/CVE. Local leaders are developing strategies and programs to address the violent extremist threat at each stage of the radicalization cycle.³¹ Cities across Europe have been at the forefront of these efforts,³² with Aarhus, Denmark, often cited as a model.³³ In Montgomery County, Maryland, as part of the first, independently evaluated, evidence-based, P/CVE-relevant programming in the United States, county authorities are involved in a community intervention program that includes training for faith leaders, teachers, social service providers, police, and parents on how to recognize the early signs of extremism in underserved immigrant communities.³⁴

In Montreal, a \$2 million, multidisciplinary “anti-radicalization center” provides mothers who suspect their children may be vulnerable to radicalization or recruitment with resources that do not involve contacting the police. The center focuses on training people to identify signs of radicalization and researching the drivers of radicalization in Montreal and what works

25 European Commission International Cooperation and Development, “Voices and Views: Supporting Young Peacebuilders to Counter Extremism,” 28 July 2016, <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/article/supporting-young-peacebuilders-counter-extremism>.

26 Kofi Annan Foundation, “Extremely Together: Young People Coming Together Against Violent Extremism,” 13 April 2016, <http://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/promoting-youth-leadership/extremely-together-initiative-next-generation-counter-prevent-violent-extremism/>.

27 The Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN), <http://youthcan.net/> (accessed 9 November 2016).

28 EU Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism, “Symposium on Youth and CVE in the Horn of Africa,” June 2016, <http://ct-morse.eu/global-counterterrorism-forum-horn-of-africa-working-group-co-chaired-by-turkey-and-the-eu/>.

29 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “Emerging Young Leaders Award and Exchange Program,” 2016, <https://exchanges.state.gov/non-us/program/emerging-young-leaders-award-and-exchange-program>.

30 Club de Madrid, “How to Build New Narratives to Prevent Violent Extremism, Core of the Newest CdM Project,” 22 September 2016, http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/noticia/how_to_build_new_narratives_to_prevent_violent_extremism_core_of_the_newest_cdm_project.

31 Club de Madrid, “Madrid +10, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism,” October 2015, <http://www.clubmadrid.org/PD2015/PD2015booklet.pdf>.

32 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, “Towards an Alliance of European Cities Against Violent Extremism Initiative,” n.d., <http://citiesagainstextremism.eu/> (accessed 9 November 2016).

33 City of Aarhus, “Anti-Radicalization in Aarhus Municipality,” 17 October 2016, <http://www.aarhus.dk/antiradicalisation>.

34 World Organization for Resource Development and Education, “The Montgomery County BRAVE Model,” n.d., <http://www.worde.org/programs/the-montgomery-county-model/> (accessed 9 November 2016).

to prevent its growth.³⁵ Inspired by the Montreal initiative, Brussels opened a prevention-focused, antiradicalization center, which, like the Montreal center, keeps the police out of the picture unless necessary to confront an imminent threat.³⁶ In Bordeaux, the Center for Action and Prevention Against Radicalization of Individuals, which uses a multidisciplinary approach involving imams, psychiatrists, teachers, and social workers, opened in 2016.³⁷ In Australia, New South Wales and Victoria have set aside funds to support interventions led by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that target individuals who may be radicalizing and build community resilience.³⁸

New prevention-focused P/CVE networks designed to connect and empower subnational actors, often with funds from Western donors, are now in place. These platforms are pooling limited resources and focusing on connecting and training growing numbers of young people and women working in this area;³⁹ local researchers focused on understanding the local drivers of violent extremism and what has worked to stem its tide in particular communities;⁴⁰ and mayors and other municipal officials from across the world working to build social cohesion to prevent violent extremism from taking root in their communities.⁴¹

At the multilateral level, in addition to the rollout of the UN Secretary-General's PVE plan of action, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) decided in February to allow

its member states to report P/CVE funding as part of their annual development assistance targets.⁴² The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has developed a teacher's guide on the prevention of violent extremism and will soon be offering training in this area.⁴³ The World Bank and the PVE initiative of the UN Development Programme,⁴⁴ organizations that had historically been reluctant to engage in security-related activities, now support programs aimed at P/CVE.

These developments are noteworthy, relatively rapid, and broadly positive and include systemic changes within some of the world's wealthiest, most powerful, and sprawling global bureaucracies.

The Glass 'Half-Empty'

Even as some states, civil society organizations, local authorities, and international organizations are beginning to turn their attention to extremism and P/CVE, there are a number of obstacles to achieving broader and durable progress. These include funding and organizational weaknesses, coordination challenges, lingering trust deficits between governments and the relevant communities, a continued insistence of many national governments to view national security issues such as violent extremism as being the exclusive policy domain of the capital,⁴⁵ and an international architecture for addressing terrorism and violent extremism that continues to be driven by the interests and needs

35 Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, n.d., <https://info-radical.org/en> (accessed 9 November 2016).

36 Catherine Solyom, "New Centre in Brussels Modelled After Montreal's Anti-Radicalization Efforts," *Montreal Gazette*, 16 December 2015, <http://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/new-centre-in-brussels-modelled-after-montreals-anti-radicalization-efforts>.

37 "France: Centre Aims to Fight Against Radicalization and Terrorism," Agence France-Presse, 26 March 2016, <http://www.africanews.com/2016/03/26/france-centre-aims-to-fight-against-radicalization-and-terrorism/>.

38 New South Wales Government, "Early Intervention Program to Counter Violent Extremism," 22 June 2015, <https://www.nsw.gov.au/media-releases-premier/early-intervention-program-counter-violent-extremism>; Premier of Victoria, "Building Resilience to Keep Our Communities Safe," 8 April 2016, <http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/building-resilience-to-keep-our-communities-safe/>.

39 YouthCAN; Victims Support Fund.

40 RESOLVE Network, n.d., <http://www.resolve.net.org/> (accessed 9 November 2016).

41 Strong Cities Network, n.d., <http://strongcitiesnetwork.org/> (accessed 9 November 2016).

42 OECD, "DAC High Level Meeting Communiqué," 19 February 2016, p. 16, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf>.

43 UNESCO, *A Teacher's Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extremism*, 2016, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002446/244676e.pdf>.

44 World Bank, "European Commission and World Bank Group to Accelerate Joint Action to Tackle Fragility, Conflict and Violence," 14 June 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/06/14/european-commission-world-bank-group-to-accelerate-joint-action-to-tackle-fragility-conflict-violence>; UNDP, "Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity," 14 July 2016, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/preventing-violent-extremism-through-promoting-inclusive-develop.html>.

45 Eric Rosand and Ian Klaus, "It Happens on the Pavement: Putting Cities at the Center of Countering Violent Extremism," Brookings Institution, 1 June 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/06/01/it-happens-on-the-pavement-putting-cities-at-the-center-of-countering-violent-extremism/>.

of national governments and has yet to heed calls to be more inclusive of civil society and other subnational actors.⁴⁶

Reliable funding for P/CVE programs is difficult to obtain. On the security side, the vast majority of resources continues to support traditional law enforcement and intelligence priorities, such as training programs for prosecutors and police and enhanced intelligence collection capabilities. Few donors explicitly designate resources for P/CVE efforts, and funding for community-led efforts that are a critical part of the P/CVE agenda is in short supply. On the development side, despite progress in the OECD, too few development agencies have shown a willingness to shift their support from traditional development priorities or ones seen as more urgent such as the migration crisis, let alone add a P/CVE lens to their work.⁴⁷ Furthermore, despite the economic costs of terrorism reaching their highest level ever, the private sector has generally shied away from investing in solutions to violent extremism, apart from some social media and technology companies concerned about preventing terrorist use of their platforms.

Where funding has been mobilized, governmental donors have generally struggled to coordinate their contributions and embrace the innovation and experimentation that experts argue is essential to reaping the full benefits of P/CVE.⁴⁸ Too often, donors resort to funding short-term projects implemented by preferred organizations rather than joining together to invest in

building the long-term capacity of local organizations to be agents of change in the relevant community.

International donors continue to prefer to direct P/CVE funds to organizations that have shown they can comply with their onerous requirements, leaving newer, smaller, less “connected,” and more innovative partners behind.⁴⁹ Donors continue to struggle with identifying and supporting those local partners that might have the most credibility in their communities, as some civil society groups may be perceived as politically motivated movements, be labeled opposition groups or sometimes even violent extremists by the host government, or be extremist groups that are non-violent but ardently opposed to the Western foreign policy agenda.

Despite the rhetoric about the need for a whole-of-society approach to the problem, some governments remain reluctant to empower and support local communities, in some cases limiting the space for civil society to operate, let alone contribute to preventing violent extremism in their communities or involve other nonsecurity actors in this work. The past year has seen governments arresting civil society actors for peaceful protest, criminalizing speech and media oversight, and passing antimigrant and antirefugee policies in the face of unprecedented levels of global human suffering.⁵⁰

Overly broad definitions of terrorism or violent extremism, particularly across the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, are used too often

46 James Cockayne, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe, “An Opportunity for Renewal: Revitalizing the United Nations Counterterrorism Program,” Global Center, September 2010, http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Opportunity_for_Renewal_Final.pdf.

47 There is lingering apprehension from development and humanitarian actors about being linked to P/CVE efforts, which will require attention. Some UN Peace Operations and UN country teams are concerned that being too closely aligned with, let alone being seen as implementing, P/CVE programs risks threatening their impartiality and can invite hard-security responses by violent extremist groups. These UN groups also have voiced concerns that the use of development assistance to support P/CVE efforts will privilege groups vulnerable to violent extremism rather than be based on need, which has traditionally been the basis for funding decisions. See Boutellis and Fink, “Waging Peace.”

48 Erin Marie Saltman and Jas Kirt, “Guidance for International Youth Engagement in PVE and CVE,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue and YouthCAN, 2016, p. 10, <http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/YouthCAN-UN-PVE-Survey.pdf>.

49 The Prevention Project and Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), “Opportunities and Challenges for Mobilizing Resources for Preventing Violent Extremism,” 21 June 2016, p. 5, http://www.organizingagainste.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Meeting-Summary-Mobilizing-Resources-for-PVE-June-21_Final.pdf.

50 Kenneth Roth, “The Great Civil Society Choke-Out,” Foreign Policy, 27 January 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/27/the-great-civil-society-choke-out-human-rights-democracy-india-russia-china-kenya/>; Mercy Corps, “An Ounce of Prevention,” n.d., <https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/ounce-prevention> (accessed 9 November 2016).

to criminalize the nonviolent actions of opposition groups, civil society organizations, and human rights defenders.⁵¹ Indeed, according to one estimate, more than 63 countries have passed restrictive laws in recent years, shrinking civil society space and increasing the criminalization of and discrimination against civil society organizations worldwide, including restricting or banning foreign funding and imposing onerous registration requirements.⁵² In addition, despite some recent progress, the international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime continues to have a chilling effect on the ability of civil society organizations to support P/CVE work.⁵³

Too often, mayors and other local leaders are not part of national-level conversations about how to prevent violent extremism;⁵⁴ and some members of target communities remain skeptical of government-led P/CVE efforts, sometimes believing them to be a ruse for intelligence gathering or to stigmatize and stereotype certain communities.⁵⁵

Moreover, in the current threat environment in which the public demands a “zero tolerance” approach, it can be an unpopular position to argue for what are perceived too often as “soft” approaches that stop short of prosecuting and incarcerating, let alone killing, terrorists. Thus, for example, despite the provision in UN Security Council Resolution 2178 that calls on countries to develop and implement rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs),⁵⁶ few if any such strategies, including

ones that allow alternatives to prosecution or reduced sentences, exist, despite the fact that many returnees or defectors cannot be prosecuted, whether due to lack of laws or evidence. In some cases, even if prosecuted and convicted, they may serve short prison sentences in environments that have been found to be central vectors of radicalization. This lacuna exists despite an increasing awareness that alternatives to criminal prosecution and incarceration in certain circumstances can help facilitate the cooperation of family, friends, and other members of vulnerable communities who may be reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement if they know that any outreach might put their loved one in a prison cell.

Perhaps most fundamentally, too many national governments continue to double down on authoritarian policies and practices, often with direct or indirect support from partners in the West, that are geared to protect the regime and the status quo. These policies and practices ultimately do more in the long run to create grievances that can spur radicalization to violence rather than provide security and liberty to the people they are intended to serve.

Ensuring a Sustainable and Successful Global P/CVE Movement

The sustainability and ultimate success of the global P/CVE movement and the whole-of-society approach it embodies are largely dependent on building on the progress achieved and overcoming the

51 Ban Ki-moon, “Remarks at General Assembly Presentation of the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism,” 15 January 2016, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-01-15/remarks-general-assembly-presentation-plan-action-prevent-violent> (hereinafter Ban PVE plan of action remarks); Mercy Corps, “Investing in Iraq’s Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism,” n.d., <https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/investing-iraqs-peace-how-good-governance-can-diminish-support-violent-extremism> (accessed 9 November 2016); Nate Rosenblatt, “All Jihad Is Local: What ISIS’ Files Tell Us About Its Fighters,” *New America*, 20 July 2016, <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/policy-papers/all-jihad-is-local/>; UNDP, “Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach,” n.d., http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Local%20Governance/UNDP_RBA_Preventing_and_Responding_to_Violent_Extremism_2016-19.pdf (accessed 9 November 2016).

52 Rebecca Wagner and Julia Dankova, “The CSO’s Shrinking and Closing Space Tendency - How EU Institutions Can Support CSOs Worldwide,” *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*, 7 April 2016, <https://eu.boell.org/en/2016/04/07/csos-shrinking-and-closing-space-tendency-how-eu-institutions-can-support-csos-worldwide>.

53 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “Outcomes of the Plenary Meeting of the FATF, Busan Korea,” 24 June 2016, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/plenary-outcomes-june-2016.html>; FATF, “Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-Profit Organisations,” June 2014, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-of-terrorist-abuse-in-non-profit-organisations.pdf>.

54 Rosand and Klaus, “It Happens on the Pavement.”

55 Ian Cobain, “UK’s Prevent Counter-Radicalisation Policy ‘Badly Flawed,’” *Guardian*, 18 October 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/19/uks-prevent-counter-radicalisation-policy-badly-flawed>.

56 UN Security Council, S/RES/2178, 24 September 2014.

above-mentioned challenges and obstacles. Among other things, this requires ensuring that the necessary institutions, networks, and platforms, resources, and political will are in place to sustain the effort over the long term. The sheer number of actors that have a role to play, domestically or internationally, within or outside government (national and local), risks producing a web of overlapping mandates, structures, and activities that could hinder overall effectiveness if not organized properly at the different levels. Moreover, ongoing tensions between near-term, tactical counterterrorism goals and longer-term P/CVE objectives, which continue to impede progress on translating P/CVE

rhetoric into action, will need to be addressed or at least mitigated.

Finally, the continuing confusion regarding what is and should be labeled a P/CVE program, either P/CVE “specific” or “relevant,” requires attention. Many parts of government (e.g., education, social welfare, health) and actors (e.g., women’s groups, development workers) are undertaking important work that will help prevent and counter violent extremism. This work will need to be captured in strategies for reducing levels of violent extremism, including when adding a P/CVE label risks undermining its effectiveness.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Extensive conversations with a diverse group of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders form the basis for the following recommendations on overcoming the challenges discussed above and helping operationalize and sustain whole-of-society approaches to P/CVE. These recommendations are also informed by the need for sustained attention to essential cross-cutting issues, such as promoting good governance, the rule of law, and gender mainstreaming.⁵⁷

The project team grappled with the following questions, which led to the recommendations that follow.

- Is governmental rhetoric regarding true investments on prevention-focused CVE efforts being matched by resources, and what are the appropriate roles for the public and private sectors in supporting CVE efforts?
- How do stakeholders deepen and sustain the community-led work that involves professionals (e.g., public health, mental health, social services, and teachers), faith and other local leaders, and families who have generally not been part of the counterterrorism discourse but lie at the heart of the P/CVE agenda, without instrumentalizing their work or adding additional layers of burdens?
- How are national governments struggling with the challenges associated with supporting and empowering local actors, including cities and community members?
- What obstacles do civil society and other community-level actors face in implementing P/CVE programs, and how can these obstacles be identified and overcome?
- To what extent are governments willing to recalibrate when necessary from the traditional zero tolerance approach taken with regard to terrorism and allow for more risk-taking and innovation in P/CVE policymaking and programming decisions?
- How do stakeholders balance P/CVE and counterterrorism policies and interventions to ensure they are not working at cross-purposes?
- How do stakeholders strike the appropriate balance between countermessaging and other communications efforts to dissuade potential recruits and delegitimize violent extremist organizations and those activities aimed at addressing the “push” factors that can make communities and individuals susceptible to terrorist recruitment and propaganda in the first place?
- How do stakeholders scale up existing off-ramp programs focused on prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation and reintegration and develop and pilot new ones in different contexts?
- To what extent does the international counterterrorism architecture need to be updated or further strengthened to support and be informed by the P/CVE agenda given its nongovernmental and subnational emphasis?

Given the cross-cutting nature of the P/CVE agenda, the recommendations cover a range of domains and stakeholders, including all levels of government; security- and nonsecurity-focused governmental agencies; developed and developing countries; global, regional, and subregional bodies and platforms; and international and local NGOs and other civil society groups, including those with a specific and important focus on youth and gender. With the nature of the violent extremist challenge very localized and the most effective response often linked to the particular historical, political, social, and economic specificities of the relevant country or community, not all recommendations are applicable to every stakeholder or every national or local context. Regardless of the context, progress on the P/CVE agenda cannot be achieved by one set of actors

57 Council of Europe, “The 12 Principles for Good Governance at Local Level, With Tools for Implementation,” n.d., http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/Strategy_Innovation/12principles_en.asp (accessed 10 November 2016).

alone or dictated by the national or any government. Rather, it will require sustained contributions from and the formation of durable, trust-based partnerships among a diversity of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders.

Moving From Rhetoric to Action

1. Deepen investments in P/CVE.

- (a) Despite the increasing rhetorical importance that leaders worldwide now attach to P/CVE, specific programming and funding for these efforts continue to lag.⁵⁸ The lion's share of counterterrorism resources continues to be directed to support short-term, tactical efforts.⁵⁹ A commensurate investment in P/CVE is now required, or else the words of support from political leaders will ring hollow, the political and practical momentum will diminish, and the large sums spent on defeating terrorism will not pay the dividends that are badly needed.⁶⁰
- (b) Security assistance budgets should be recalibrated to support P/CVE work, provided that the source of funding for any such work is made transparent and such work is not implemented by the military, security, or intelligence services.⁶¹ Each donor should commit to set aside an appropriate percentage annually of civilian-focused counterterrorism assistance for local or community-led P/CVE initiatives. Development agencies should set aside funds to support P/CVE-specific projects instead of simply relabeling existing programs that are not designed with specific P/CVE objectives.
- (c) The OECD should collect statistical data on official development assistance being spent on P/CVE efforts and then move to set an annual target for its members.
- (d) Further expanding its donor coordination role, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) should develop a user-friendly catalogue of donor investment in P/CVE to stimulate future investment, while reducing duplication of efforts. The GCTF could ask each of its members to report at its annual ministerial meetings on the amount of funding they are allocating to support different types of domestic and, where appropriate, international P/CVE efforts.
- (e) Get businesses on board (box 1).
 - (i) Companies should invest in at-risk communities or offer training, mentorship, and funding to local organizations that can serve as agents of change in their community. Companies can invest in solutions to violent extremism, strengthen institutions, and promote meaningful governmental reforms that can lead to a reduction in levels of violent extremism.
 - (ii) Firms should direct some of their corporate social responsibility projects in marginalized communities toward P/CVE. Empowering women and young people and encouraging intergenerational exchanges can help companies mitigate risk on a more long-term and sustainable basis compared to simply buying insurance.
 - (iii) Governments should look beyond mere direct financial contributions when seeking private sector partnerships and be open to flexible, innovative avenues for collaboration that do not necessarily require a P/CVE label. For example, businesses have

58 Eric Rosand, "The Global CVE Agenda: Can We Move From Talk to Walk?" Brookings Institution, 20 April 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/04/20/the-global-cve-agenda-can-we-move-from-talk-to-walk/>.

59 Eric Rosand, "Investing in Prevention: An Ounce of CVE or a Pound of Counterterrorism?" Brookings Institution, 6 May 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/05/06/investing-in-prevention-an-ounce-of-cve-or-a-pound-of-counterterrorism/>.

60 Eric Rosand, "Minding the Gap: A Multi-Layered Approach to Tackling Violent Extremism," *RUSI Newsbrief* 36, no. 4 (July 2016): 24–26, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/2016_newsbrief_july_rosand.pdf.

61 P/CVE funding, however, should be allowed to support efforts to help security actors better understand how their actions can fuel or prevent violent extremism. In addition, funding from security budgets could be allocated to support research on the drivers of radicalization, particularly in conflict zones or postconflict environments.

Box 1. The Business Case for P/CVE

Businesses are perceived as more politically neutral than most governments, and violent extremism poses a clear threat to the private sector because it disrupts supply chains, drains local labor pools, and endangers employees. The economic costs of terrorism reached €83 billion in 2015—its highest level ever.^a In the wake of the attacks in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in July, for example, Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi and Toyota are withdrawing essential staff and considering scaling back operations there.^b

In the travel industry, according to one report, some 10 percent of U.S. travelers canceled trips due to the recent attacks in Egypt, France, Lebanon, and Mali, which affected more than €7.4 billion in travel spending.^c Air France lost an estimated €50 million, and airlines, hotel chains, and travel websites expe-

rienced drops in their stock prices after this year's airport bombing in Brussels.

The increasing number of smaller-scale terrorist and lone-wolf attacks in cities that were not deemed as potential targets has changed the political risk insurance landscape.^d Terrorism insurance sales have been on the rise in recent years, and more than 60 percent of companies in the United States have terrorism insurance.^e Companies are becoming increasingly aware of the potential direct and indirect losses they can suffer from violent extremist attacks. Private companies can make a strategic investment in prevention efforts, especially in communities where political violence or violent extremism is a concern.^f Such efforts can help companies mitigate risk on a more long-term and sustainable basis compared to simply buying insurance.

^a Institute for Economics and Peace, "Global Terrorism Index 2016," *IEP Report*, no. 43 (November 2016), p. 62, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf>.

^b "Uniqlo Owner Suspends Bangladesh Travel After Terror Attacks," BBC, 4 July 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-36700595>.

^c Marsh, "2016 Terrorism Risk Insurance Report," July 2016, p. 4, <https://www.marsh.com/content/dam/marsh/Documents/PDF/US-en/2016%20Terrorism%20Risk%20Insurance%20Report.pdf>.

^d Amy O'Connor, "Religious Extremists, 'Lone Wolf' Attacks Changing Political Risk Landscape," *Insurance Journal*, 30 June 2016, <http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016/06/30/418692.htm>.

^e Caitlin Bronson, "Orlando Mass Shooting Sparks Interest in Terrorism Insurance," *Insurance Business*, 17 June 2016, <http://www.ibamag.com/us/news/breaking-news/orlando-mass-shooting-sparks-interest-in-terrorism-insurance-33519.aspx>.

^f Ryan B. Greer, "Commentary: Big Business Needs to Step Up in the Fight Against Islamic State," *Reuters*, 17 August 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/commentary-france-greer-idUSKCN10M1XZ>.

marketing and branding expertise that can help position and promote P/CVE programs.⁶²

- (iv) The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) should appoint part-time or volunteer ambassadors from the business world (e.g., former heads of

Fortune 500 companies) to make the case to peers as to why corporations should invest in P/CVE solutions.⁶³

- (f) Leverage the power of private philanthropy. Wealthy individuals and family foundations, which have long supported global peace and justice efforts and do not have large boards with

⁶² A source of good practices could be Shift, which works directly with companies, governments, civil society, investors, and international institutions to implement the "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights," or organizations such as Building Markets that work to connect key sectors and promote economic activity in fragile contexts, including by championing local entrepreneurs and connecting them to new business opportunities. See Shift, "Our Story," n.d., <http://www.shiftproject.org/who-we-are/> (accessed 11 November 2016); Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' Framework," 2011, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; Building Markets, "About Us," n.d., <http://buildingmarkets.org/about-us> (accessed 11 November 2016).

⁶³ GCERF is a public-private partnership "established [in 2014] to serve as the first global effort to support local, community-level initiatives aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas." GCERF, "About Us," n.d., <http://www.gcerf.org/about-us/> (accessed 11 November 2016).

vested interests that need convincing to support new lines of effort, should be engaged in P/CVE work. They may be more willing to take risks and innovate and be better positioned to get money quickly to local partners than other private actors, not to mention often bureaucratically challenged governments and international organizations.

- (g) Generate and share more data on what has and has not worked to prevent, counter, and build resilience against violent extremism and other forms of violence and on how to monitor and measure the effectiveness of P/CVE programs to allocate existing resources better and help bolster the argument for more investments. Lack of knowledge of effective programs is a fundamental problem, leading to underfunding, inefficient use of finite resources, and potentially counterproductive interventions built on received wisdom and politicized assumptions.
 - (i) Build the capacity for independent P/CVE program evaluation. Currently, the vast majority of measurement and evaluation is conducted by the program implementers and is not independent. Where appropriate, funders should allocate additional resources to support third-party evaluation as a standard part of P/CVE programming.
 - (ii) The results of P/CVE program evaluations should be shared among key P/CVE stakeholders to the extent possible. P/CVE programming and the identity of local partners can be sensitive, but the tendency of donors and implementers to restrict access to the results of evaluations inhibits comparative analysis and outside scrutiny of the effectiveness of such efforts.
 - (iii) Donors and implementers should facilitate the timely and regular transmission of information, including evaluation results

and other information about effectiveness in P/CVE and related fields across the P/CVE community.

- (iv) Donors and implementers should develop a catalogue of potential individual factors and community structures that are critical to building resilience against violent extremism that could be promoted through P/CVE efforts.
- (v) Develop a center of excellence for monitoring and evaluation in P/CVE, perhaps linked to an existing platform such as GCERF, the RESOLVE Network,⁶⁴ or Hedayah that could, inter alia, facilitate the implementation of the above recommendations.

2. Focus on objectives and outcomes, not a global definition.

- (a) Given the diversity of P/CVE interests, stakeholders, and approaches, a global definition of P/CVE runs the risk of being so watered down that even if attainable, it is of limited practical utility.
- (b) In the absence of a single definition of P/CVE, the need for conceptual clarity around this work is particularly important to help reduce the confusion around the purpose of P/CVE strategies, policies, and funding. A lack of clarity or overly broad interpretation can, for example, create community-level tensions and generate or exacerbate existing feelings of stigmatization or marginalization.
- (c) In the short term, P/CVE should be defined in relation to its specific end goal: reducing the pool of recruits for terrorist groups, including via their propaganda.
 - (i) P/CVE-specific work would include interventions more directly linked to achieving this stated goal. Examples include programs that build community-led platforms to identify and address local grievances and trust

⁶⁴ The RESOLVE Network is a “global effort that offers an online suite of open-source data, tools, and curated research to help researchers, practitioners and policy makers gain fresh insight into the drivers of violent extremism.” It provides “locally-informed research from the granular level to the 30,000-foot macro view to deepen understanding, simplify research, and promote effective policy.” RESOLVE Network, n.d., <http://www.resolve.net.org/> (accessed 11 November 2016).

between the community and the government and that provide off-ramps for those identified as celebrating terrorist propaganda, for returning foreign fighters, or for members of terrorist groups deemed not to present a security risk to the community.⁶⁵

- (ii) P/CVE-relevant work would include work further upstream, whether on the periphery of communities that terrorist recruiters are targeting or designed to build resilience as opposed to counter violent extremism in those communities.

3. **Design and implement whole-of-society national and, where appropriate, local P/CVE strategies or action plans that take into account “push” and “pull” factors.** Such frameworks should be developed in consultation with all layers of government and representatives from communities and should include implementation roles and funding to support local or community-led efforts to develop tailored, non-law enforcement programs to identify and intervene against early signs of radicalization to violence. Careful attention should be paid to ensuring that such strategies are not used to further political objectives, such as closing nonviolent “extremist” groups that a national government might not like.

Ensuring Coherence Between Counterterrorism and P/CVE Policies and Objectives

1. **Make the strategic case for P/CVE.** Political leaders and national security professionals must do more to refute the false dichotomy between hard

and soft measures and to make the strategic case for a more nuanced approach to P/CVE to national parliaments and at all levels of society.

2. **Recalibrate traditional counterterrorism and broader security partnerships.** Where appropriate, governments should recalibrate their broader security relationships with bilateral partners with a view to matching support for foreign governments with a commitment to reform, including with a view to addressing underlying drivers of violent extremism. For example, preserving tactical counterterrorism cooperation with frontline states should not take priority over addressing human rights abuses and political repression in those countries, which may exacerbate violent extremism.⁶⁶
3. **Properly scope the national definitions of terrorism or violent extremism.** This action must be taken to ensure compliance with human rights and other international law requirements that are too often being used to criminalize the legitimate actions of opposition groups, civil society organizations, and human rights defenders.⁶⁷
4. **Develop a global P/CVE index.**⁶⁸ Governments and local and civil society organizations committed to the whole-of-society approach toward P/CVE, as well as international NGOs, should draw on the Global Terrorism Index and other relevant indexes and jointly launch a biannual P/CVE index.⁶⁹ This index, inter alia, could track states’ risks to violent extremism, aggregate their compliance with existing human rights and other international obligations and norms relevant to strengthening the relationship between the state and the citizens they are meant to protect and to prevent violent extremism, and collect information on steps taken to

65 Eric Rosand, “Taking the Off-Ramp: A Path to Preventing Terrorism,” War on the Rocks, 1 July 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/taking-the-off-ramp-a-path-to-preventing-terrorism/>.

66 “Ethiopia Meets Protests With Bullets,” *Washington Post*, 11 October 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ethiopia-meets-protests-with-bullets/2016/10/11/0f54aa02-8f14-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html?utm_term=.b87ebcdc4683. See also Shannon N. Green and Keith Proctor “Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2016, p. 48, https://csis-ilab.github.io/cve/report/Turning_Point.pdf.

67 Ban PVE plan of action remarks.

68 Eric Rosand and Madeline Rose, “How Close Is ‘Whole of Society’ Movement Against Violent Extremism?” IPI Global Observatory, 16 September 2016, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/09/countering-violent-extremism-terrorism-united-nations/>.

69 For the Global Terrorism Index, see the Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2016,” *IEP Report*, no. 43 (November 2016), <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.pdf>. The UN Universal Periodic Review, the Global Peace Index, the Freedom House indices, and Transparency International’s corruption perception index are among the models that could inform a P/CVE index.

implement the UN Secretary-General’s PVE plan of action. Among other things, the index could draw on local civil society organizations’ recommendations regarding the indicators to assess; be informed by data being generated by GCERF and Hedayah and other relevant organizations on what is and is not working to build resilience to violent extremism in different communities; include an independent evaluation of relevant national legislation, whether focused on terrorism and violent extremism or civil society; and contain an “innovation” section containing new, big ideas that could be implemented. The goal should be to announce the launch of this index, with a layout of the indicators that will be assessed, on the margins of the September 2017 UN General Assembly meetings in New York, with the first complete index published in 2018.

Moving From a State-centric to a Community-centric Approach

1. **Deepen national-level investment in community-level solutions and break down barriers to effective vertical, i.e., national-subnational, cooperation on P/CVE issues.** National governments should
 - (a) increase the involvement of local authorities in conversations about national security,
 - (b) provide incentives for local authorities to work with their communities to develop innovative policies and programs to build resilience against violent extremism,
 - (c) include representatives of local authorities in the development and implementation of national P/CVE frameworks and coordination mechanisms, and
 - (d) include representatives of local authorities in relevant security and broader foreign policy dialogues.
2. **“Desecuritize” P/CVE.**⁷⁰
 - (a) P/CVE efforts should not be driven by the same governmental agencies that gather intelligence and investigate crime.⁷¹ Keeping these efforts separated while allowing for some connectivity between them, where appropriate, is essential for building the trust and cooperation of local communities.
 - (b) Depending on the type of P/CVE initiative, some “connective tissue” with law enforcement might be necessary, particularly to deal with instances with an imminent risk of violence in a pre-crime prevention or intervention program.
3. **Adopt, where appropriate, a public health or other non-law enforcement or criminal justice framework.**⁷² This can facilitate efforts to involve health and social service professionals, educators, teachers, and religious leaders and allow for the development of the necessary multidisciplinary and multiagency approach to P/CVE at the local level. Such a framing also can facilitate efforts to integrate P/CVE into existing community-level structures and initiatives.
4. **Avoid instrumentalizing non-law enforcement actors involved in P/CVE or creating the impression that they are working for or serving law enforcement or other security agendas.** To reduce the risk that communities will feel that they are being securitized, governmental funding for community-based programs aimed at building social cohesion or resilience to violent extremism that do not rely on law enforcement should not come from a law enforcement or security agency.
5. **Invest in a “community center, hub and spokes” approach for P/CVE that relies on a local “backbone” organization to manage the center and coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the various programs and other services that would be offered to the target community.** Among other things, the center would offer services and programs aimed at identifying individual and communal indicators of violent extremism and other forms of violence or illicit behavior of concern to the community, identifying grievances and building trust

70 The Prevention Project and GCERF, “Opportunities and Challenges for Mobilizing Resources for Preventing Violent Extremism,” p. 4.

71 Robert L. McKenzie, “Countering Violent Extremism in America: Policy Recommendations for the Next President,” Brookings Institution, 18 October 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/countering-violent-extremism-in-america-policy-recommendations-for-the-next-president/>.

72 National Security Critical Issues Task Force, “Countering Violent Extremism: Applying the Public Health Model,” Georgetown Security Studies Review, October 2016, <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NSCITF-Report-on-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf>.

between local authorities and the community, and designing and implementing tailored interventions to steer at-risk individuals away from violence and toward positive alternatives.

- (a) Frame programs around concerns as viewed by the community rather than donors, national authorities, international organizations, or NGOs. Programs should offer a variety of treatments and programs for at-risk individuals referred to or otherwise part of the relevant programs and on changing behavior, not ideology.
- (b) Pool donor resources, where appropriate, to develop and implement community center, hub and spokes approaches in relevant communities. This would involve, inter alia, providing funding and capacity-building support to an existing local organization to serve as the backbone organization for the program and supporting individual but integrated programs that could be delivered at, by, or otherwise linked to the center.
- (c) Build on existing structures, where appropriate. In some instances, including for political or perception reasons, communities may be reluctant to host or lead a “P/CVE platform” or the level of threat may not justify it. In these cases, integrating P/CVE into a broader, perhaps already existing entity that addresses the top priorities of the community (e.g., violence, drugs, mental health, education) should be encouraged.
- (d) Ensure specialized P/CVE training. When integrating P/CVE into an existing community-led platform, there may be a need to make sure that those running the platform receive the necessary specialized training on P/CVE.

6. Create more national, regional, and cross-regional networking opportunities for non-law

enforcement professionals, including family members, women, and community leaders, who are interested in learning how to identify and address early signs of radicalization.

This could be done through leveraging existing networks in related fields such as crime or drug prevention, mental health, human trafficking, or child trauma, more informally, or the formation of dedicated national violence prevention networks as appropriate.⁷³ National and regional violence prevention networks could draw lessons from the EU Radicalization Awareness Network and existing national networks in relevant fields.⁷⁴ Where appropriate, they could be anchored in public, non-law enforcement governmental agencies (e.g., public health or education) and connected to each other via the Strong Cities Network.

Empowering Cities and Civil Society

1. **Provide civil society with the political and legal space to contribute to P/CVE efforts, recognizing that too many governments continue to crack down on civil society’s operating space and freedoms in the name or under the pretense of countering terrorism or violent extremism.**⁷⁵ National counterterrorism legislation should be reviewed to ensure it does not adversely affect civil society’s ability to support and deliver local P/CVE interventions, some of which need to target “former” extremists and “defectors” if they are to have impact.⁷⁶
2. **Ensure that the international AML/CFT regime and national AML/CFT frameworks do not negatively affect the ability of civil society organizations to access funding to support P/CVE efforts.**⁷⁷

73 Eric Rosand, “Communities First: A National Prevention Network to Defeat ISIS,” *Hill*, 2 August 2016, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/290046-communities-first-a-national-prevention-network-to>.

74 European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN),” 13 October 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm.

75 Kenneth Roth, “The Great Civil Society Choke-Out,” Human Rights Watch, 27 January 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/27/great-civil-society-choke-out>.

76 *Ibid.* For example, one of the unintended consequences of the overly broad U.S. law that prohibits the provision of “material support” to terrorism is that NGOs operating in conflict zones where foreign terrorist organizations operate are often unable to work in the areas where the need is greatest or partner with the most locally influential organizations because of the risk of being charged. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.

77 Royal United Services Institute and The Prevention Project, “CVE Practitioner Workshop: Opportunities and Challenges for Civil Society in Pushing Back Against Violent Extremism,” n.d., <http://www.organizingagainste.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Formatted-CVE-Practitioner-Conference.pdf> (summary of 26–27 July 2016 meeting).

3. Organize civil society around the P/CVE agenda better by strengthening existing civil society networks and, where appropriate, supporting the development of new ones (appendix table 1).

- (a) Given the growing number of P/CVE projects, whether labeled as such or not, led by civil society organizations, the need for greater horizontal networking among these organizations in this area continues to grow (appendix table 2). In addition, although civil society organizations often find themselves having to compete for limited donor funds, greater collaboration among these organizations should be encouraged and, where appropriate, incentivized.
- (b) Where appropriate, specialized, locally owned P/CVE networks could be created to connect and amplify community-led P/CVE efforts at the national, regional, and global levels.⁷⁸

Moving Toward More Strategic Donor Engagement

1. Ensure that P/CVE policies and programs are more responsive to local demands and locally owned.

- (a) Donors should move away from short-term contracts and support longer-term programs run by civil society organizations and, where possible, provide them with core funding to develop their capacity. This will position them better to become self-sustainable entities and agents of change.
- (b) Donors should ensure that local voices are integrated at every stage of programming, from design to implementation to monitoring. This could include the formation of community and civil society advisory committees to

ensure donors receive inputs from independent civil society groups when identifying funding priorities.

2. Experiment and take more risks when deciding which P/CVE projects and community-based organizations to support.

- (a) Donors should support the most “credible” civil society organizations. Donors should make a more concerted effort to support directly or indirectly those local P/CVE actors with a track record of good governance and as trustworthy partners on the ground.
- (b) Donors should not support only government-friendly civil society organizations.⁷⁹ The most effective P/CVE actors can often be groups that want to safeguard their independence from governments and thus will be reluctant to receive funding from any government. They may be perceived as politically motivated movements, be labeled “violent extremists” by the host government, or be extremist groups that might agree with the donor community on the evils of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant but little else. Donors should also take into account that some nonviolent extremists, although against violent extremist groups such as the Islamic State, may nevertheless be contributing to an environment that can produce violent extremism by advocating positions or advancing ideas that undermine efforts to promote tolerance and peace.
- (c) Donors should consider the extent to which the host government should be consulted before deciding which local organizations to fund, recognizing that giving national capitals a veto can make it difficult to fund those groups most likely to have the greatest credibility in marginalized communities. At the same time, that

78 Regional, P/CVE-focused civil society organization networks are being developed in the Horn of Africa, as well as West Africa and the western Balkans. Global Center, “Horn of Africa Civil Society Organization Hub,” October 2016, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/16Oct27_Horn-of-Africa-CSO-Hub_Synopsis.pdf.

79 Examples include QUANGOs (quasi-autonomous NGOs) and GONGOs (government-organized NGOs). Alan Pifer, “Letter: On Quasi-Public Organizations; Whence Came the Quango, and Why,” *New York Times*, 5 September 1987, <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/05/opinion/l-letter-on-quasi-public-organizations-whence-came-the-quango-and-why-969587.html?pagewanted=1>; Moises Naim, “What Is a GONGO?” *Foreign Policy*, 13 October 2009, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/what-is-a-gongo/>.

partnership with or at least acquiescence by the government can be critical to the success and sustainability of the relevant initiative.

3. **Ensure an integrated approach to P/CVE that includes a comprehensive assessment of the drivers of violent extremism in the relevant community, drawing on existing and local research whenever possible, and the development and funding of an integrated set of locally led interventions to address the range of drivers.** In most cases, this will require pulling together interventions that have different labels (e.g., P/CVE specific or relevant, peacebuilding, human rights, education, and conflict resolution), depending on the local sensitivities and the source of funding within the donor government, and taking into account programs being supported by different agencies within the particular donor government, as well as other governmental and nongovernmental donors.
4. **Match P/CVE program funding with the use of diplomatic and political influence.** P/CVE is not simply a matter of funding programs; it must also emphasize that how governments treat their citizens matters when it comes to effectively addressing terrorist threats and reducing violent extremism.⁸⁰ P/CVE programming must be matched with the use of diplomatic and political influence to ensure that partner governments live up to their commitments in that regard and build trust with and invest in marginalized and vulnerable communities.
5. **Ensure there is a research component for all local P/CVE programs, as opposed to developing or funding a program based on an intuitive sense that more jobs or better schools must be beneficial.**

Integrating Into Broader P/CVE Efforts Countermessaging and Other Communications Efforts to Dissuade Potential Recruits and Delegitimize Violent Extremist Organizations

1. **Acknowledge some of the reasons why countermessaging and broader counternarrative work have attracted a disproportionate amount of attention in the wider P/CVE effort.** For example, this topic is easier for bilateral and other intergovernmental discussion because it focuses attention on the violent extremists' ideology and propaganda, thus ignoring the role that governments play in creating the structural, or "push," factors that can make individuals more susceptible to recruitment. In addition, countermessaging can be used for regime propaganda in the case of authoritarian governments. Further, it is more concrete and short term than broader P/CVE work and thus lends itself to easier measurement.
2. **Integrate countermessaging and other counternarrative work into broader P/CVE efforts and complement with opportunities for alternative courses of action.** Messaging is rarely the start of the radicalization process, and it alone cannot steer young people away from violence.⁸¹ Countermessaging and other counternarrative programs must be integrated strategically and bureaucratically within broader P/CVE efforts to address the underlying drivers of radicalization directly, i.e., the local grievances making individuals susceptible to the message of extremists. Online campaigns should be paired with offline support and resources for at-risk individuals, parents, peers, and

80 Despite data increasingly showing that marginalization, poor governance, and state-sponsored violence are among the most prevalent drivers of violent extremism, where such factors are identified as key drivers of violent extremism, the reform of governing institutions, end of corruption, implementation of bold policies of inclusion and reconciliation, and acceptance of local communities as critical partners in preventing their young people from being recruited into or inspired by terrorist groups should be part of the broader counterterrorism and security dialogues. David Robinson, remarks at session II of the Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism on addressing the drivers of violent extremism, 7 April 2016, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org/counterterrorism.ctitf/files/USA%20Robinson_Panel2_April7_0.pdf.

81 Kate Ferguson, "Countering Violent Extremism Through Media and Communication Strategies: A Review of the Evidence," Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research, 1 March 2016, pp. 25–26, <http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf>.

community professionals to offer guidance on dealing with an at-risk community or family member.⁸²

3. **Focus a higher proportion of P/CVE efforts on interventions to address the underlying problems directly, i.e., the local grievances that are more often than not making individuals susceptible to the message, as opposed to countermessaging.**
4. **Identify and empower credible, independent voices to counter extremist messaging.** Governments should scale up work with professionals outside of government to train and support credible messengers, including former extremists and survivors, allowing them to remain independent and unaffiliated with government or the private sector.⁸³ Efforts to engage with “formers,” however, should be mindful of the associated risks (e.g., they might unwittingly encourage people to join the violent extremist cause).
5. **Focus on identifying and empowering credible, independent voices to counter extremist messaging.** Governments should seed but not guide, whether directly or indirectly, those efforts.⁸⁴
6. **Align and integrate efforts to identify and support credible, independent “countermessengers” better and network them with local civil society organizations that are leading initiatives aimed at addressing local drivers of violent extremism and creating alternative pathways for young people being targeted by violent extremist propaganda.**⁸⁵ This could involve, inter alia, developing new or leveraging existing mechanisms, such as the GCTF or the Strong Cities Network, to bring together key influencers (e.g., “formers,” “defectors,” returning foreign fighters, or survivors) across the globe, including people displaced or harmed by terrorist groups who can take the fight to them, particularly via face-to-face interactions.

7. **Support nongovernmental efforts to understand online and offline radicalization.** Governments should increase support for research to better understand what fuels support for terrorist propaganda and what makes communities resilient to its influence. There is a particular need for increased understanding about the ways in which audiences are actually engaging with the online material disseminated by violent extremists. Currently, too much of the research in this space lacks empirical data and makes assumptions about the passivity of audience receptivity of the messages and content. Without improving knowledge about the ways in which audiences engage and use violent extremist material, it is difficult to develop effective counter- or alternative messages and strategies. VOX-Pol, an EU-funded academic research network focused on violent online political extremism and responses, is developing a knowledge bank of all work being completed in this space.⁸⁶ These and other relevant research findings, particularly related to offline radicalizations, should be shared with academics, civil society organizations, and policymakers.

Taking the Off-Ramp: A Path to Prevention, Intervention, and Rehabilitation and Reintegration

1. **Recalibrate from the traditional zero tolerance approach taken with terrorism and allow for more risk-taking when it comes to the development of off-ramps.**
2. **Put in place legal and policy frameworks that create the space for the development of off-ramp programs and provide participants with a clear understanding of how they work and legal guarantees of fair treatment, as well as delineating**

82 Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Ties That Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds,” *CTC Sentinel* 9, no. 2 (February 2016): 15–17, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss210.pdf>.

83 International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, “The Power of the Swarm: Where Next for Counter-Messaging?” 12 July 2016, <http://icsr.info/2016/07/icsr-insight-power-swarm-next-counter-messaging/>.

84 Ibid.

85 Rosenblatt, “All Jihad Is Local.”

86 VOX-Pol, “About Us,” n.d., <http://www.voxpol.eu/> (accessed 11 November 2016).

a clear role for civil society organizations and professionals.

3. **Put in place national-level protections and disseminate policy guidance to the relevant practitioners and professionals.** In particular, the role, if any, of law enforcement and the security services should be clearly spelled out.⁸⁷ This includes when a mental health or social work professional in an off-ramp program must report an individual to them (e.g., only in cases of imminent violence). In higher-risk environments, the frameworks should ensure the necessary security and aftercare to mitigate the chance of retribution from members of the violent group from which the individual is seeking to separate. A multilateral platform such as the GCTF should develop best practice guidance to countries in this area, which can inform the delivery of technical assistance to interested governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders.
4. **Raise awareness among criminal justice officials and practitioners, as well as the wider public, to make clear that off-ramp programs do not mean being “soft” on security but rather are a successful outcome of the criminal process and one that will lead to a reduction of the threat if implemented properly.**
5. **Recognize the diversity of actors that can benefit from appropriate off-ramp programs and the corresponding need to develop multidisciplinary programs tailored for the particular target audience and environment (e.g., pre- or postcriminal space).** These programs can be developed for every stage of the radicalization life cycle—early stage prevention, intervention, diversion, and rehabilitation and reintegration—and for a range of actors. This includes at-risk youth whom have yet to celebrate terrorist propaganda, those

who have come to the attention of law enforcement or have been arrested and charged with a terrorism offense, violent extremist offenders nearing the end of their prison sentence, and returning FTFs deemed not to pose a security risk.

6. **Consider, where appropriate, allowing judges to issue reduced or alternative sentences for violent extremist offenders provided that such individuals agree to participate in a rehabilitation or reintegration program.**
7. **Base the partnership with the community members involved in off-ramp and other local P/CVE programs on trust, particularly where law enforcement is involved.** Sustained engagement between communities and local police and local authorities more broadly is critical to building trust.⁸⁸ Community-oriented policing programs and training, geared to building sustainable relationships between local police and the communities they serve and thus making public safety a collective endeavor, should be part of a comprehensive P/CVE strategy.⁸⁹
8. **Ensure a commitment to program evaluation in the development and implementation of off-ramp programs.** More systematic data should be gathered and shared across all stages of off-ramp programs, metric-based frameworks should be developed to define and measure what “success” means, and clear objectives should be set when designing these programs.

Improving International Cooperation and Ensuring the International Architecture Is Fit for Purpose

1. **Multilateral fora such as the United Nations, regional organizations, and the GCTF should**

⁸⁷ The extent of law enforcement’s involvement in off-ramp programs will likely vary depending on the type of program, with increased involvement when the program is focused on individuals who have already been brought to the attention of law enforcement and have been arrested, convicted of a crime, or incarcerated. In some instances, however, law enforcement involvement, such as in an early-stage prevention program, where individuals may be reluctant to participate if the police are involved, may not be appropriate and may be counterproductive.

⁸⁸ Georgia Holmer and Fulco van Deventer, “Inclusive Approaches to Community Policing and CVE,” *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, no. 352 (September 2014), pp. 2–4, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR352_Inclusive-Approaches-to-Community-Policing-and-CVE.pdf.

⁸⁹ Cameron Sumpter, “Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: Evident Potential and Challenging Realities,” *RSIS Policy Report*, September 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PR160922_Community-Policing-for-CVE.pdf.

do more to engage local actors on an ongoing basis on counterterrorism and P/CVE.⁹⁰ To that end, they should

- (a) encourage the meaningful involvement of subnational stakeholders in national counterterrorism and P/CVE discussions;
- (b) constitute, where appropriate, civil society working groups comprised of international NGOs and local civil society organizations involved in P/CVE work, which could feed into and inform relevant intergovernmental discussions; and
- (c) mobilize capacity-building resources to support the strengthening of subnational capacities—whether municipal authorities or civil society.

2. Ensure local needs and priorities are more fully reflected in global P/CVE discussions.⁹¹

International NGOs should do more to ensure that global P/CVE conversations, including at the United Nations, are informed by what is happening on the ground and vice versa. Develop an independent, international civil society P/CVE steering group coordinated from New York. This new group could be linked to an existing organization or platform such as the Global Solutions Exchange, which was launched in September 2016 in New York.⁹²

Such a group could, inter alia,

- (a) elevate and amplify local voices in global, regional, and national PVE policy conversations and advocate for whole-of-society approaches to PVE in these contexts, such voices too often absent or otherwise not heard;
- (b) connect, including through a dedicated website and secure platform, the growing number of existing networks, including global and regional PVE or PVE-related civil society and other subnational ones that have been launched over the

past few years with a focus on discrete issues or a segment of nongovernmental or subnational PVE stakeholders;

- (c) conduct advocacy at the global, regional, and national levels in support of the whole-of-society PVE agenda;
- (d) convene local civil society practitioners around different elements of the PVE agenda to ensure that community resilience is genuine (locally owned and led) and sustainable;
- (e) play a central role in developing and managing the global P/CVE index referred to earlier, which would include a scorecard to assess the implementation of the P/CVE commitments national governments are making at the United Nations; and
- (f) generate and disseminate good practices, including for national governments, across a range of PVE issues but from the perspective of civil society. This could be linked to the global index to help ensure that its findings are acted on so that governments that have a low score are encouraged to improve that score and that more positive practices in one country or community are shared, adapted, and adopted by others.

3. Strengthen support for existing subnational and nongovernmental cooperation and collaboration platforms.

Over the past 18 months, new global and regional P/CVE networks focused on bringing cities and local researchers together and regional platforms oriented toward connecting youth, women, and other civil society players, including those working on rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorist offenders and returning foreign fighters, have been launched.⁹³ Greater networking and collaboration opportunities for these

90 Eric Rosand, “21st Century International CVE Cooperation,” *Global Center on Cooperative Security Policy Brief*, June 2016, <http://www.organizingagainstve.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/21st-Century-International-CVE-Cooperation.pdf>.

91 Ibid.

92 The Global Solutions Exchange is a platform launched in September 2016 to facilitate regular interaction and dialogue on issues, ideas, and solutions between senior representatives of government and independent civil society organizations, including members of the Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL), that have experience in P/CVE. Norwegian Office of the Prime Minister, UN Women, and WASL, “Global Leadership – Local Partnerships: Women’s Leadership and Gender Perspectives on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism; Concept Note,” 20 September 2016, p. 3, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56706b861c121098acf6e2e8/t/57d1fca237c581b8cb63bc70/1473379500154/Concept+note+060916.pdf>.

93 Global Center and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, “Call For Proposals: Engaging Civil Society Actors in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders and Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” October 2016, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/16Jul20_CFP_EN.pdf.

subnational platforms, including via the GCTF CVE working group⁹⁴ or other existing platforms, should be facilitated.

4. **Leverage existing mechanisms to achieve greater coordination among different global P/CVE donors and actors.** An informal “community of practice” of a subset of P/CVE development practitioners from a handful of development agencies has been launched under EU and U.S. leadership to address some of these gaps.⁹⁵ Yet, consideration should be given to creating something more permanent, with staff whose full-time responsibility includes operation of the platform, and inclusive, including practitioners from the counterterrorism and development communities, perhaps linked to the GCTF, GCERF, or another existing multilateral platform.
5. **Address the “stove-piping” and lack of synergy that exists across the UN system, including in the field, and governmental bureaucracies when**

it comes to funding and engaging in the different thematic areas that make up the P/CVE agenda. For example, in the United Nations, a growing number of agencies are now designing and implementing P/CVE-specific and P/CVE-relevant programs. Far too often, however, these are either counterterrorism or development programs that have simply been relabeled as P/CVE. Moreover, this is being done too often in isolation from other relevant agencies, let alone non-UN implementers. Moreover, this is not based on a common, coordinated assessment of the P/CVE needs and priorities of the targeted country.

6. **Update the mandates and priorities of existing multilateral P/CVE institutions and platforms periodically to ensure they are learning lessons from and keeping pace with the rapidly evolving P/CVE field and are as mutually reinforcing and complementary as possible (boxes 2–5).**⁹⁶

Box 2. Recommendations for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)

1. Allow for more targeted fundraising around thematic or country priorities. Individual donors should not be allowed to direct funding to specific community-based organizations. Such decisions should remain with the GCERF board.
2. Devolve more authority from the GCERF Governing Board to the organization’s secretariat. The board should focus on providing the necessary strategic direction and avoid the temptation to micromanage funding decisions, providing more discretionary authority to the executive director for grant approvals.
3. Streamline the grant-making process going forward, including by allocating more resources to the fast-track Accelerated Funding Mechanism.
4. Focus more on enabling small, community-based organizations to access international GCERF funds, including by working with local private sector partners to build the capacity of such organizations.
5. Establish a field presence in key countries or regions to better position GCERF to build trust and partnerships with the growing number of national and local preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) stakeholders.
6. Ensure that GCERF becomes a resource for the broader P/CVE community at every level, including the United Nations.

94 GCTF, “Countering Violent Extremism,” n.d., <https://www.thegctf.org/Working-Groups/Countering-Violent-Extremism> (accessed 12 November 2016).

95 Susan Reichle, statement before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 12 April 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/apr-12-2016-susan-reichle-counselor-sacfo-countering-violent-extremism>.

96 For recommendations concerning the role of the United Nations in P/CVE, see Alistair Millar and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Blue Sky III: Taking UN Counterterrorism Efforts in the Next Decade From Plans to Action,” Global Center, September 2016, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Blue-Sky-III_low-res.pdf.

Box 3. Recommendations for Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism

1. Narrow the focus of effort to those where Hedayah has developed or should develop unique expertise and comparative advantages over other preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) actors. These include national P/CVE strategy development, P/CVE counternarrative resources and training, and education and P/CVE and issues related to the intersection of religion and P/CVE.
2. Focus on providing capacity-building assistance rather than project funding to local civil society organizations to better position them to receive and implement Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and other grants.
3. Focus on providing capacity-building assistance to local civil society organizations to better position them to receive and implement GCERF and other grants.
4. Position the new P/CVE National Action Plans Task Force,^a established in partnership with the Global Center on Cooperative Security, to serve as a global hub to support the development and implementation of national P/CVE strategies and plans of actions. Leverage the necessary diplomatic and other political tools to ensure governments do not put in place problematic strategies that are not consistent with an inclusive, “whole of society” effort that is not dominated by law enforcement.
5. Encourage Hedayah’s growing orientation toward the Middle East and North Africa, and more broadly, encourage Hedayah to adopt a regional focus to its work.
6. Focus more attention on developing P/CVE technical assistance and other capacity-building tools (e.g., mentoring) that others can leverage.

^a Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, “Launch of the PCVE National Action Plans Task Force and Increased UK Support,” n.d., <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/activities/80/activities/511/2016/659/launch-of-the-pcve-national-action-plans-task-force-and-increased-uk-support> (accessed 12 November 2016).

Box 4. Recommendations for the Strong Cities Network

1. Facilitate specialized online and offline training and other capacity building for local authorities and communities interested in developing locally led programs and policies, including through short- and long-term, city-to-city exchanges and pairings, shared thinking, and expertise between two or more cities.
2. Mobilize public and private resources to activate an innovation fund to help kick-start local authority-led, multidisciplinary wraparound and other programs, with a particular focus on matching local authority contributions to ensure a local investment and commitment to such programming.
3. Focus more attention on local authority action plan and strategy development to build resilience and social cohesion to prevent violent extremism and related challenges, as seen through the lens of local authorities.
4. Devote more attention to identifying and overcoming the challenges to vertical cooperation and integration and to understanding how national governments have developed mechanisms to structure their support for and engagement with local communities.
5. Prioritize highlighting the unique role of cities in addressing the twin challenges of migration and violent extremism, recognizing that a growing number of local authorities are on the frontlines of and are developing innovative solutions for dealing with both threats.

Box 5. The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IJ)

Although designed to build the criminal justice-related counterterrorism capacities of countries in the Middle East, North Africa, West Africa, and East Africa, as well as the western Balkans, there are a number of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) topics linked to the justice sector, where the IJJ has a comparative advantage. These include

- how justice systems address the increasing number of people under the age of 18 who are being targeted by terrorist recruiters or have traveled or attempted to travel to support terrorist groups in conflict zones in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere;
- rehabilitation and reintegration programs for use by the criminal justice sector in cases involving violent extremism; and
- legal and policy frameworks that create the necessary space for the development of justice sector-related “off-ramp” programs (e.g., ones in lieu of prosecution or involving alternative or reduced sentencing).

APPENDIX

Table A-1. Examples of P/CVE-Specific or P/CVE-Relevant Initiatives Led by Civil Society Organizations

THEME	NETWORK	GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS	URL	FOCUS
Messaging	Awake the World	Global	http://www.awaketheworld.org/	A group involving university students that develop and execute campaigns and social media strategies against extremism that are credible, authentic, and believable to their peers and resonate within their communities.
Messaging	Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE)	Kenya	http://www.braveprogram.org/	A nongovernmental organization (NGO) that works to address misuse of religion for violent extremist ends, focusing on actions to prevent recruitment, legitimization of extremist ideologies, and intimidation by extremist groups.
Messaging	I Am Your Protector	Global	http://www.iamyourprotector.org/	An NGO that amplifies stories showing people standing for one another across religion, race, gender, and beliefs and that conducts art and education campaigns in addition to outreach to universities and schools.
Messaging	My Jihad	United States	http://myjihad.org/	A public education campaign that seeks to share the proper meaning of jihad as believed and practiced by the majority of Muslims.
Messaging	See It, Report It	Global	http://seeitreportit.org/	An NGO that aims to eradicate hate speech and extremism from social media platforms, providing a simple step-by-step guide on how to report extremist posts on social media.
Messaging	#NotInMyName	Global	http://isisnotinmyname.com/	A campaign launched by the Active Change Foundation that aims to fight the extremist distortion of Islam that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is disseminating using social media with the hashtag #NotInMyName.
Prevention	The Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)	United Kingdom and Somalia	http://theatm.org/	An NGO that aims at educating and raising awareness about the effects of tribalism within communities, connecting youth in each country to create opportunities for dialogue and promote peace and tolerance.
Prevention	Canadian Friends of Somalia	Canada	http://www.canadianfriendsofsomalia.org/	An NGO that focuses on supporting the Somali-Canadian community, developing, coordinating, and delivering effective social, community, health, and settlement and integration services.
Prevention	Cooperation for Peace and Unity Afghanistan	Afghanistan	http://cpau.org.af/	An NGO that aims to strengthen peace and tolerance by improving the resilience of vulnerable populations through educational programs to decrease illiteracy and that aims to empower civil society and use effective strategic messaging to promote mainstream religious knowledge and narratives.
Prevention	Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre	Somalia and Canada	https://www.facebook.com/ElmanPeaceHRC/	A center that promotes human rights and peaceful coexistence, seeks equal opportunities for the most vulnerable members of society, and envisions alternative livelihoods for war-affected Somalis.
Prevention	Equality for Peace and Democracy (EPD)	Afghanistan	http://www.epd-afg.org/	An NGO that empowers women and young people at the community and policy levels by building coalitions and advocacy networks and promoting human rights, peace, and good governance.
Prevention	Generations for Peace	Global	http://www.generationsforpeace.org/en/	An NGO dedicated to sustainable conflict transformation at the local level, empowering volunteer youth leaders to promote tolerance and responsible citizenship in communities experiencing different forms of conflict and violence.

THEME	NETWORK	GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS	URL	FOCUS
Prevention	Haki Africa	Kenya	http://www.hakiafrica.or.ke/index.php/en/	An NGO that promotes partnerships between state and nonstate actors to improve the well-being of communities and ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Prevention	International Alert	Lebanon	http://www.international-alert.org/lebanon	An NGO that aims to strengthen the resilience of local communities, political actors, and institutions to conflict, supporting collaboration between security agencies and communities to build resilience and reduce the risk of spillover effects from the conflict in Syria.
Prevention	Just Unity	Norway	http://www.justunity.no/	An NGO that offers customized courses, lectures, and workshops for students, teachers, local authorities, police, businesses, and organizations to prevent radicalization and extremism among youth.
Prevention	Konrad Adenaeur Stiftung	Indonesia	http://www.kas.de/indonesien/en/	A foundation that aims to reinforce and help Islamic schools realize their responsibility as influential actors of local civil society and thus lead to peaceful dialogue and coexistence with religious minority groups.
Prevention	The Kosovo Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)	Kosovo	http://www.qkss.org/en/Home	A center that conducts research on the causes and consequences of citizens' involvement as foreign fighters and implements projects focused on raising awareness at the local level about the threat of violent extremism.
Prevention	Mercy Corps	Jordan	https://www.mercycorps.org/countries/jordan	An NGO that prevents radicalization through engagement with vulnerable youth and communities through local grassroots-level interventions.
Prevention	PAIMAN Alumni Trust	Pakistan	http://paimantrust.org/	An NGO that reaches out to women and young people in conflict-ridden regions through awareness of the impacts of radicalization and extremism on their lives and the role they can play in combating it.
Prevention	PAVE – MyHack	Australia	http://www.myhack.org.au/	An NGO that brings groups of young people, called Hack Teams, together to use their skills, knowledge, and know-how to develop innovative solutions to countering violent extremism.
Prevention	S.A.V.E. Belgium – Society Against Violent Extremism	Belgium	http://www.savebelgium.org/	An NGO that aims to fight all forms of violent radicalization by creating networks of prevention and awareness, promoting educational networks in schools about preventing violent extremism.
Prevention	Search for Common Ground	Kyrgyzstan	https://www.sfcg.org/kyrgyzstan/	A group that works to promote a culture of tolerance and collaborative problem-solving, supporting reconciliation through innovative media and governance tools and fostering dialogue between religious and community leaders and local and national government bodies.
Prevention	Search for Common Ground	Nigeria	https://www.sfcg.org/nigeria/	An NGO that aims to strengthen the capacity of state and local actors to secure their communities and increase dialogue and outreach by religious leaders, youth, and women to reduce societal tensions and grievances.
Prevention	Transnational Initiative Countering Violent Extremism (TICVE)	Morocco and Mali	http://ticve.org/	An initiative that promotes sustainable peace through building youth resilience in communities susceptible to radicalization, working with Koranic schools that adopt a literalist religious approach to change the curriculum, including the introduction of more philosophical texts to emphasize critical thinking.
Prevention	Victorian Arabic Social Services (VASS)	Australia	http://vass.org.au/	A community-based organization that provides support to people of Arabic-speaking-background communities in Victoria, providing a range of support including counseling, case work, referrals, advocacy, community development, and mediation.

THEME	NETWORK	GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS	URL	FOCUS
Prevention and intervention	Royal United Services Institute – Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE)	Kenya and Somalia	https://rusi.org/rusi-news/rusi-implement-project-counter-violent-extremism-european-union	A three-year project that aims to understand the drivers of violent extremism through evidence-based analysis to develop best practices around programming on preventing and countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa based on short pilot activities and to provide recommendations allowing for increased impact and more focused interventions.
Prevention and intervention	World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE)	United States	http://www.worde.org/	An NGO that developed a community-led public safety model focused on generating public awareness about the risk factors of violent extremism and empowering the appropriate figures to intervene with vulnerable individuals before they choose a path of violence.
Prevention and rehabilitation	African Prisons Project	Uganda	http://africanprisons.org/	A project that supports prisoners in Kenya, Uganda, and across Africa through health care, education, justice, and reintegration programs.
Prevention and rehabilitation	Straathoekwerk in Zaanstad (SWZ)	The Netherlands	http://www.ggdzw.nl/jongeren/straathoekwerk	An NGO of trained social workers who reach out to at-risk young people who are entangled in problems of addiction, housing, jobs, and social life and show signs of radicalization and violence.
Prevention and rehabilitation	Violence Prevention Network (VPN)	Germany	http://www.violence-prevention-network.de/de/	A network that works in prevention and first-line deradicalization with people that are susceptible to violent right-wing extremism or religious fundamentalism.
Rehabilitation	EXIT USA	United States	https://twitter.com/exitusateam	An NGO that provides ongoing support for members of violent hate groups who want to change their lives.
Religious leaders	Berghof Foundation	Lebanon	http://www.berghof-foundation.org/programmes/middle-east-north-africa/	A foundation that engages and partners with key local religious institutions to counter violent extremism by mitigating the appeal of radical ideas and promoting moderate narratives.
Religious leaders	Religious Rehabilitation Group in Singapore (RRG)	Singapore	http://www.rrg.sg/	A voluntary group consisting of individual <i>ulama</i> and a community of <i>asatizah</i> (Islamic scholars and teachers) with a mission to correct the misinterpretation of Islamic concepts and dispel extremist indoctrination.
Support for mothers	Mothers MOVE! (Mothers Opposing Violent Extremism)	Global	http://www.women-without-borders.org/projects/underway/35/	An NGO that provides mothers the encouragement, support, and necessary tools to protect their children from the threat of violent extremism.
Supporting families impacted by terrorism	Aliansi Indonesia Damai (Alliance for a Peaceful Indonesia) (AIDA)	Indonesia	http://victimsvoices.community/about.html	An NGO that seeks to empower victims of terrorist attacks in Indonesia through their personal stories of survival, forgiveness, and triumph over adversity in order to convince youths and other at-risk communities to steer clear of violent tactics to achieve political goals.
Supporting families impacted by terrorism	Tuesday's Children	United States	http://www.tuesdayschildren.org/	An NGO that works on the front lines of unimaginable tragedies, providing personalized support and a safe “landing place” to traumatized, grief-stricken children, families, and communities left reeling from terrorism or traumatic loss.
Women	Fempower	Global	http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/outreach/fempower/	An outreach program on gender extremism addressing women's grievances through community engagement, clear communication of policy, and better reporting structures for anti-Muslim hatred and gender extremism and equipping women, especially mothers, with tools to challenge extremist narratives.
Women	Inspire	UK	http://www.wewillinspire.com/	An NGO that seeks to empower women, address inequalities, and create positive social change for a more democratic UK.

THEME	NETWORK	GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS	URL	FOCUS
Women	Jihad Against Violence: Muslim Women's Struggle for Peace	Global	http://www.wisemuslimwomen.org/about/shuracouncil/	A project led by the Global Muslim women's Shura Council aiming to end violence toward women to promote women's advancement in the Muslim world and beyond.
Youth	FARE (Football Against Racism in Europe)	Europe	http://www.farenet.org/	A network that seeks to address the rise of racism, anti-Semitism, and far-right political activities by building a resource and campaigning hub and supports a long-term antidiscrimination action in football in eastern Europe.
Youth	Inspiring American Muslim Youth (Iamy)	United States	http://www.iamy.org/	An NGO that raises awareness about the struggles faced by American Muslim youth by educating them and their families about youth issues and that aims to give the Muslim community the tools and knowledge needed to overcome these challenges.
Youth	International Alert	Tunisia	http://www.international-alert.org/tunisia	An NGO that addresses the social and political marginalization felt by young people by strengthening young men's and women's participation in local governance.
Youth	"Promoting Democratic Values and Active Citizenship Among Muslim Youth"	Albania	None	An NGO led by the Albanian Islamic Community aiming to educate youth on civic engagement, democracy, and human rights issues.
Youth	"Radicalism, No Thank You"	Morocco	http://www.euneighbours.eu/medportal/news/latest/45326/%E2%80%9CRadicalism,-no-thank-you%E2%80%9D:-a-project-to-prevent-youth-radicalisation-in-Morocco	An NGO that supports young people whose background makes them vulnerable to extremist discourse and radicalization, organizing activities for young people including training, mentoring, cultural and educational activities, and personal development.
Youth	The Unity of Faiths Foundation FC	UK	http://theunityoffaiths.org/tuff-fc/	A football project to support youth from different religious and cultural backgrounds, mostly coming from low-income families.
Youth	The Youth Centre	Australia	http://www.theyouthcentre.com.au/	A center that focuses on youth in the Canterbury-Bankstown region who have been exposed to some form of violent extremism, are at risk of being exposed to extremist messages, or may be sympathetic to or already influenced by extremist messages and ideologies in the community.
Youth	Youth Off the Streets	Australia	https://youthoffthestreets.com.au/	A community organization working for disadvantaged young people who may be homeless, drug dependent, or recovering from abuse, supporting these young people as they work to turn their lives around and overcome immense personal trauma such as neglect and physical, psychological, and emotional abuse.
Youth	Youthprise	United States	https://youthprise.org/	An NGO that focuses on empowering youth in the Somali-American community, acting as an incubator that connects community-based organizations, schools, funders, public agencies, youth, and adults.

Table A-2. Examples of Global and Regional P/CVE and Related Networks

THEME	NETWORK	GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS	URL	FOCUS
Counter and alternative narratives	Extreme Dialogue	Canada and United Kingdom	http://extremedialogue.org/about/	A platform that aims to reduce the appeal of extremism among young people and offer a positive alternative to the increasing amounts of extremist material and propaganda available on the internet and social media platforms.
Families impacted by violent extremism	FATE (Families Against Terrorism and Extremism)	Europe	http://findfate.org/en/home/	A network working to prevent radicalization and counter violent extremism.
Frontline practitioners and professionals	The EU Radicalisation Awareness Network	Europe	http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm	A network that brings together, through a series of working groups, frontline practitioners and professionals working on the prevention of radicalization.
Local authorities and community leaders	Strong Cities Network	Global	http://strongcitiesnetwork.org/	A global network of mayors, municipal-level policy-makers, and practitioners united in building social cohesion and community resilience to counter violent extremism in all its forms.
Mothers	Mothers for Life Network	Global	http://girds.org/mothersforlife/mothers-for-life-network	A global network of mothers who have experienced violent jihadist radicalization in their own families.
Regional civil society organization network	The Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN)	Asia	http://www.iiipeace.org/AMAN%20Network%20Info%2005_07_13.htm	A network that brings together individuals, groups, and associations of Muslims subscribing to a progressive and enlightened approach to Islam and that has been cooperating with groups whether they are Muslims or of other faiths and whether they are working with grassroots communities or engaged in research and policy advocacy for poverty eradication, environmental protection, human rights, social justice, interfaith and intercultural dialogue, communal harmony, and peace.
Regional civil society organization hub	Horn of Africa Civil Society Organization Hub	Horn of Africa	http://www.globalcenter.org/project-descriptions/horn-of-africa-civil-society-organization-hub/	A “network of networks” for national and regional civil society organizations and other community actors, such as academics and youth, women, and religious leaders, involved in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) that provides a platform to discuss national and regional priorities and challenges, share expertise and best practices, consolidate research to better identify regional trends and dynamics, and support and facilitate ongoing efforts to strengthen peer relationships and civil society organization engagement with national governments, regional organizations, and donors.
Regional civil society organization hub	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)	West Africa	http://wanep.org	A hub with more than 500 member organizations that places special focus on collaborative approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, working with diverse actors from civil society, governments, intergovernmental bodies, women’s groups, and other partners in a bid to establish a platform for dialogue, experience sharing, and learning, thereby complementing efforts at ensuring sustainable peace and development.

THEME	NETWORK	GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS	URL	FOCUS
Rehabilitation and reintegration	Rehabilitation and Reintegration Network	Global	http://www.globalcenter.org/project-descriptions/call-for-proposals -engaging-civil-society-actors-in-the-rehabilitation-and-reintegration-of-violent-extremist-offenders-and-returning-foreign-	A network of civil society organizations and community leaders to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders who have been released from custody, as well as returned foreign terrorist fighters, including via cooperation with governmental actors such as law enforcement and prison services.
Religious and community leaders	Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers	Global	https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/about-us/	A network that builds bridges between grassroots peacemakers and global players in order to strengthen the work done for sustainable peace and strengthens peacemaking through collaboratively supporting the positive role of religious and traditional actors in peace and peace-building processes.
Research linked to online political extremism	VOX-Pol	Europe	http://www.voxpol.eu/	A research network focused on the prevalence, contours, functions, and impacts of violent online political extremism and responses to it.
Research linked to P/CVE	The RESOLVE Network	Global	http://www.resolvenet.org/global-network/	A global consortium of researchers and research organizations that generates, facilitates, aggregates, and synthesizes methodologically sound, locally informed research on the drivers of vulnerability and sources of resilience to violent social movements and extremism.
Victims and “formers”	The European Union’s Terrorism and Radicalisation network (TerRa)	Europe	http://www.terra-net.eu/index.php	A prevention and learning program network to reinforce the positive role victims and former terrorists can play in relation to the prevention of radicalization and to provide practical guidance to specific target groups.
Women	Alliance of Women Against Radicalisation and Extremism	Europe	http://euaware.eu/	An online platform and network to exchange and foster successful initiatives focusing on the crucial role played by women in preventing radicalization.
Women	Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)	Global	http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/	A group that brings together a broad spectrum of women determined to create a united front against violent extremism and that provides women with the tools for critical debate to challenge extremist thinking.
Women	Women Against Radicalization Network (WARN)	Global	http://warn.org.uk/	A network that provides a platform for women to discuss ways to fight extremism, reaching women and children in their community.
Women	Women and Extremism Network	Global	http://www.waenetwork.org/	A network dedicated to studying the active and counteractive aspects of women and extremism, bringing together researchers, practitioners, and activists to help produce counter- and alternative narrative content, initiatives, and programs to lessen the threat of violent extremism.
Women	Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL)	Global	http://www.waslglobal.net/	A group that brings together existing women’s rights and peace practitioners, organizations, and networks actively engaged in preventing extremism and promoting peace, rights, and pluralism, to enable their systematic and strategic collaboration.
Women	The Women Waging Peace Network	Global	https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/experts/	A network of more than 2,000 women peacemakers from conflict areas.

THEME	NETWORK	GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS	URL	FOCUS
Youth	Against Violent Extremism	Global	http://www.againstviolentextremism.org/	A group that empowers former violent extremists, or “formers,” and survivors of violent extremism to work together to push back extremist narratives and prevent the recruitment of at-risk youth.
Youth	Extremely Together	Global	http://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/promoting-youth-leadership/extremely-together-initiative-next-generation-counter-prevent-violent-extremism/	An initiative based at the Kofi Annan Foundation and led by 10 youth leaders who have demonstrated a record in building resilience against violent extremism in their communities that aims to share experiences, exchange knowledge, and support communities globally.
Youth	“Generation Change”	Global	http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/generation-change-program-emerging-leaders	An initiative that works with young leaders to foster collaboration, build resilience, and strengthen capacity as they transform local communities.
Youth	United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY)	Global	http://unoy.org/	A network of youth peace organizations with 70 member organizations in 45 countries.
Youth	The Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN)	Europe and Commonwealth countries	http://www.youthcan.net/	A network that connects a wide array of youth activists from around the world, including artists, tech entrepreneurs, civil society leaders, youth workers, filmmakers, cartoonists, students, and innovators and that represents young people’s needs and views to policymakers.



The Prevention Project

Organizing Against Violent Extremism



ABOUT THE PREVENTION PROJECT: ORGANIZING AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The Prevention Project is based out of the Global Center on Cooperative Security in Washington, D.C. The Global Center, along with the Royal United Services Institute in London and the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, serve as project partners.

