Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Training for first-line practitioners

Radicalisation Awareness Network

RAN

2018 Edition

Table of Contents

Multi-agency approach

1. General description

The multi-agency approach focuses on creating Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) infrastructures that ensure people at risk are provided with early-stage support from different authorities and organisations across multiple levels. This coordinated effort is referred to as multi-agency, as it involves support from different sectors across the public and private domains, both at national and local level.

Governments cannot counter radicalisation on their own. In some cases, violent extremism could have been prevented had practitioners worked together and shared information across hierarchies, agencies and sectors. What is needed is a multi-partner approach in which relevant players have the ability, the knowledge and the capacity to identify and support individuals at risk. Practitioners working in organisations where individuals at risk could be identified should get to know each other, be able to share concerns and information, and develop a combined approach to support individuals at risk.

In short, a multi-agency approach is a system in which information can be shared, which is crucial for identifying and dealing with vulnerable, at-risk individuals. These multiagency structures and working processes provide for more effective identification of vulnerable individuals at-risk, improved information-sharing, joint decision-making and coordinated interventions.

2. Aim

- Early identification of vulnerable at-risk individuals;
- Assess the nature and the extent of risk vulnerabilities;
- Develop an appropriate and effective interventions and support package to protect those at-risk individuals of being drawn to violent extremism;
- Foster rapid, early-stage information-sharing through efficient coordination of efforts.

3. Methods

A multitude of actors across levels of government and civil society may participate in counter-radicalisation. The following (non-exhaustive) list highlights key players:
Law enforcement
- Police officers;
- Prison wardens;
- Probation officers;
- Border control/customs officers.

Youth workers
- Teachers, tutors and lecturers at schools, colleges and universities;
- Youth offender services;
- Children's services;
- Sports coaches.

Government/social work
- Social workers/Youth work;

- Family work;
- Local authorities;
- Legal aid;
- Housing authorities.

Healthcare professionals
- Health services;
- Mental health services, psychologists and addiction treatment services;
- General practitioners (doctors).

Civil Society
- Community workers;
- Charity workers and volunteers;
- Representatives of religious communities.

A risk assessment/vulnerability framework can be used to assess individuals' risk in terms of:
- engagement with a group, cause or ideology;
- intention to cause harm;
- capability to cause harm;
- protective factors (family situation, health/social care assessments, housing situation etc.).

4. Lessons learned

4.1 Defining goals and strategy

- The objective of a multi-agency approach is to share knowledge and expertise of the counter-radicalisation programme in a more coordinated, effective and managed way. It can also be an effective means of discussing individuals on a case-by-case basis in order to agree the most appropriate course of action to support that individual and contribute to problem-solving. Each individual agency have different pieces of relevant information about individuals at-risk which can provide a more holistic 360 degree picture of individuals' needs and scope for intervention options.
- A multi-agency approach should be applied throughout all stages, from radicalisation to de-radicalisation and disengagement during/after a prison sentence, for example. All players dealing with a (potential) violent extremist should have access to relevant information and resources to enable interventions and adequate follow-up. Multi-agency approaches should also be embedded in job roles, functions and responsibilities and should be consistently applied in day-to-day working arrangements.
- To ensure a coordinated multi-agency approach, it is necessary that one lead organisation chair and coordinate the information-sharing process and decision-making about individual cases and have final responsibility over the programme and outcome. The lead organisation (local authority, police, etc.) differs from one country or city to another, but it should be established from the outset which organisation is responsible. The coordinated and joint decision-making in cases may result in different organisations assuming the lead in implementing intervention action. These lead organisations may differ depending on the case and the level of involvement of the organisation with the individual or family in question. Having a lead organisation and other key players creates a 'safeguarding hub' that ensures continuity, while other entities can be invited to participate on an ad-hoc and needs basis. Cases may be handled by one organisation but there is usually shared reporting about progress in the multiagency setting on a regular basis.
- The number of organisations and the extent to which they are involved varies substantially from one case to another. However, partnership involvement ensures that those who are considered

vulnerable have access to the widest range of support through to the provision of specific services such as education and vocational training, housing and employment; It is advisable to keep this framework on a manageable scale inviting in organisations that have operational relevance and that can provide practical support while safeguarding the confidentiality of the cases.

- A multi-agency approach should build on existing collaboration between local authorities, statutory partners (such as education and health sectors, social services, children's and youth services and offender management services), the police and, in some cases, the local community, instead of setting up new, complex arrangements. This is absolutely essential in order to avoid overlap and duplication of efforts.
- Multi-agency cooperation requires mutual understanding of the mandate and purpose of the cooperation. This could enhance shared ownership and shared accountability. Clarity on roles and expectations is a crucial precondition for success.
- It is recommended that local agencies be provided with awareness-raising training and education material. These training resources should clearly identify and articulate the threat of radicalisation, and set out approaches and models of working with individuals from the perspective of various agencies across sectors. Some level of training specific to counter radicalisation needs to be provided to all actors involved, from senior management to front-line workers. Access to tool-kits and manuals that provide a framework for assessing and responding to the needs of at-risk individuals is often an important aid.

4.2 Starting the process of multi-agency cooperation

- Go as local as possible: where possible, it is preferable to build multi-agency structures on a local level. However, especially in more rural areas, regional or even national structures might not be avoidable due to both the number of inhabitants and the facilities available.
- Involve a wide range of organisations: partnership involvement ensures that those who are considered vulnerable have access to a wide range of support, from diversionary activities through to specific services. Therefore, when identifying possible partner organisations during the setting up a multi-agency structure, besides the more obvious organisations such as the (local) police, schools and (local) authorities, efforts should be made to also include organisations typically less involved in such structures, such as the health and social care sectors, and even prison and probation. The model could involve a core structure of a number of main partners, whereas other partners could be included depending on the case needs.
- Avoid stigmatising and labelling by setting up a more general structure. An overall multi-agency structure focused on different kinds of social issues which for example serves the more general aim of crime prevention and integrates the prevention of radicalisation dimension rather than making it the main objective of the structure, prevents stigmatising and labelling as a radical person, violent extremist or even terrorist. Building a more general structure around, for example, safeguarding children and vulnerable adults is also beneficial when it comes to wanting to receive additional information from, for example, schools or youth workers. One possibility is to have a specific unit or expert team within the structure to help on cases related to violent extremism.
- Involve communities: it is generally adviseable to involve organisations within the structure that is bound by confidentiality and privacy laws. This will exclude inviting in NGO's into the case-handling process. However it is important to recognise that establishing contact with civil society actors and communities will be essential in implementing different interventions. Building long term (trust) relationships – not only during crises – with communities is necessary. Seeing and having to cooperate with familiar faces will help engage vulnerable people in addressing their potential problems. As such, it is important that multiagency structures develop long-term relationships with communities over a range of community concerns.

- Come together on a regular basis: meeting each other face-to-face, for example fortnightly or once a month, increases understanding of the other professionals, organisations and sectors. It is important that partners have the opportunity to meet each other outside formal meetings to discuss specific cases or crises.
- Embed multi-agency cooperation in job roles and functions: often trust is built through personal relationships which means that people know each other, each other's work and interests and ask for/give help when needed. The downside of personal relationships appears when people change position or job and new relationships need to be built. When this happens, it will most likely have a negative effect on the partnership. To ensure less reliance on personal relationships, cooperation with other agencies could be embedded and made an integral element in specific roles/functions. New employees in the organisations involved should immediately get familiar with the multi-agency structures.
- Create a partnership, not a legal entity: legislation varies across countries and even within a country across sectors. Building partnerships, instead of a legal entity, is a way to possibly overcome this challenge. In terms of legislation, examples have shown that the existence of some legislation can be an obstacle as much as it can be an enabler (by facilitating cooperation and making organisations realise the 'duty' they have to cooperate). It should be clear that cooperation is not optional but it is a legal safeguarding duty.
- Appoint a coordinator, avoiding hierarchical structures and politics: in order to ensure a coordinated multi-agency approach, one organisation should chair and facilitate the overall process. This coordinating organisation will differ across countries or even localities, but it should be clear to everybody which organisation leads the process and coordination of interventions. Ideally this role is executed by the police or local municipality or an independent person (for example an ombudsman). Although political support is helpful, the coordinating person ideally has no political role.
- Evaluate and follow up: be sure to jointly evaluate the process that takes place within the multi-agency structure as well as the interventions that took place for a certain case. It is equally important to follow up on all actions undertaken and feed back to your partners on results obtained and lessons learned. Overall, this crucial last step makes it possible to adjust the multi-agency structure where necessary and build on experience – and as such make improvements.

4.3 Information sharing and management

- Secure a common understanding of goals, roles and procedures at the outset.
- Clear rules and guidelines about (confidential) information sharing are essential, and information sharing agreements are valuable in this process. In some instances, there is the need for cross-jurisdictional cooperation. Test the agreement/agreed process with made-up and real cases.
- Participating organisations should be prepared to share information on individual cases by advance preparation. This presupposes that information-sharing agreements are in place and conform to data protection and privacy regulations.
- It is recommended that steps be taken to build awareness, knowledge and skills in this area (information sharing) among actors and sectors relevant to counter-radicalisation in the EU. This should be done through knowledge transfer between EU Member States, and training and awareness-building activities at national level.
- Reciprocity is also key; all partners should share information in a way that is proportionate and necessary to protect the interests of the vulnerable individual. This also builds mutual trust and understanding.
- While individuals will not always consent to information sharing, the right to privacy and confidentiality is not absolute. There may be situations in which a professional judges a client to be at serious and immediate risk of self-harm or harming others. In such circumstances, the duty to share information may outweigh the professional duty to confidentiality.

4.4 Potential challenges related to information-sharing

- The barriers to information sharing include:
  - a lack of awareness and knowledge of radicalisation among certain sectors e.g. health workers, communities;
  - a lack of knowledge of the legal limits and possibilities of data protection and privacy regulations with regard to information-sharing and breaching confidentiality;
  - the absence of a culture of information-sharing within services or across sectors, the reality that some professionals work alone, and without access to peer-support or national expertise;
  - perceived ethical barriers to information-sharing.

- Authorities should provide reassurance that they adhere to requisite privacy laws. Authorities should respect the fundamental rights of the individual to confidentiality, privacy and freedom from interference by the State. Clients of healthcare services and legal professions in particular have a reasonable expectation that their information will not be shared without their consent.
- Where a professional does breach confidentiality, this could have permanent negative impacts on the therapeutic relationship, trust in the services in general, and future willingness to engage with social workers.

4.5 Cross-jurisdictional cooperation

- There may be cases where cross-border multi-agency cooperation is required. In these cases a lead agency should coordinate this process and foster learning and cross-fertilisation of policies and procedures. Information sharing is key and opportunities to disseminate knowledge across territories should be encouraged.
- Cooperation can take shape via practical partnerships between organisations and does not need to have a legal basis (see previous point on potential cross-border legal difficulties).
- In areas where there is no precedent for dealing with radicalisation towards violent extremism in particular sectors, key players should learn from/adopt similar practices to those used in other relevant sectors. For example, where clinical services have received referrals to review individuals who have threatened to use violence (e.g. threatened mass shootings on social networking sites; psychiatric patients threatening to use explosives), knowledge from past experiences with former violent extremists could be used and adapted, e.g. for right-wing and Islamist extremism.
- Establish evaluation mechanisms of the effectiveness of process and case-management outcomes.

> *Colleagues from several practices were interviewed during the writing of this text, and the valuable insights shared have been included.*

5. Practices

The following practices are presented:
- City of Vilvoorde - Setting up a local network
- CSD - Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends
- CVE - PSP (Psychiatry, Social Services and Police) co-operation
- Google ISD - Against Violent Extremism (AVE)
- Helsinki Police Department - Preventive Policing Unit
- Local Prevention Council Augsburg (LPC) - Augsburg's network for the prevention of radicalisation

- Ministry of the Interior Finland - Anchor model

- Préfecture de la Côte-d'Or - The multidisciplinary approach to prevent and counter radicalization in Côte-d'Or, France
- Prevent Mental Health / Police Team
- The Danish SSP system
- UK NCTP HQ – Archer
- UK NCTP HQ - Channel

	# 5.1 Setting up a local network
Description	This practice is a step-by-step guide on how to set up a local network, based on the experience of Vilvoorde in Belgium.

1.   First step: Individual outreach
In order to start creating a local network, you need to first start creating your own personal network of relevant stakeholders from your local municipality. Reach out to relevant stakeholders within the different organisations and parts of the municipality (the formal network), and to stakeholders within the local community. This may be someone from the local football club, the church, mosque or the local farmers' women's club.
▫   Locate the relevant stakeholders within your municipality/city
Use the networks already in place, for example the network of organisations working on truancy or youth workers, or the communities working together on keeping the city clean. Introduce yourself to the stakeholders and get acquainted. Be very clear about your focus. For example: 'I am trying to set up a network within Valencia to prevent radicalisation amongst our youth.'
Keep in mind: relevant stakeholders already identified will be able to point out other relevant stakeholders. You could do this in order to create the formal and the informal parts of the network.
▫   Go as local as possible
Look for initiatives at community level. They are sometimes small scale and not very well known to authorities.
▫   Look for key personalities
There is no such thing as a set participants list indicating who should be involved when it comes to tackling radicalisation. Look for individuals who can help you reach certain communities, who can echo your efforts to their audience. Be creative: this individual could be the owner of the grocery store across the street from the mosque if he has the right status within his community.
▫   Create awareness
Talk about the situation in your municipality with the stakeholders. Is there polarisation between different communities? Is there general polarisation? Are there cases of young people becoming radicalised / violent extremists / foreign fighters? Make sure you have your facts and numbers straight when creating awareness of the possible risk of radicalisation among young inhabitants of your municipality. Be prepared to hear other concerns that aren't necessarily within your scope, but try to refer them to the right services in order to create a sense of cooperation and understanding.
▫   Sharing information
Ask stakeholders for information about their 'youngsters' or their community members. But if you want them to share information with you, you should be willing to share information with them as well. If there is any information from the local authorities in which you think they might be interested, do not hesitate to share this with them. Don't sit on your information, share it. And if stakeholders ask you for information that you cannot provide, be upfront about this. Tell them you do not have or cannot share the requested information, and explain why. You would want them to be as upfront with you as well.
▫   Don't rush
A path is created by walking the same route several times. Take your |

time to get to know people, however frustrating it may be that you need to find a 'quick fix': the process is as valuable as the result. Make your contacts sustainable, don't just reach out when you have a problem that needs solving.

2.   Second step: Put similar people together

When you have your local individual network in place, start enabling them to get acquainted with one another. Start simple by organising meetings between groups that are similar. For example, stakeholders from all the municipality's youth organisations or all sports and youth clubs within the local community. In short, create groups of similar stakeholders.

□   Exchange of experiences

The different relevant stakeholders should also get acquainted, if they do not already know each other. Organise meetings with all of them to discuss matters of violent extremism and polarisation currently relevant to your region. Or, talk to them about the role of prevention of radicalisation, or the ways in which they have come into contact with radicalisation and radicalised people within your local region.

□   Localise solutions and cooperate to achieve them

If in the meetings with these groups you come across specific problems within your local municipality, do address them and try to establish in what way this problem can be solved. Try to work together with the stakeholders to find a solution. Focus on this solution, not on the problem, while cooperating. Keep in mind the different tasks and responsibilities of the different stakeholders. If needed, write down what your takeaways from these meetings are and disseminate this within the groups. Remember, you are coordinating, this does not mean that you have to do everything (or that everyone will do things according to your ideas).

□   Create a shared story

Don't only focus on what you are doing, but also on why you are doing it. Formulate shared goals, and hence work on a shared vision you can reach back to when discussions get bumpy. This is easier in a group of similar people or organisations as a first step.

□   Explain why these participants sit around the table

Define the criteria by which you have selected them: what do they bring, what do they take away, are there participants missing?

□   Good coordination is crucial from the beginning. Define who takes the lead and who can be approached if issues arise.

3.   Third step: Put people with the same goals together

Now start combining the different mini-networks – the formal and informal groups as well. They need to get to know each other and understand who could do what within the local community. This way you'll have a network throughout the whole of the local municipality. The key message to the multi-agency setting is: 'You're all part of the solution.'

□   Define clear rules on the sharing of information. This creates trust. Carefully consider the ownership of information before formulating actions: who brought a piece of information to the table? Who will act on this information? How can this happen without endangering the position of the one who brought the information to the table?

□   Reciprocity is key. Avoid participants who only take but never give. Make a distinction between who deals with the actual cases in order to have hands-on discussions, and the bosses and managers in order to talk policy. Different profiles require different networks. Ideally, you should have both: the one can support the other.

□   Gain expertise if needed. Provide specialised training for your participants. This not only creates the relationships that make it

	possible to 'do' something together, apart from just talking, participating in training together also enhances a shared language and vision. ▫ Continue to work on the different levels. Keep paying enough individual attention to your partners, to the different sectors, and keep enhancing your multi-agency setting.
Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure Community engagement/empowerment
Target audience	Authorities Local community organisations/NGOs General public
Deliverables .	This practice has led to the creation of a local multi-agency setting through which Vilvoorde deals with individual cases of radicalisation: the so-called partners' round table. This approach is described in the city's local policy plan on countering violent extremism (CVE), and in a manual on the partners' round table (published in autumn 2017).
Evidence and evaluation	The best evidence is the monthly meeting of the partners' round table, during which all partners from various sectors (police, mental health, education, social work, youth work, religious organisations, etc.) gather to discuss the individual cases of persons on the path to radicalisation. This structure is directed by the city. All the partners base their activities connected to individual casework on this structure. Hence, it is owned and supported across all sectors.
Sustainability and transferability	The different steps of the strategy are transferable, regardless of the partners involved, the impact of the problem on the local level and the sectors in which the partners work.
Geographical scope	Local authorities anywhere in Europe (or beyond) dealing with various partners of different sectors. Also applicable to other institutions or agencies that take the lead in directing the individual casework within a multi-agency setting. A number of European local authorities are working on this issue and have built similar expertise.
Start of the practice	End of 2013.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN LOCAL kick-off meeting, 22–23 February 2016, Rotterdam (NL) Here are some relevant ex post papers of the RAN LOCAL Working Group that are linked to this topic: Cooperation with religious communities Local communities in PVE Local networks
Relation to other EC initiatives	None

Organisation	City of Vilvoorde: local authority within the Flemish part of Belgium. There is no project funding for this practice, but limited financial support comes from the federal government as well as Vilvoorde.
Country of origin	Belgium
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Last update	2018

Name of the practice	**5.2 Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends**
Description	The **Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends** (SAET) is an instrument for the systematic collection and analysis of statistical data, open source data and intelligence information pertaining to extremist actors and activities. It is used by law enforcement and intelligence institutions for the purposes of developing regular situational reports of the spread, nature and trends in extremism and violent radicalism.

The approach was developed as part of the project 'MONITOR (2014-2017): Countering Radicalisation in Central and Southeast Europe through a Radicalisation Monitoring Tool', funded by the Directorate-General of Home Affairs. It was inspired by the Czech Annual Extremism Report as well as other similar instruments used in Germany and other EU Member States.

The practice emerged from a needs assessment undertaken in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece. These three EU Member States are in the initial stages of developing counter-radicalisation measures and programmes, and sorely lack a solid evidence base for defining priorities and the nature of interventions.

SAET provides a methodology for establishing a viable mechanism to monitor and assess the current state as well as developments over time in national-level extremism-related acts and actors. More specifically, the instrument aims to capture the capabilities, activeness and attractiveness of extremist actors and ideas, by measuring several elements: group membership, the proportion of different types of extremist acts committed as part of the general crime environment in a country, and the spread of radical views among the population at large.

The tool, based on statistical data (core indicators), captures the core violent and non-violent manifestations of extremism, while the adjustable (qualitative) component (supplementary indicators) allows for an in-depth analysis of all facets relevant to specific phenomena of interest in the national setting.

The situational assessment includes 12 core indicators whose purpose is to present the national threat picture, as well as subject-specific indicators providing more in-depth information on specific areas of interest (e.g. right-wing, left-wing and Islamist extremism).

The first set of core indicators captures the spread and nature of criminal activity: incidence, share in violent criminal activity, and share in overall criminal activity. It accounts for the number of crimes of interest, and how they figure in the country's crime overall. It also captures the nature and differences between extremist offences — the proportion of specific crime subtypes.

The second cluster of indicators measures the spread and nature of the actions of active supporters of the extremist scene, as denoted by notable events and their participation, as well as the propensity of such gatherings to turn violent.

The final set of indicators focuses on the penetration of extremist ideas in society. This is measured by participation in extremist or support |

organisations, the share of the population offering electoral support alone or active support beyond the electoral, and the general approval of radical ideas.

Furthermore, depending on the issue being examined, subject-specific and supplementary indicators should be taken into account, to ensure a comprehensive analysis. These include profiling perpetrators and reviewing the core characteristics of major known extremist organisations or movements, in order to assess their intent and capability to cause harm. Supplementary indicators include analyses of extremist content, activity and engagement on the internet, through different techniques.

All sets of core indicators are dependent on the availability and quality of statistical data and intelligence gathered systematically by the respective institutions. The indicators' success is also determined by the analytical and resource capability of the compiling authority to process such data, and utilise alternative sources of information on proxy indicators, for example by monitoring online content. Regular surveys of social attitudes as well as victimisation surveys are also required to complement the assessment of the national threat picture.

The applicability of the situational assessment methodology was tested in the three central and south-east European countries mentioned above. Pilot national studies were conducted in each country, evaluating the data collection and analytical capacity of all relevant national institutions, providing reviews of extremist trends as per available data, and formulating recommendations for improvement of national data collection systems in view of the preparation of regular situation assessment reports of extremist trends. The three countries differ in several ways: policy and legislative context, the historical development of extremist threats, the availability of data, and how prepared respective institutions are to produce analytical products in the field of extremism and related trends. Despite these differences, the proposed methodology enables a more comprehensive and systematic assessment of extremist criminal tendencies in any context, which allows for the formulation of specific, evidence-based strategic as well as operational priorities.

Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure
Target audience	Law enforcement officers Local Community Organisations/NGOs
Deliverables	The methodology as well as pilot results from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece are described in the report 'Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends' (see http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17917 online).
Evidence and evaluation	The approach was presented to and discussed with practitioners and academics on several occasions, and both oral and written feedback have been taken into account in the final methodology: - a methodological workshop in Sofia on 8 December 2015 with participants from academic and law enforcement fields: see http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17563 online; - an expert validation workshop in Sofia on 28 June 2016: see http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17749 online; - a RAN study visit for practitioners from eastern Europe, held in Sofia and co-hosted by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) on 17 January 2017: see

	http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17905 online; - a training seminar with Bulgarian law enforcement practitioners in Sofia on 28 February 2017: see http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17931 online; - two national training seminars to introduce the framework in the Czech Republic and Greece for frontline practitioners and LEAs, held in May 2016 and February 2017; - a round table in Brussels attended by EU policy officers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academic experts on 23 February 2017, where the instrument received positive feedback: see http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17933 online. The methodology has been peer-reviewed by academic and law enforcement experts. Their comments have been taken into account in drafting the final report and finalising the methodology for the SAET.
Sustainability and transferability	The approach is transferable to other contexts, since indicators for situational assessment and reporting are uniform across contexts and adjustable where necessary.
Geographical scope	Pilot tested in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece
Start of the practice	Developed in 2015; tested and refined in 2016-2017
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	Presented during a RAN study visit for practitioners from eastern Europe, held in Sofia on 17 January 2017 and co-hosted by the CSD: see http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17905 online.
Relation to other EC initiatives	
Organisation	The practice was developed by the CSD, a Sofia-based NGO (BG), in partnership with the Center for Security Policy at the Charles University in Prague (CZ), and was funded by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs under the Prevention of and Fight against Crime (ISEC) programme. Founded in 1990, the CSD is a multidisciplinary think tank dedicated to connecting researchers, policymakers, practitioners and civil society. The CSD is a non-partisan, independent organisation fostering the reform process in Europe through impact on policy and civil society. It combines a broad range of capacities: sociological and criminological research, legal and regulatory analysis, policy monitoring and evaluation, institutional capacity-building, security sector reform and crime prevention policies. The CSD is at the forefront of the development of effective methods to better understand and monitor radicalisation processes and identify risk factors in south-east Europe. The CSD pioneered a comprehensive study of the nature, spread and risks of radicalisation in Bulgaria, focusing on Islamist radicalisation, right-wing and left-wing extremism and football hooliganism (see http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17621 online). Under CSD coordination, the study was also implemented in Greece and the Czech Republic, allowing for cross-country comparisons and lesson-learning. In addition, the CSD works on developing practitioner-level tools and methods for early identification and monitoring of radicalisation risks as a basis for designing tailored interventions. The CSD contributed to developing the first Bulgarian National Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism (2015-2020), by suggesting specific measures for multi-agency cooperation in prevention efforts and engaging communities and civil society. CSD staff are members of

	the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (EENeT) and RAN.
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Name of the practice	**5.3 PSP-network (PSP = Police, Social Services and Psychiatry)**
Description	Tailor made training course for the PSP-network The overall and primary goal of the project is to reduce potential radicalisation among vulnerable people with psychiatric and/or mental diagnosis in Denmark. It is difficult to measure as to whether the tailor-made course is sole responsible for a given effect in reducing the number of people in risk of radicalisation. Recognizing this difficulty the project is working with three secondary goals for the training course for key PSP-members. First, The aim of the tailor-made two-day training course is to raise the awareness of radicalisation among key members of the PSP-network as well as to give them knowledge of radicalisation as a social, psychological and political phenomenon. Second, the course aims at giving the participants knowledge of the Danish strategy and methods in preventing radicalisation in general as well as among mentally vulnerable people. Last, the course aims at giving the participants knowledge of the "standard-operating-procedure" in organisation and communication confronted with a concern of possible radicalisation.
Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure Training for first line practitioners and managerial level
Target audience	First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers Health practitioners
Deliverables	As part of the project the working group has developed a two-day training programme focusing on how to work with vulnerable people in the PSP-target group. The training programme/tailor-made course is organized so as to give a comprehensive introduction to risk factors, signs of concern and motivation and prevention of radicalisation among mentally vulnerable people. The perspectives cover the division of labour among social workers, police officers and psychiatry as well as the methods at work in these professions respectively. The courses are organised and provided jointly by The Danish Security and Intelligence Service/PET (The Preventive Security Department) and The Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration/SIRI and specifically address upgrading radicalization knowledge and prevention competencies for professionals.
Evidence and evaluation	An evaluation is being carried out in 2016. The evaluation was initiated in Oct 2014 running through Dec 2016 and the main focuses are studies of the degree of benefit and usefulness of the radicalization prevention courses aimed at professionals from all of the three PSP sectors. The Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration has made a contract with an external evaluator. The project doesn't operate with measuring target group impact as it is too complex and with too many variables to be able to say anything

	about the effect/impact of the trainings course. The evaluation will in addition focus on how to improve the citizen case handling so as to give recommendations and to qualify the casework.
Sustainability and transferability	The content is exportable and transferable to member states, but it has to be restructured to the local organisation and networks.
Geographical scope	As of February 2015 the project – and the tailor-made training course – has been held in 4 out of 12 local police district. The plan is that all police district and all PSP-key-members in each district have been offered the course by the end of 2015. In the autumn of 2016 a one-day version of the course is being held regionally for all forensic psychiatric units in Denmark.
Start of the practice	The first part of the project was launched in October 2013 and ran until mid-October2014. The idea was that the first part of the project should be the developing stage where the working group could put together a training course and put it to test in one local police district and in one municipality. The result of the initial stage was a two-day tailor-made course. The course was tested and ad hoc evaluated and in light of this knowledge the course was restructured and new themes included. The final two-day course is now offered to the lasting 11 police districts.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN Health, Berlin, 18-19 April 2013 RAN Plenary, Brussels, 16-17 June, 2014
Organisation	*The Danish effort in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism (CVE) is primarily organized in the SSP-network. The goal of the SSP-network is to prevent criminal activity and behaviour among youngsters. The network consists of members of the social services, schools and police.* *In 2009 the initial SSP-network was by law supplemented with the PSP-network. PSP is comprised of the local Police (P), Social Services/social psychiatry (S) and Psychiatry (P) and has its target group on vulnerable people with a psychiatric diagnosis in risk of recurring criminal activity.* *The PSP-project is located within The Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration and is driven in close collaboration with the Ministry for Immigration, Integration and Housing, Ministry of Health and The Danish Security and Intelligence Services. The project is thus a governmental initiative but offered to the key organisations in the Danish local crime-prevention network. The PSP-project is also government funded and the participants don't pay a tuition fee to participate. The included organisations aren't compensated for sending their employees to attend the two-day course.*
Country of origin	Denmark
Contact details	The National Board of Social Services Landemærket 9 1119 Copenhagen K Denmark Kristian Walther, The National Board of Social Services

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Last update	2016 and before

Name of the practice	**5.4 Against Violent Extremism (AVE)**
Description	The Against Violent Extremism (AVE) network of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) is a unique and powerful global force in the ongoing struggle to tackle violent extremism. Former violent extremists ('formers') and survivors of violent extremism are empowered to work together to push back against extremist narratives and prevent the recruitment of 'at risk' youth. AVE uses technology to connect, exchange, disseminate and influence violent extremism in all forms: the far right and far left, Al Qaeda, and violent gangs in South America. Via the AVE website, or through the AVE app, formers and survivors can join the network (also on Facebook, Twitter and Google+), find and assist related projects and connect to and support members of the network. By connecting former extremists from different backgrounds, we facilitate the sharing of best practice and ideas so as to encourage member collaboration. The network leverages the lessons, experiences and connections of individuals who have dealt first-hand with extremism, in an effort to challenge it effectively. The network has three primary functions: 1. To connect credible messengers to one another so they can learn best practices and share ideas. 2. To match credible messengers to private sector resources, skills and support. In the aftermath of an extremist attack AVE can act as a positive outlet for members of the public wishing to 'do something' as they can register their skills and interests in order to get involved with AVE projects working to counter extremism. The AVE network and associated website will allow individuals and organisations to share practical expertise, pool resources and find donors or volunteers. 3. AVE advocates for an increase in the role that former extremists and survivors of violent extremism play in pushing back against extremist narratives to governments and international bodies. The AVE network has played a vital role in the success of the ISD's counter-narrative programmes, including our Extreme Dialogue counter-extremism education programme and our One to One direct intervention initiative. We draw on the experience of our AVE network members to inform and develop our wider counter-extremism work.
Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure Training for first line practitioners
Target audience	Formers Victims of terrorism Youth/Pupils/Students Online
Deliverables	Given the nature of AVE as a network, its deliverables to date are as follows.

	- Connecting credible messengers to each other to share best practices and ideas concerning countering violent extremism. - Connecting members to private sector funding. - Facilitating the establishment of ongoing sub-projects between members and other partners. An example of the latter is the ISD's Extreme Dialogue project that uses members' stories to create educational resources for the prevention of violent extremism. This initiative started in Canada and is now being rolled out in the UK, Germany, and Hungary. AVE members also play an active role in other ISD-led programmes; these include one-to-one interventions in order to facilitate dialogue between former extremists and young people who demonstrate extremist tendencies online.
Evidence and evaluation	As a network, AVE's performance can be measured principally by the growth of the network and partnerships facilitated. To date, AVE has an ever-growing membership of over 2 625 connections (306 formers, 165 survivors, and 81 projects, inclusive). In addition, AVE has also facilitated partnerships offline which have led to the establishment of numerous sub-projects involving AVE members. • Working as part of the ISD's One to One online intervention programme, AVE formers achieved a 60 % engagement rate with individuals expressing extremist sympathies online, and assisted in the development of best practice guides and indicators for future online intervention initiatives. • ISD's Extreme Dialogue project has reached over 450 000 educators, parents and young people online, with AVE members involved in delivering training in use of the educational resources to over 250 practitioners.
Sustainability and transferability	Through its network, AVE allows members to share ideas, collaborate, and identify partners and resources to find ways of amplifying their initiatives and message to a wider audience. Members are encouraged, to cross-pollinate their expertise, and transfer these to other local contexts.
Geographical scope	Global: members across Africa, Asia, Australasia, Europe, Middle East, North America and South America.
Start of the practice	AVE began in June 2011, and was launched publicly in April 2012.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN-DERAD Working Group, 'First line De-radicalisation Practitioners and Interventions', 4-5th June, Stockholm RAN-DERAD Working Group, 'De-radicalisation and Exit Interventions', 10-11th October 2012, Barcelona RAN@ First Working Group Session, 'Exploring innovative ways in which the Internet and social media may contribute to the fight against violent extremism', 14th November 2012, London RAN@ Working Group, 'Internet and Social Media', 25-26th March 2013, London RAN@ Working Group on the Internet and Social Media, 29th January 2014, The Hague RAN INT/EXT Working Group, 'Reintegrating foreign fighters', 26-27th

	May 2014, Berlin RAN C&N and RAN Exit Working Group, 'Working with formers', 26-27th June 2017, Bordeaux
Relation to other EC initiatives	AVE provided assistance and networking opportunities to EU TerRa (Terrorism and Radicalisation), a European-based prevention and learning program. AVE facilitated the use of members' testimonies for Extreme Dialogue (Prevention of and Fight against Crime (ISEC) Counter-Narrative Project (CNP)). AVE surveyed our members and prepared a paper which fed into the INT/EXT working group paper: "Proposed policy recommendations for the high level conference, from the ran INT/EXT working group (December 2012)"
Organisation	*The ISD is a global counter-extremism organisation dedicated to powering new generations against hate and extremism.* *For 10 years, we have responded to the rising challenge of extremist movements and the ideologies that underpin them. We deliver cutting-edge programmes built from world-leading expertise in communications and technology, grassroots networks, knowledge and research, and policy advice.* *Our approach is to counter extremism and the ideologies underpinning it in ways that are practical, affordable, effective and scalable. We support this through cutting-edge research, analysis, data management and capacity building.* *As an independent organisation, we are able to coordinate government, private, academic and civil society sectors that are often at odds with each other. We help synergize their efforts and ensure each of them plays an appropriate and effective role in fighting extremism.* *We have honed this approach with a decade of experience, working from both inside and outside government, grassroots communities, technology and media, to build a soft power strategy that is proportional in impact, professionalism and scale to the increasingly sophisticated propaganda and recruitment efforts of extremists.*
Country of origin	United Kingdom
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Last update	2017

Name of the practice	**5.5** *Preventive Policing Unit*
Description	The Preventive Policing Unit in Helsinki Police Department was founded in 2012, based on experiences and lessons learned abroad. The main aim of the unit is to enhance the security of the city of Helsinki, and to prevent phenomena endangering security, in advance. The unit works with other local and national police units (e.g. the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and National Bureau of Investigation), authorities, NGOs, companies and citizens of Helsinki. A key condition for this to work is trust between police and NGOs as well as communities in Helsinki, and a joint effort to solve security and safety challenges. Security planning and cooperation is based on reciprocal actions that benefit all parties involved. Early intervention requires active and target-oriented cooperation with the given partners. One of the main daily tasks of the Preventive Policing Unit is to prevent violent extremism (i.e. individuals who are prepared to use violence to further their ideology, i.e. religious, left-wing and right-wing extremists, individuals with hard-line, extremist views and lone actors such as school shooters). This preventive work is carried out by three different groups, each of which has its own focus and approach. • **Team 1** Cooperation with multicultural and multilingual communities in Helsinki, prevention of violent extremism. • **Team 2** Local problem-solving and work with youth, especially with those at risk of committing crimes, first-time young offenders, socially excluded individuals, etc. • **Team 3** 'The Anchor': a multi-professional team that includes police officers, social workers and psychiatric nurses who share a working space. In daily work, both uniformed and plainclothes Preventive Policing Unit police officers meet communities and the youth, participate and help to organise community events, visit mosques, work as 'negotiators' in demonstrations, hold seminars and Q&A sessions with communities. In cases where teams encounter an individual at risk of radicalisation or who has already been radicalised (in addition to having other issues) a multidisciplinary approach is often used. This means that such cases are managed either by Team 3, another team, or jointly with other teams and units; the assistance of appropriate NGOs can also prove useful. Thanks to this good cooperation, police in Helsinki have a wide network of partners in cooperation, carrying out the same work towards the same goal: to enhance security and prevent violent extremism.
Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure Community engagement/empowerment
Target audience	Law enforcement officers

	Youths/pupils/students General public
Evidence and evaluation	Four cases in different contexts have been evaluated. Case: Old Shopping Mall Collaboration with multicultural stakeholders to enhance the safety of the shopping mall. Evaluation method: interviews before and after intervention. Results were very positive. Case: Kontula A suburban neighbourhood which suffers from multiple social problems and segregation. A wide range of collaborative interventions and proposals were made to enhance safety of the area and residents. Evaluation method: survey of residents and stakeholders. Results were promising. Close collaboration enhances trust and openness between police and citizens. Case: Two long-standing demonstrations at the railway square near the city centre. 'Stop deportations' and 'Finnish first' demonstrations were located near each for other several months. Police used negotiation methods to ensure the safety of the demonstrators and surrounding area. The evaluation, based on interviews, was very positive. Case: City Centre. Youngsters spending their time with drug dealers in the city centre area. Problems due to abuse of alcohol and drugs, sexual offences etc. Evaluation is still ongoing. Generally, feedback from the field (e.g. from immigrant communities, other authorities, and NGOs) has been positive and encouraging. Multidisciplinary and non-traditional police work have been widely acknowledged.
Sustainability and transferability	A permanent part of the Helsinki Police Department since April 2012. Basic elements of the model could be transferrable to other local police departments too.
Geographical scope	Helsinki, Finland
Start of the practice	1 April 2012
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN Derad, 16–17 April 2015, Riga (LV)
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	None
Organisation	Preventive Policing Unit, Helsinki Police Department (a local police department/law enforcement authority)
Country of origin	Finland
Contact details	Address: Pasilanraitio 11 00240 Helsinki Finland

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	FI-00241 Helsinki
	Finland
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Last update	2018

Name of the practice	**5.6** *Augsburg's network for the prevention of radicalisation*
Description	The City of Augsburg has been working on the prevention of (religiously inspired) radicalisation since 2011. In cooperation with the Bavarian Ministry for Social Affairs, and cross-linked in Augsburg-Oberhausen, the pilot project was set up in 2012 at city-quarter level. The aim was to explain the phenomenon of radicalisation to all stakeholders and practitioners working in this city quarter. In 2016, the network was expanded citywide as well.
	The shared goal of the network members is that all actors in Augsburg are sensitised to the signs of radicalisation, meaning they are aware of the push-and-pull factors influencing radicalisation processes, as well as of available helplines and information centres. Risk and protection factors and environments fostering violent radicalisation are taken into account when developing prevention measures. This practice has led to multiple other projects in the City of Augsburg.
Approach	Multi-agency approach
	Community engagement/empowerment
Target audience	Local Community Organisations/NGOs
	First responders or practitioners
	Educators / academics
Deliverables	- Local action plan (under development) - Film: *A new, happy life?* - Theatre play: *Krass!* (Young Theater Augsburg), in cooperation with ufuq.de, offering training for teachers and workshops for students - Training module 'Mädchen mischen mit' (Empowerment of girls) - 'Project 264 – Knowledge is Queen' (Empowerment of girls) - Implementation of the projects BOUNCE (by Arktos) and MotherSchools (by Women without borders) - Case management
Evidence and evaluation	The feedback we have received to date is of a qualitative nature. The training modules of the projects BOUNCE and 'Mädchen mischen mit' generated a positive response. The impressions/feedback of the target groups were recorded by questionnaires. BOUNCE is being evaluated by the University of Gent. Both projects will be continued in 2019. Ufuq.de (training for teachers and workshops for students) evaluates their seminars and workshops by questionnaire.
	By participating in the EU project 'Local Institutions AgaInSt Extremism' (LIAISE), Augsburg was able to exchange information with experts and partner cities. Based on this knowledge, Augsburg's network is being implemented, and the local action plan was developed further thanks to participation in RAN meetings and the resulting communication. Participants of the RAN study visit in August 2018 were impressed by the work being carried out in Augsburg. They saw potential in

	implementing the case management, which is still lacking in terms of protocol and risk management. An urgent recommendation also was to draft the local action plan.
Sustainability and transferability	Augsburg's network for the prevention of radicalisation is part of the Local Prevention Council (LPC); using this already existing structure guarantees continuity. The Mayor of Augsburg chairs the LPC, and political support is ensured. We are in continual contact with communities and the network is constantly growing. Most of the network members are full-time practitioners in their fields, and their participations incurs no costs. The person responsible for work carried out at city-quarter level and liaison with communities holds a full-time salaried position.
Geographical scope	Augsburg's network for the prevention of radicalisation is implemented in Augsburg, the State of Bavaria, Germany.
Start of the practice	The City of Augsburg started work on the prevention of radicalisation in 2011. The network was officially launched in February 2016 and will be continued.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN study visit to Augsburg, 'The Local P/CVE Approach of Augsburg', 29 and 30 August 2018
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	The network for the prevention of radicalisation is funded by the Bavarian Ministry of Social Affairs. It is linked to the European Forum for Urban Safety (EFUS) and the German-European Forum for Urban Safety (DEFUS). It is a partner in the Horizon 2020 project 'Partnership Against Violent Radicalisation in Cities' (PRACTICIES), and in the 'Local Voices' project of the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) in cooperation with the US State Department. The City of Augsburg participated in the LIAISE EU project of the 'Prevention of and Fight against Crime' ISEC programme.
Organisation	The LPC connects Augsburg's practitioners on prevention. Its objective is to prevent crime, but also to enhance the sense of safety in public spaces for Augsburg's citizens and visitors. The Mayor of Augsburg, Dr Kurt Gribl, chairs its steering committee. Currently, 10 working groups tackle issues such as graffiti, substance abuse and civic courage — and 1 of these working groups is Augsburg's network for the prevention of radicalisation. The executive board of the LPC is located at the Office for Local Prevention in the municipality.
Country of origin	City of Augsburg, Germany
Contact details	Address: Rathausplatz 1 86150 Augsburg Germany Local Prevention Council Augsburg (LPC) Contact person: Diana Schubert

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	Telephone: +49 8213243309
	Website: http://kriminalpraevention-augsburg.de/
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	**5.7 Anchor model**
Description	Anchor is a Finnish working model aiming to increase adolescent well-being by intervening at an early stage in order to prevent criminal behaviour, violent radicalisation and extremism. It offers comprehensive support for adolescents and their families through multi-agency collaboration.
	The Anchor model brings together social workers, youth workers, psychiatric nurses and police to prevent adolescents in risk groups from crossing over to criminal activity or violent radicalisation. This approach facilitates individual and comprehensive support for adolescents.
	The professionals chiefly responsible for implementing the approach work at shared office premises on a daily basis: this strengthens collaboration and information-sharing between agencies, and improves the consolidation of intervention and support practices. In addition to the primary professionals involved in Anchor, other collaboration partners are selected based on individual needs, e.g. other agencies, schools or non-governmental agencies (NGOs).
Approach	Multi-agency approachMulti-agency approachMulti-agency approach Family supportFamily supportFamily support
Target audience	Youth / pupils / studentsYouth / pupils / studentsYouth / pupils / students FamiliesFamiliesFamilies Violent extremistsViolent extremistsViolent extremists
Deliverables	Presentations and leaflets Publications
Evidence and evaluation	The Anchor model was piloted over the period from 2004 to 2006 in one Finnish police district. Collaboration partners also provided feedback during this time.
	Professionals working with Anchor found that the model strengthens multi-agency collaboration thanks to improved information-sharing, increased trust between professionals, and the provision of opportunities to cooperate on a daily basis. In addition, because it enables comprehensive confrontation and support, Anchor's multi-agency approach was considered to enhance preventive and supportive actions for adolescents. Feedback from service users has also been very encouraging.
	To strengthen the evidence basis of the Anchor model, current practices in the local level and evidence-based electronic implementation manual will be reviewed in 2018.
Sustainability and transferability	As a permanent element in Finnish preventive services since 2004, the Anchor model is transferrable to other countries.
Geographical scope	The Anchor model is implemented in the basic preventive structure throughout Finland.
Start of the practice	The Anchor model was developed in the period from 2004 to 2006 as a project that became established as a permanent working model. Currently, the model is in use throughout the country.

Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN POL, 21.12.2016, Utrecht, Netherlands
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	The electronic manual for Anchor teams that will be drafted in 2018 is funded by the Internal Security Funds (ISF).
Organisation	Ministry of Interior (Police Department)/Ministry of Social Affairs and Health/other Ministries National Police Board Regional Police Departments/Municipalities Anchor teams Governmental institutionGovernmental institutionGovernmental institutionGovernmental institutionGovernmental institution
Country of origin	Finland
Contact details	Ministry of the Interior Kirkkokatu 12 Helsinki Finland Tarja Mankkinen tarja.mankkinen@intermin.fi +358 405955760 http://www.intermin.fi/
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	**5.8** *The multidisciplinary approach to prevent and counter radicalization in Côte-d'Or, France*
Description	The strategy for preventing and countering radicalisation in the Côte-d'Or (region of Bourgogne-Franche-Comté in France) is based on a multidisciplinary and multi-actor approach which is tailored in response to individual requirements, as follows. • At **regional level,** the **Concordance Resource Centre** aims to enable equal access to resources, share best practices and improve practical tools across a number of districts. • At **district level** (subregional), the **Prevention Group**, a global network of professionals, set up customised prevention measures for each individual. A **District Security Group**, comprising security and intelligence services, conducts a global real-time assessment of the danger, threat and risk level, and evaluates Islamic extremism. A **District Officer** in charge of radicalisation coordinates all these actors at district level. • At **local level** (subdistrict) on the field, social, health and integration workers form Territorial **Units** which carry out follow-up for each individual. • For radicalisation prevention, all these actors listed above work closely with a clinical psychologist, developing a detailed and shared assessment of the situation, while taking into account personal factors.
Approach	Multi-agency approach
Target audience	First responders or practitioners Local Community Organisations/NGOs Health practitioners
Deliverables	Training courses All social, health and integration employees working in the field of preventing and countering radicalisation in the Côte-d'Or district are asked to attend specific training modules delivered by the District Officer in charge of radicalisation. The objective is to share a common approach towards radicalisation as well as to form a global network of professionals. The Concordance Resource Centre Four key institutions at district level head a resource centre dealing with radicalisation: The prefecture (government representation in the district), the regional health agency, child judicial protection services and prison services. The centre aims to mutualise human, financial and technical resources, and share the common methodology through a practical handbook delivered to a network of health professionals in the district (mainly psychologists and psychiatrists) as well as to intelligence services. The centre also aims to share best practices for radicalisation prevention among these professionals and to develop and improve practical tools to detect, support, evaluate and supervise persons who have been reported as radicalised.
Evidence and evaluation	Qualitative views and quantitative data

| | The practice has been adopted by all official and unofficial actors in the Côte-d'Or district and is acknowledged for its efficiency and practical aspects. It is also important to highlight that this practice is not static, but dynamic. It evolves in line with the specific needs on the ground, which gives it an important edge: it has led to several partnership with key actors not included initially, for example with public social landlords. The practice also benefits from being able to rely on a network of referring advisors within many public institutions: schools, municipalities, social centres, etc. At this time, however, it is too early to perform quantitative measures for the outcome of the practice.

Feedback
The practice has been supported and enhanced by two national institutional structures: the National Anti-terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT), and the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR).

Peer review
The practice received a remarkably warm and positive welcome when presented at a RAN working group in Munich on 7 June 2018. Moreover, several districts in France have shown interest in implementing the same approach as that applied in the Côte-d'Or district.

Evaluation
The district-level multidisciplinary Prevention Group convenes every month to collectively evaluate each individual situation and plan the subsequent course of action.

Example
The method's success is illustrated by the case of a 16-year-old girl who was responsible for glorifying terrorism. Thanks to the practice, she was supported by a specialised association, and at 18, has just graduated from high school and is seeking employment. |
|---|---|
| **Sustainability and transferability** | The practice is based on coordination and sharing of a common methodology by all actors, and **does not require considerable funding**. The only aspects requiring funding are the services of a clinical psychologist and use of the Concordance Resource Centre.

The practice is also based on **a principle of adaptability** to local and individual situations, with a network of professionals geared to evolve in line with circumstances and developments. This feature makes it **particularly** transferable to many contexts, as shown in the interest of other districts in France to adopt the approach. It is also easily transferable to other fields such as crime prevention. |
| **Geographical scope** | The practice has been implemented in the district of Côte-d'Or (subregional level), France. It encompasses district as well as local actors.

Moreover, the Concordance Resource Centre functions at regional level, allowing sharing and mutualisation with other districts of the region of Bourgogne-Franche-Comté. |
| **Start of the practice** | • November 2014: implementation of the district-level Prevention Group.
• 2017: definition of the Territorial Units strategy following several months of work carried out by the Prevention Group.
• February 2018: the Concordance Resource Centre is fully operational. |
| **Presented and discussed in RAN meeting** | The practice was presented and discussed at the 'RAN working group social and health workers' on 6 and 7 June 2018, in Munich. |

Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	The practice is not yet linked to nor funded by any EU initiative.
Organisation	At district level (subregional), the **Prevention Group** brings together government representatives, social and health workers, intelligence and security services, prosecutor and child judicial protection services, etc. including a clinical psychologist, who is specific to the group in the Côte-d'Or district. The **District Security Group** proceeds to a global real-time evaluation of the danger, threat or risk level, and evaluates Islamic extremism. A **District Officer** responsible for radicalisation prevention coordinates these actors at district level. At local level (subdistrict) on the field, social, health and integration actors form part of **Territorial** Units which ensure follow-up for individuals, according to the requirements of the situation. Members of the Prevention Group and District Security Group must sign a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement. The Concordance Resource Centre is based on a common partnership between its four key institutions: the prefecture (government representation in the district), the regional health agency, child judicial protection services and prison services. The centre is supervised by the District Officer for radicalisation, and coordinated by the clinical psychologist. The centre is funded by the CIPDR, which is a national body.
Country of origin	The practice is active in the Côte-d'Or district, region of Bourgogne-Franche-Comté, France.
Contact details	Address : Préfecture de la Côte-d'Or 53 rue de la Préfecture 21041 Dijon Cedex France Contact person: Karine Rostaing Email: karine.triques-rostaing@cote-dor.gouv.fr Telephone: +33 380446423 +33 645761985 Website: N/A
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	**5.9 Prevent Mental Health / Police Team**
Description	The UK Counter Terrorism network working with the National health Service have implemented a pilot of three mental health hubs. The aim is to assess the value of mental health professionals working alongside counter terrorism police officers. This is in relation to the management of individuals referred to the police with known or suspected mental disorders who may be vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism.
Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure
Target audience	Law enforcement officers Health practitioners General public
Deliverables	Presentations and leaflets
Evidence and evaluation	The pilot is undergoing an evaluation process and the three hubs are recording a standardised data set and collecting feedback from service users. The first interim report has just been released and the initial findings indicate that Preliminary analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data presented in this interim report is suggestive of a positive impact within all three mental health hubs in relation to the following outcomes: ✓ Improved detection of mental health vulnerabilities ✓ Significantly reducing the time it takes to get health information and has thus markedly saving police time and resources. ✓ Increased confidence in Police assessment of risk / vulnerability, and facilitated access to appropriate services ✓ Enabling more efficient use of Interventions, including use of mentors and disruptions, which are now more targeted to assessed need with improved outcomes and reduces cost. ✓ Identifying previously unidentified mental health needs, thereby improving risk awareness and creating new treatment options and plans ✓ Enabling long standing Prevent cases to be discharged thus releasing police resource for responding to other cases ✓ Helping police Prevent and CTU colleagues to better understand how mental health vulnerabilities may impact upon behaviours and risk ✓ Creating better outcomes for individuals referred to Prevent

Sustainability and transferability	The overall evaluation aims to identify a sustainable model past 2018, as the service is currently being paid for from the national counter terrorism budget. The cost of Medical practitioners is approx. £180,000 per annum
Geographical scope	The service covers England and Wales
Start of the practice	The three hubs had a staggered implementation from April 2016 – July 2016. All are funded until at least March 2018.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN POL meeting on the role for police in multi agency cooperation, 21st December 2016
Relation to other EC initiatives	N/A
Organisation	*National Counter Terrorism Police* *Counter Terrorism Police West Midlands force, London and Greater Manchester* *National health Service England*
Country of origin	UK
Contact details	**Debbie Mackenzie** **Chief Inspector Prevent - Strategic Partnership** National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ Phone: +44 (0)203 276 0231 Mobile: +44 (0)7769887143 E Mail: Debbie.Mackenzie@met.pnn.police.uk
Last update	**2016 and before**

Name of the practice	## 5.10 The Danish SSP system ### Local collaboration between schools, social services and police
Description	## Origins and effort The Danish SSP collaborative system organises local and municipal crime preventive efforts in support of children and adolescents (and families, if appropriate). The SSP system was originally established in 1977, when the Danish Crime Prevention Council appointed the Central SSP Committee. Today, the vast majority of local authorities have established SSP collaboration, which may be run differently across municipalities. All SSPs have the same basic setup: the three central units (school, social services and police) work together in the SSP system, while these bodies in particular are responsible for children and young people's well-being and upbringing. Furthermore, Danish legislation requires the school system, the social system and the police to carry out crime prevention in the broadest sense. Other professions are also incorporated into this joint preventive action, when appropriate: social housing projects, cultural institutions and volunteer organisations, among others. The SSP system has continually supplemented its efforts in concerted action with other cross-sectional and interdisciplinary structures: - the PSP system (police, social services and psychiatric services cooperation); - the KSP system (prisons and probation, social services and police cooperation); - the SSD system (social services, school, healthcare and daycare cooperation); - the SSP+ system (local SSP collaboration extended to youth in the 18-to-25 age group). ## The aim and practical objectives of the SSP system The aim of SSP collaboration is to identify risk factors and reasons behind at-risk behaviour, delinquency and crimes committed by children and youngsters. Furthermore, SSP collaborative efforts aim to process these causal factors from a preventive perspective, as well as provide attention and support as protective factors in daily life and environments. The basic idea behind the SSP collaboration system is that crime prevention work is enhanced by information-sharing across professions. Thus, interdisciplinary collaboration results in increased awareness of risk signs and risk factors in the daily life of children and

	adolescents at risk, as well as increased opportunities for preventive action or even intervention when such signs and factors are observed. Thus, the objectives of SSP collaboration are to build, operate and maintain a local network with an efficient crime preventive impact on the everyday reality of children and young people. Three focus areas underpin this joint effort: - general preventive action, where the preventive focus spans all age groups or areas where at-risk behaviour could potentially arise; - specific effort, where the preventive focus is on groups of young people with known at-risk behaviour; - individual-oriented effort, where the preventive focus is on an individual young person exhibiting worrying or at-risk behaviour.
Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure Community engagement/empowerment
Target audience	Youth/pupils/students
Deliverables	## *General* preventive action In practice, general preventive action targets groups of youngsters who have not displayed criminal or at-risk behaviour. This early general preventive work takes the form of actions and attitudinal lessons in schools and youth clubs. The groups of young people are selected based on age or perceived increased risk of developing at-risk behaviour. This type of work may also include recreational actions such as sports and other leisure activities, homework support, leisure centres in vulnerable residential areas and family involvement. ## *Specific* action SSP collaboration at this level targets children and young people exhibiting at-risk behaviour or signs of neglect. Apart from the actions mentioned above for general prevention, specific efforts may also include special projects intended to produce new good practice, where targeted methods are developed and tested. ## *Individual*-oriented action These efforts target children and young people considered to be at risk of committing a crime or who have already done so. The goal is to divert them from following a criminal course, often through special treatment measures. Methods used include home visits in order to assess the individual's environments. These visits involve the parents as well as the child in question, and are carried out by a team comprising a preventive police officer and a school teacher or social worker, depending on the severity of the concern. Accordingly, a family-based plan may be drawn up and set in motion for further preventive efforts. Overall, individual-oriented efforts are geared

	towards re-offence or relapse prevention.
	## Role of the SSP in the fight against radicalisation and extremism
	The SSP system plays a central part in general efforts against radicalisation and extremism among young people in Denmark. All over the country, local SSP councils and implementation networks have been trained to spot and handle risk signs of youth radicalisation and attachment to extremist ideas and groups. Moreover, the SSP system has played a pivotal part as partner in special projects and other initiatives in government action plans against radicalisation and extremism.
Evidence and evaluation	As a very old system forming the basic structure of municipal preventive efforts in Denmark, the SSP system is currently being evaluated. It represents efficient prevention and supports interdisciplinary efforts, and its evidence-based approach and knowledge-sharing is a linchpin for all work in the SSP system. In a recent appraisal (2012), the Danish Crime Preventive Counsel published the report 'SSP — a guide to the collaboration', describing the long-term experience and good practice from the SSP organisation (in Danish).
Sustainability and transferability	The system's overall transferability may be challenging, as the SSP forms the basic structure of all preventive actions in Denmark, as stated by law. This notwithstanding, the Danish SSP system may serve as inspiration, and may also be transferable in terms of its method: it demonstrates how local interdisciplinary collaboration can work through local committees with representatives from the school system, social services and police. This kind of preventive collaboration could also be established on a more informal basis than in Denmark, i.e. not necessarily requiring a formal and statutory structure.
Geographical scope	The SSP system is implemented in the basic preventive structure in all Danish municipalities. All local SSP organisations are also members of a national organisation known as SSP Samråd.
Start of the practice	The SSP system dates back to the 1970s.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN Prevent, June 2013, Berlin The SSP system has been presented in RAN meetings on several occasions, due to the central position it holds in all prevention work in Denmark, including efforts against de-radicalisation and violent extremism.
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding'	
Organisation	*Organisational structure* *SSP collaboration functions on three levels:* - *the political-strategic level*

	- *the coordination level* - *the implementation level.* *The political-strategic level* includes representatives from the highest police ranks, alongside mayors from municipalities and other strategic partners at regional-local level. Here, annual strategies and action plans are drawn up for cross-sectional and interdisciplinary collaboration. *The coordination level* involves local councils and comprises leading figures/coordinators from municipal authorities and local police. The local councils are responsible for implementation of the overall strategies and action plans. Selected SSP consultants are appointed to liaise between coordination and implementation levels. *The implementation level* comprises local professionals from schools, police services, social workers, social housing workers, etc. These professionals are closely networked and meet regularly to coordinate practical preventive actions in the local area.
Country of origin	Denmark
Contact details	SSP Copenhagen ssp@sof.kk.dk
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	**5.11 Archer**
Description	Archer is a consequence management exercise designed to bring together key strategic partners to help them improve their understanding and communication in the wake of a spontaneous counter terrorism arrest. It uses a backdrop of a number of issues such as hate crime, key national events and national demonstrations.
Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure
Target audience	Authorities Local Community Organisations/NGOs Health practitioners
Deliverables	Training modules, DVD and linked workbooks.
Evidence and evaluation	Each delivery is quality assured by trained facilitators in Prevent. Each Archer event is evaluated by regional Prevent teams.
Sustainability and transferability	Archer explores the wide ranging and long term detrimental impact that counter terrorism operations can have on communities if not managed effectively. It plays a great deal of emphasis on media messages and social media in the run up to high profile events. Delivery and cost: Free, excluding venue and provisions. Training is also provided at no cost. Delivered by ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit with support from local Prevent leads.
Geographical scope	Across England Wales and Scotland.
Start of the practice	Since 2010 – based on a concept from Lancashire Constabulary and developed into a national product by ACPO(TAM)/NCTPHQ.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	Nominated through a number of RAN POL meetings but especially at the RAN Pol Study visit in London in December 2013.
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	*The National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) (Formerly ACPO (TAM)) is the strategic coordinating and liaison body of the UK police response to Prevent across all 43 police forces. They are financed by central government Counter-Terrorism funding.*
Country of origin	United Kingdom
Contact details	NCTPHQ Prevent, 8th Floor 10 Victoria Street London, SW1H 0NN United Kingdom prevent.acpotam@met.pnn.police.uk
Last update	2016 and before

Name of the practice	5.12 Channel
Description	Channel was first piloted in 2007 and rolled out across England and Wales in April 2012. Channel is a programme which focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The programme uses a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by: a. identifying individuals at risk; b. assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and c. developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned. Channel may be appropriate for anyone who is vulnerable to being drawn into any form of terrorism. Channel is about ensuring that vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism, and before they become involved in criminal terrorist related activity. Success of the programme is very much dependent on the co-operation and co-ordinated activity of partners. It works best when the individuals and their families fully engage with the programme and are supported in a consistent manner. Individuals and organisations holding extremist views or supporting terrorist-related activity of any kind, in this country or overseas, have no place in delivering Channel and will not be given public funding to do so. This applies irrespective of the source of the funding: central government, local government, policing or other publicly-funded bodies. The police co-ordinate activity by requesting relevant information from panel partners about a referred individual. They will use this information to make an initial assessment of the nature and extent of the vulnerability which the person has. The information will then be presented to a panel. The Counter Terrorism & Security Act 2015 is intended to secure effective local co-operation and delivery of Channel in all areas and to build on the good practice already operating in many areas. In practice, the legislation requires: a. local authorities to ensure that a multi-agency panel exists in their area; b. the local authority to chair the panel; c. the panel to develop a support plan for individuals accepted as Channel cases; d. the panel to consider alternative forms of support, including health and social services, where Channel is not appropriate; e. all partners of a panel (as specified in Schedule 7), so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable, to cooperate with the police and the panel in the carrying out of their functions.
Approach	Creating CVE infrastructure Community engagement/empowerment

Target audience	Authorities Law enforcement officers Local Community Organisations/NGOs
Deliverables	Establishment of multi-agency panel chaired by the Local Authority capable of developing bespoke interventions utilising both mainstream safeguarding techniques as well as bespoke CT/extremism interventions.
Evidence and evaluation	Each referral is monitored for success and outcome by Channel practitioners using the Vulnerability Assessment Framework throughout the process to identify changes in vulnerability.
Sustainability and transferability	Channel is now a statutory duty in England and Wales following its inclusion in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2015. On that basis the programme is sustainable as Local Authorities, the police and other partners must deliver it as core business. It is good practice for Channel to work alongside existing mainstream provision whenever possible.
Geographical scope	England and Wales
Start of the practice	2007
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN POL , 12 -13 December 2013, London (UK)
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	*UK Home Office and Police Service*
Country of origin	United Kingdom
Contact details	NCTPHQ 10 Victoria Street SW1H 0NN, London United Kingdom David Smart, Superintendent david.smart.nctphq@met.pnn.police.uk (+44) 02070848773
Last update	2016 and before

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