

Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Prison and probation
interventions

Radicalisation Awareness Network



2018 Edition

Table of content

Contents

Table of content	2
1. General description	4
2. Aims.....	5
3. Methods	5
4. Lessons learned	7
.4.1 Multi-agency approach in view of rehabilitation.....	7
.4.2 Prison regimes	7
.4.3 Healthy prison environment	8
.4.4 Prison and probation staff training.....	8
.4.5 Barriers to reintegration	8
5. Practices	9
.5.1 <i>R2PRIS Multi-level In-prison Radicalisation Prevention Approach</i>	11
.5.2 <i>Sociocultural and behavioural keys of violent radicalization</i>	16
.5.3 <i>Social Net Conferencing</i>	18
.5.4 <i>De-radicalisation in prisons</i>	20
.5.5 <i>Team TER (Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals)</i>	22
.5.6 <i>Inclusion</i>	25
.5.7 <i>Risk assessment instrument in the Spanish prison context</i>	28
.5.8 <i>From Personal Transformation to Positive Social Impact: IAHV Model</i>	30
.5.9 <i>Training of on-site referee trainers (ORT) on violent islamist radicalisation awareness in detention</i>	38
.5.10 <i>Training courses on violent radicalisation and proselytism in prison</i>	40
.5.11 <i>Information management to prevent radical escalation</i>	42
.5.12 <i>Training for the prison sector</i>	46
.5.13 <i>NeDiC -Network for Deradicalisation in Corrections</i>	48
.5.14 <i>Identification of violent extremism and radicalisation in Finnish prisons</i>	52
.5.15 <i>E-learning: Understanding and Addressing Extremism in Prisons and Probation</i>	56
.5.16 <i>Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2-revised (VERA-2R) Pressman, Rinne, Duits, Flockton (2016)</i>	58
.5.17 <i>Seminar and training for prison staff</i>	63
.5.18 <i>Train-the-Trainer for future prison officers</i>	65
.5.19 <i>Terrorist Wing Vught</i>	67
.5.20 <i>Train-the-trainer awareness training and resource persons</i>	70
.5.21 <i>Multi-disciplinary teams in Romanian prison system</i>	72
.5.22 <i>The manifestation of extremism and radicalisation inside Czech prisons</i>	74

.5.23 *Basic training for correctional officers* 77

1. General description

Practitioners and policy-makers are under immense political and public pressure to ensure public safety in light of the public reaction to terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere. This is particularly apposite in relation to violent extremist offenders (VEOs), a group which includes terrorists and others considered at risk of engaging in violent extremism in a prison and probation context. Since the launch of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2012, the Prison and Probation (RAN P&P) Working Group has focused on preventing violent extremism, engagement with extremist groups and extremist behaviour during detention and probation.

However, since 2012, the context of terrorism has changed dramatically for prisons and probation, with foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) now constituting the chief perceived threat to security in Europe. According to Europol, the largest proportion of arrests in the EU over the past three years ⁽¹⁾ is represented by Jihadist terrorism and foreign fighters, while ethno-nationalist, separatist, left-wing and anarchist terrorism threats have dwindled. Moreover, concerns over right-wing extremism are growing.

This complex situation is reflected in prison and probation environments: practitioners have a responsibility to keep prisons - and the public domain - safe from terrorist activity, and must also deal with individuals at risk of radicalisation. Based on practitioners' experiences collated in the P&P Practitioners' Working Paper ⁽²⁾, RAN P&P has developed an approach to prison and probation interventions.

The RAN P&P principles ⁽³⁾ guiding this approach are as follows:

- promoting offenders' well-being and rehabilitation is the way to best ensure safety for society;
- terrorism crimes apply to a range of activities; individuals sentenced for terrorist acts do not all pose the same risk to society;
- offenders are capable of positive change, and they need support when disengaging from violent extremism;
- universal human rights must be upheld at all times and under all circumstances;
- promoting positive staff-prisoner relationships and healthy prison settings is necessary if radicalisation risk is to be reduced, and rehabilitation and reintegration stimulated;
- multi-agency cooperation is crucial in preventing radicalisation and supporting desistance processes.

⁽¹⁾ Europol. (2016). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat)* (p.18) The Hague: European Union.

⁽²⁾ Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence. (2016). RAN P&P Practitioners' working paper 'Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation'. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_approaches_to_violent_extremist_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence. (2016). RAN P&P Practitioners' working paper 'Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation'. (p. 2). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_approaches_to_violent_extremist_en.pdf

2. Aims

The aim of prison and probation interventions is twofold: to ensure security and safety (for the offender(s) in question, staff, other offenders and society at large), and to support offender rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

There are diverse types of offenders, including individuals who have not committed acts of violence and may never do so. Being radical does not necessarily entail violent action. Any response to radicalisation must acknowledge this diversity. We also recognise that effective management of VEOs and those considered at risk of radicalisation calls for multi-agency cooperation. It is crucial that offenders receive continuous support and that information be exchanged between organisations, including prison and probation services, police, and community organisations.

In pursuing the general aims of safety and rehabilitation, at least three key elements should be taken into account.

- A range of activities are now considered terrorism offences, many of which are non-violent and therefore pose a limited risk to society. 'Lesser risks' include those associated with fundraising, the intention to travel or possession of material considered extremist. The response to such risks should be proportionate, since disproportionate measures may fuel radicalisation processes.
- With some VEOs receiving short sentences, criminal justice systems have a limited window of opportunity in which to affect the process of change. For this reason, continuity is crucial for individuals leaving prison for the community, and multi-agency cooperation is paramount as needs are assessed. Probation services can also help design alternatives to prison rehabilitation.
- In light of the different types of offenders and the varied associated risks and needs, specialised programmes might be considered, although decision-making should be informed by the contextual and individual circumstances.

3. Methods

Member States hold at least two approaches towards VEOs, and these apply to both prison and probation.

- General approach: Member States adopting this approach tend to normalise the risk associated with VEOs and radicalisation, through a rehabilitation approach not tailored to the group (although it might be tailored to the individual).
- Specialist approach: Member States adopting specialised approaches believe the risks call for special structures and/or processes. The offenders' individual circumstances are the defining criteria that determine whether a specialist approach is required.

In terms of security and safety, the following interventions and methods are in use.

- General monitoring, which is linked predominantly to intelligence gathering. If considered relevant, information is collected, analysed and reported. General monitoring has the advantage of individualising decision-making, as information-gathering targets specific individuals. However, its disadvantage lies in the subjective judgement on which the decision-making is based, which increases the risk of false positives; also, there is a low level of risk acceptance of radicalised individuals. To offset this disadvantage, many Member States use risk assessment tools.
- Risk assessment tools have been developed in an attempt to prevent the formation of subjective judgement based on information gathered through monitoring, and thus provide a 'statistical' foundation for the decision-making process. However, these tools are under development and are still in their infancy. There is also a risk that these tools might be used in a predictive way:

adverse effects include labelling individuals as 'extremists', contributing to alienation and potentially decreasing the legitimacy (fairness) of the prison (4). Therefore, it is important to use specialised tools alongside other more general risk and need assessment tools. In both cases, it is vital that risks be assessed regularly, to ensure that individuals have the possibility of lowering their risk.

- Prison regimes is another method used to ensure safety and security objectives. VEOs placed in the prison infrastructure fall under certain regimes, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Advantages and disadvantages of regime choice

Regime choice	Potential advantages	Potential disadvantages
Containment Placing VEOs together in a special wing/unit within the prison	-Close monitoring -Limited effect on mainstream population -Focused interventions -Specialised staff -Reassuring for public safety concerns	-New and stronger bonds forged among prisoners -Eroded trust between staff and prisoners -Entrenched oppositional mindset -Perceptions of unfairness reinforced -Labelling effects; stigmatisation -Status associated with being on a special unit -All VEOs assumed to be of equal risk -Difficulties finding staff -High financial cost
Dispersal Dispersing VEOs within the 'regular' prison population, based on risk assessment	-Less stigmatisation and marginalisation -No status derived from placement on special unit -Opportunities for positive influence from others	-General staff; training costs -Difficult to ensure high quality of intelligence -Challenges in 'knowing' prisoners and dynamic security -VEOs may exert influence over others -VEOs may be influenced by criminal gangs
Combination Having both containment and dispersal options available	-Tailor-made response to individual needs/risks	-Selection criteria/risk assessments are imprecise

VEO rehabilitation interventions and methods are as follows.

- Psychological care: although individual psychological sessions are more expensive and harder to finance, experience dictates that they also generate the best results. During group interventions,

(4) Liebling, A., & Williams, R. J. (in press). The new subversive geranium: Some notes on the management of additional troubles in maximum security prisons, *British Journal of Sociology*.

participants are often less 'honest', especially regarding their own situation and views. The potential disruption of group dynamics (e.g. charismatic radical 'leaders' who challenge facilitators) must also be taken into account.

- Religious and spiritual support: chaplaincy provisions can help with religious education and support, as well as challenge certain views and provide opportunities for detainees to consider issues differently. However, at times, care and guidance overlap with deradicalisation and preventive aims, for example when providing alternative theological perspectives. Therefore, chaplains involved in disengagement/deradicalisation efforts should be trained for this task.
- Social support: working with family and friends as partners in a disengagement process is effective if the social circle was not a factor in the radicalisation process in the first place. Interventions such as mentor projects can also be used to provide social support and help build trust-based relationships, for example with staff, community members and NGO professionals.

4. Lessons learned

.4.1 Multi-agency approach in view of rehabilitation

One of the principal lessons learned in prison and probation interventions is the importance of multi-agency approaches. A multi-agency approach is called for at several stages of the sentence. Given that the aim of any intervention is rehabilitation of the inmate, the approach must incorporate different fields of intervention.

Police and intelligence services are fundamental allies in the multi-agency approach, mainly thanks to their information-gathering. In some cases, prison administrations have developed intelligence units within the prisons.

Multi-agency cooperation is also very important during the transition period from prison to community: it maximises opportunities for offenders to have their needs accurately assessed and met. Part of post-release planning, this cooperation should involve a multidisciplinary team to cover individualised needs and risks, build trustful relationships and social networks, and offer support. In particular, it is key that positive relationships be developed to provide support, suggestions and help when needed: transitional periods are vulnerable times when the risk of recidivism is high, and having plans in place is vital.

.4.2 Prison regimes

In terms of choice of prison regimes, the lessons learned are both limited and general, as circumstances vary greatly among Member States. Key recommendations included in the P&P Practitioners' Working Paper include the following.

- Prison regime choices should be guided by the aim to normalise VEOs whilst minimising risks to the VEOs themselves, other prisoners, staff and the general public.
- The pros and cons of different prison regime models for managing the risks around radicalisation must be carefully considered alongside the individual needs of offenders. For prisoners demonstrating behaviour of concern linked to radicalisation, special units might be necessary, but their use must be guided by clear entrance and exit criteria, and they must operate within the legal frameworks of the country concerned.
- Differentiation within special units is important for tailoring security and rehabilitation efforts to different levels of risk and need, in relation to the level of the offence and the individual's gender and ideological background.

.4.3 Healthy prison environment

A healthy prison environment can also make a positive difference in staging a successful disengagement intervention. Indeed, the risks of radicalisation are reduced in professional, secure and fair prisons. The absence of these elements can reinforce extremist mindsets and distrust towards authorities, and increase the chances of formation of groups and triggers for violence. Investing in day-to-day staff-offender relationships, through staff empowerment, professionalism, respect and dynamic security measures, is key to dealing with VEOs.

- **Staff-prisoner relationship:** a good VEO-staff relationship can help build trust and break down 'us' versus 'them' barriers and the distrust and suspicion towards 'the authorities' often held by extremist individuals.
- **Personal development:** vocational training is important, not only for the personal development of prisoners, but also to minimise distress. Developing personal skills might also facilitate the transition period once the inmate is released.
- **Conditions and family contact:** family contact is a crucial form of support for prisoners, and contributes to the formation of healthy relationships after release. Frequency of contact with family, a meaningful space for visits that includes comfortable child-friendly areas, and an appropriate time allocated for meaningful contact are all important. Family bonds can be a positive driving force for rehabilitation.
- **Security, safety and control:** a lack of structure and inconsistencies in security and control can negatively impact prisoners' experiences, and safety needs may be met through other means, including groups (e.g. religious or gang-like groups) that offer protection.
- **Professionalism:** professional discretion should be exercised to ensure that punitive practices are enforced only when other options have been exhausted. Staff should communicate clearly with prisoners so that they understand why disciplinary actions are being taken and what behaviour needs addressing. Professionalism entails equal treatment of VEOs and other offenders.

.4.4 Prison and probation staff training

A useful lesson learned from Member States' experiences is to set up a national training and support unit for prison and probation staff that can help with dissemination of training material, development of better training practices and psychological support for staff. A national training unit at central level can also ensure harmonisation and standardisation of training materials, strengthen cooperation at local, national and international levels and facilitate the sharing of best practices and training material.

Another key element is to ensure that both general and specialist training are provided. General training should be made available to all staff, and specialist training is required for different staff roles and in relation to the prisoner population considered at risk. Staff training should include diversity awareness: staff must appreciate different cultural and religious backgrounds of prisoners if they are to distinguish between behaviours and practices potentially linked to radicalisation and those that are not. Staff should be trained to understand radicalisation as a process, as well as the individual, social and environmental reasons behind prisoners' behaviour. Staff must recognise the process, not just be on the lookout for 'signs'.

.4.5 Barriers to reintegration

Research has long established that offenders encounter significant difficulties (economic, relational and emotional, among others) in becoming 'requalified citizens' once released from prison. Individuals convicted of terrorist offences face additional barriers. There are unique sources of stigma associated with terrorist offences, and in some contexts, this negative label may be appropriated to serve as a status symbol in marginalised communities.

Stigmatisation: stigmatised offenders experience challenges in accessing social support and opportunities to reintegrate, including employment or education opportunities. Professionals working with VEOs must make a point of providing support to offenders as they seek to reintegrate. Offenders who feel they are the subject of prejudice may entrench barriers and reinforce oppositional and radicalised identities.

Trust: it is crucial that professionals work towards building and maintaining trust with offenders as well as with wider segments of the public. Distrust of communities or community organisations can reinforce perceptions of unfairness among community members. Member States' probation services (or their equivalent) can benefit from building strong relationships with community organisations. This ensures that multiple sectors of society maximise opportunities for offenders, post-release.

Release conditions: conditions can be quite strict for these offenders, more so than those for other types of offenders. This may hamper reintegration, if, for example, offenders are easily recalled to prison for breaches. Practitioners, however, may also utilise these conditions (and the more frequent contact they entail) as an opportunity to work closely with offenders and respond to their needs.

5. Practices

The following practices were represented:

- BSAFE LAB University of Beira Interior — R2PRIS Multi-level In-prison Radicalisation Prevention Approach
- Catalan Penitentiary System — Sociocultural and behavioural keys of violent radicalization
- NEUSTART: social net conferencing
- DERAD – Network social cohesion, Dialogue, Extremism-Prevention and Democracy - De-radicalisation in prisons
- Dutch Probation Service: team TER (Terrorists, Extremists, Radicals)
- Dutch Probation Service: inclusion
- General Secretariat of Penitentiary Institutions Vice-Directorate General for Institutional Relations and Regional Coordination — Risk assessment instrument in the Spanish prison context
- International Association for Human Values (IAHV) - From Personal Transformation to Positive Social Impact: IAHV Model
- Ministry of Justice in France: training of on-site referee trainers (ORT) on violent Islamist radicalisation awareness in detention
- Ministry of Justice in Italy: training courses on violent radicalisation and proselytism in prisons
- National Counter Terrorism Coordination (NCTV) - Training for the prison sector
- NeDiC - Network for Deradicalisation in Corrections
- Criminal sanction agency and Vantaa prison: identification of violent extremism and radicalisation in Finnish prisons
- Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS): e-learning understanding and addressing extremism in prisons and probation
- SAZ Schweizerisches Ausbildungszentrum für das Strafvollzugspersonal: recognising radicalisation in prison
- Ministry of Justice in Austria: seminar and training for prison staff.
- National School for Training of Prison Agents Tîrgu Ocna, Romania — Train-the-Trainer for future prison officers
- Pi Vught - Terrorist Wing Vught
- The national security unit and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service

- The National Penitentiary Administration - Bucharest - Multi-disciplinary teams in Romanian prison system
- The Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP)
- The Police academy of the Czech Republic - The manifestation of extremism and radicalisation inside Czech prisons
- The Supplemental education department at the University College of Norwegian Correctional Services (KRUS)
- Strafvollzugsakademie - Training modules for prison staff

Name of the practice	.5.1 <i>R2PRIS Multi-level In-prison Radicalisation Prevention Approach</i>
Description	<p>The project was developed under the European Commission project 'Radicalisation prevention in prisons' (R2PRIS) (http://www.r2pris.org/), following concerted transnational cooperation across academia, private sector researchers, correctional sector representatives and practitioners.</p> <p>The R2PRIS Multi-level In-prison Radicalisation Prevention Approach aims to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - create awareness of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the broader picture of terrorism, the mindset involved and narratives employed – this will help us understand why prisons are a breeding ground for radicalisation; - the difference between conversion, radicalisation and moving to extremist views (i.e. the terminology involved); - the pathways and levels of radicalisation; - recruitment tactics employed within the prison environment; - indicators on how to identify vulnerable people at risk of radicalisation; - provide instruments to help staff screen and assess inmates and report their observations to the appropriate staff throughout the organisation, as well as to the appropriate intelligence staff; - certify professionals at different levels of the prison administration (prison governors, frontline officers and technical staff, internal trainers and facilitators) in use of the tools that will enable them to identify risks, and screen and assess inmates that may be at risk of becoming radicalised, but also to train other colleagues in the use of these tools. <p>The R2PRIS approach includes both screening and risk assessment tools, as well as training materials (online and classroom) tailored for different levels of staff.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation Training for first line practitioners
Target audience	First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers Prison/probation/judicial practitioners
Deliverables	<p>The R2PRIS approach includes both assessment tools and training materials (online and classroom) tailored for different levels of staff.</p> <p>1. Assessment tools. The R2PRIS Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP) is an assessment process that includes a battery of instruments aiming to provide a broad assessment of inmates' vulnerabilities and risk of radicalisation. It forms part of the R2PRIS Multi-level In-prison Radicalisation Prevention approach, which also includes the Critical Incidents Readiness Assessment (CIRA). Comprising three different instruments that assess the perception of three diverse audiences (prison governors/administrators, frontline staff, and technical staff), the RRAP Toolset aims to assist both individuals and prison systems in thoughtful consideration of the factors and necessary steps, so as to provide</p>

thorough, well-considered opinions on the potential risk of future physical, radical-based violence from a known individual.

- The first RRAP tool is the **Helicopter View (HV)** (prison/prison administration level), an organisational risk assessment tool that aims to raise awareness and support prison governors/prison system administrators to reflect and assess situational dimensions in preventing radicalisation, and to identify the strategies and action plans that need to be implemented.
- The second tool, the **Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines (FBOG)** (frontline level) is an instrument developed to raise awareness of radicalisation in prisons and to support frontline staff (prison officers, educators, teachers, social workers, etc.) in signalling behaviours/changes in behaviours that might represent the externalisation of cognitive radicalisation in inmates.
- The third tool, **Individual Radicalisation Screening (IRS)**, is for technical staff, mainly psychologists or staff undergoing training to use psychological assessments. The IRS aims to assess inmates' risk of radicalisation, following a process view of radicalisation that progresses from individual vulnerabilities that might be present at the pre-radicalisation stage, to more extreme involvement (militancy) with radical groups.
- Additionally, the **Critical Incidents Readiness Assessment Readiness Assessment (CIRA)** is an organisational risk assessment tool that aims to raise awareness and assess service readiness to contend with major security emergencies.

The R2PRIS approach and assessment tools have been developed to be used with inmates suspected of being vulnerable or on a radicalisation path, not those convicted of extremism-related violence or terrorism crimes or for being part of a terrorist organisation.

2. Training. Use of the R2PRIS RRAP tools requires a 'training of trainers' certification process. The certification process consists of **online and classroom training and follow-up coaching** sessions after employing the tools.

To support their work, certified professionals will have access to:

- **the R2PRIS methodological framework**
- **training session materials** (facilitator kit with training templates, manuals and presentations)
- **R2PRIS tools** (includes the user manual for each tool, response forms and result report sheets)
- **online resources and the complete R2PRIS online training course.**

The online course was developed through an interactive process and resulted in concerted transnational cooperation across academia, private sector research, correctional sector representatives and practitioners. The course was piloted in Portugal, Belgium, Romania, Norway and Turkey and was improved following user practitioners' feedback.

Evidence and evaluation

Development process. The approach used to develop both the assessment tools and training materials followed an interactive and collaborative research-based development process. This process involved researchers from different universities and research labs, and practitioners from seven jurisdictions (governors, psychologists and prison officers) who used and tested the tools, provided feedback, participated in joint reflection exercises, provided feedback on the recommendations received from the field-test, and in some cases, had the chance to re-use the tools in a real-life context.

Feedback was collected both via questionnaires completed by end-users, as well as in short-term staff training events in Portugal, Romania, Turkey, Norway and Belgium. Overall, more than 70 practitioners were involved in these sessions.

Peer review process. The peer-review process was put in place at an early stage, gathering the feedback of participants from different training, design events and conferences, under the framework of **RAN Prisons and Probation: 'Radicalisation Assessment in Prisons'** (RAN Radicalisation Awareness Network and Excellence Centre, Brussels, 9-10 July 2018), or other events.

Future events:

- 'R2PRIS - A multi-level approach to deal with radicalisation prevention in prisons. Results from 3 years of development in Europe', **ICPA International Corrections and Prisons Association, Montreal, Canada, 21-26 October 2018**
- **EU-Council of Europe HELP Radicalisation Prevention Project, 20-21 September 2018**
- Seminar on Radicalisation Prevention, Brussels,
- **'Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons in Europe'**, High-level conference, Ministry of Justice, Berlin, Germany, 13-14 September 2018.

Developed:

- **'Terrorism and Radicalism in Prisons', Counter Terrorism World Summit**, organised by the Israel Prison Service in cooperation with the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Israel, 2-6 September 2018
- **Criminal Justice Summer Course**, Barcelona, Spain, 3-6 July 2018
- **R2PRIS International Conference** on Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons, Lisbon, Portugal, 3 July 2018. Attended by over 60 participants from 17 countries, including not only neighbouring Spain but also Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden and other European countries as well as Norway, Israel, Switzerland, Canada and the United States
- **Caribbean conference of heads of correctional services**, Kingston, Jamaica, 11-14 June 2018
- **R2PRIS Staff training**, Brussels, Belgium, 16-20 April 2018
- **R2PRIS Staff training**, Bucharest, Romania, 5-9 March 2018
- **European Commission Conference on Radicalisation in Prisons**, Brussels, 27 February 2018
- **R2PRIS Seminar and meeting**, Ankara, Turkey, 7-8-2017
- **19th International Conference of ICPA**, London, UK, 22-27 October 2017
- **R2PRIS Staff training**, Lisbon, Portugal, 24-29 September 2017
- **R2PRIS meeting**, Lillestrøm, Norway, 8-9 November 2016
- **18th International Conference of ICPA**, Bucharest, Romania, 23-28 October 2016

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 'Pathways to Radicalisation and Recruitment: Intervention Strategies in the Balkans, Central and South Eastern Europe', April 2016 - Open Class: 'Radicalisation: a challenge to European Societies - the role of penitentiary systems', Covilhã, Portugal, November 2015. <p>EU policy implications. R2PRIS is one of the European Commission actions of the European Action plan to fight terrorism (state of play of implementing the Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing) mentioned in Annex I, p. 5 of the Communication <i>Eighth progress report towards an effective and genuine Security Union</i> (Brussels, 29.6.2017 COM(2017) 354 final).</p> <p>Furthermore, R2PRIS has been selected by the European Commission to be presented at the European Conference on Radicalisation in Prisons (February 2018), hosted by DG Justice of the European Commission and the Bulgarian Presidency of the European Union, in the presence of Commissioners Věra Jourová (Justice) and David King (Security), and more than 140 participants representing more than 30 jurisdictions.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	The practice has been developed through transnational cooperation across correctional services from different jurisdictions, and therefore has great potential for transferability. The certification (train the trainer) courses, online training materials and other tools that are customizable to the specific context of each country contribute to its transferability. The partners who developed the practice are constantly updating the knowledge base of cases, indicators and training materials.
Geographical scope	The practice has been either initially implemented or tested (fully or partially) by prison professionals in Belgium, Portugal, Norway, Romania and Turkey under the R2PRIS framework. Currently, prison professionals from countries such as France, Bulgaria, Greece and Germany (in the framework of the PRACTICIES and INTEGRA projects) are also involved.
Start of the practice	The practice started development in 2015 and was tested throughout 2017 and 2018. Reviewing its results and making suggestions for improvement continue to be part of the continuous improvement process adopted by the project consortia.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	'RAN Prisons and Probation: 'Radicalisation Assessment in Prisons' (RAN Radicalisation Awareness Network and Excellence Centre, Brussels, 9-10 July 2018)
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	The 3-year R2PRIS project was funded by the EU through the ERASMUS+ programme (KA2 - Strategic partnerships for adult education, Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons' - 2015-1-PT01-KA204-013062 (R2PRIS)), with an overall budget of EUR 330 000. This practice is also related to other projects modelled on its research and achievements, e.g. Partenariat contre la radicalisation violente dans les villes (PRACTICIES) (H2020); the Integrated community, probation and prison services radicalisation prevention approach (INTEGRA) (ERASMUS+); the Integrated exit programme for prisons and probation (WayOut) (DG Home); and the Holistic radicalisation prevention initiative (HOPE) (EEA Grants, submitted).
Organisation	The BSAFE LAB Law Enforcement, Justice and Public Safety Lab of the Beira Interior University (public, Portugal) together with IPS Innovative

	<p>Prison Systems (private) is in consortium with the Romanian Centre for Correctional Studies of the University of West Timisoara (Romania), the Belgian Prison Service, the Norwegian Prison Service, the Romanian Prison Service, the Turkish Prison Service, International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA) and the European Organisation of Prisons and Correctional Services (EuroPris), and the associated partners are the Portuguese Prison Service and the Swiss Federal Penitentiary Training Centre.</p>
Country of origin	Belgium, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands, Romania and Turkey
Contact details	<p>Contact: IPS Innovative Prison Systems (QUALIFY JUST, Ltd)</p> <p>Contact person: Pedro das Neves</p> <p>Email: pedro.neves@prisonsystems.eu</p> <p>Telephone: +35 1939619873</p> <p>Website: http://www.prisonssystem.eu/</p> <p>Address: BSAFE LAB University of Beira Interior Rua Marquês de Ávila e Bolama 6201-001 Covilhã Portugal</p> <p>Contact person: Prof. Nuno Garcia</p> <p>Email: ngarcia@di.ubi.pt</p> <p>Websites: http://www.ubi.pt/en/ and http://bsafe.ubi.pt/</p>
Last update	2018

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.2 <i>Sociocultural and behavioural keys of violent radicalization</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>The training targets prison, probation and penitentiary staff, with the aim being for them to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - become aware of and identify the main features of Islamic religion and culture; - analyse the evolution and radicalisation of Jihadism in our social environment; - improve their identification and detection of indicators linked to personal processes of radicalisation. <p>This training is similar to that of the training activity 'Cat 1', with the difference here being that each subject is explored in depth.</p> <p>Training is delivered by external experts in related fields (police, the university and a research institute studying this area).</p> <p>Duration: 20 hours</p> <p>Resources: a classroom with commonly used school equipment (PC, projector, etc.) and funding for the trainers.</p>
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation</p> <p>Training is based on presentations of actual cases (analysis of real situations carried out by the prison staff involved) as well as a review of the relevant theory for each case being considered.</p> <p>The training activity takes a sociological and anthropological approach, from a security and security-research perspective.</p>
<p>Target audience</p>	<p>Prison/probation/judicial practitioners</p> <p>Prison guards, prison rehabilitation staff, probation staff and the juvenile justice system staff</p>
<p>Deliverables</p>	<p>Face-to-face training</p>
<p>Evidence and evaluation</p>	<p>We prepared a one-morning course on the subject in order to offer staff a general knowledge session. The evaluation noted that 'more in-depth activity' was needed. The course had taken 3 years to prepare.</p> <p>Ongoing evaluation is carried out via a questionnaire handed out to attendants and trainers following each activity.</p>
<p>Sustainability and transferability</p>	<p>The activity is easily sustained, and can be partially transferred to other countries.</p> <p>Although part of the content is very much focused on the Catalan situation, this could be adapted.</p>

Geographical scope	Catalan Penitentiary System
Start of the practice	Coming soon
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with European Penitentiary Training Academies (EPTA) and EuroPris.
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	Yes
Organisation	Governmental institution
Country of origin	Spain
Contact details	Contact persons: mferrerp@gencat.cat or ijambrina@gencat.cat
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	.5.3 <i>Social Net Conferencing</i>
Description	<p>Social net conferencing offers offenders in prison the chance to develop a mandatory plan for their future after their release. Offenders work together with their social network (or net) to create this plan, which is then sent to the judge, who issues orders according to the plan, at the trial. The probation officer supervises compliance with the orders, and therefore also implementation of the plan.</p> <p>The method benefits radicalised individuals by helping them develop a strategy or plan covering daily life, work, housing and so on, alongside their social network and associated professionals.</p> <p>The social net conference is organised by one or two coordinators, who set up the meeting between radicalised individuals and their social nets. Under the social net conference and the plan developed, radicalised individuals are obliged to fulfil the conditions of the plan. In this way, the individual's return to radicalised environments can be prevented – initiating a change for the better.</p> <p>The probation officer participates in the conference, and formulates the main concerns in terms of release and recidivism. The plan should address these concerns.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation Community engagement/empowerment
Target audience	Violent extremists, radicalised inmates Families Prison/probation/judicial practitioners
Deliverables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hofinger, V., & Schmidinger, T. (2017). Deradikalisierung im Gefängnis. Wien, Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology. Retrieved from http://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/Endbericht_Begleitforschung_2017.pdf - Grafl et al. (2014). Evaluationsstudie zum Projekt Sozialnetz-Konferenz in der Bewährungshilfe, Abschlussbericht.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>The studies mentioned above evaluate the method and include feedback from target groups (participants).</p> <p>Social net conferencing is part of the NEUSTART service, and therefore forms part of the quantitative data which NEUSTART deliver via the internal electronic documentation system.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	<p>To transfer the practice, it is important to get the Ministry of Justice on board, to ensure that the social net conferences can be held in prison. Cases for social net conferences are assigned by judges. The coordinators organising the conference are trained in workshops and seminars, and also by other coordinators already experienced in applying the method.</p> <p>NEUSTART offers two different types of social net conferences: those held in pretrial custody and those held prior to release. For social net conferences in pretrial custody, offenders and the social network work on a plan, which will be presented to the judge at trial. It should be an additional basis for decision-making on the sentence. One coordinator organises this type of conference, and is granted 8 hours working time per conference.</p>

	<p>For social net conferences held prior to release, offenders and the social network prepare a plan, which will be presented to the judge determining the parole. This type of conference is organised by two coordinators; in addition to the social net conference, a follow-up conference is held 6 months later. In this follow-up, offenders and participants review the status of the plan, and discuss what works and what does not work in implementing the plan.</p>
Geographical scope	Austria
Start of the practice	It started in 2014 – it is in practice and is defined by the Juvenile Code.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	P&P working group, Riga, December 2016
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	<p>NEUSTART is a non-profit organisation, set up as an association, funded by the Austrian Ministry of Justice. NEUSTART provides probation services in Austria. In addition, NEUSTART offers social work services in the fields of electronic home detention, victim-offender mediation, after-care services and community services. Since 2014, NEUSTART has also offered social net conferences, and therefore this method is also financed by the Ministry of Justice.</p>
Country of origin	Austria
Contact details	<p>Address: Castelligasse 17 1050 Wien Austria</p> <p>Contact person: Bernd Glaeser Email: bernd.glaeser@neustart.at</p> <p>Telephone: +43 154595601201 Website: http://www.neustart.at/at/en/</p>
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	.5.4 <i>De-radicalisation in prisons</i>
Description	We use counter and alternative narratives focused on the political ideology of ‘political salafiyya’, which can lead to violent extremism and consequently terrorism. The examples and methods that we use are based on history, al-aqida, fiqh, manhaj, pedagogy, history and civic education. The practice was set up to prevent violent extremism and achieve de-radicalisation in prisons as well as among clients who are on probation. The practice is also used for clients in a non-legal context, and who are very often part of a social network of radicalised people. The NGO DERAD has 13 members, all academics who are pedagogues, Islamic and/or political scientists.
Approach	Prison and Probation and Exit strategies Delivering alternative narratives and counter narratives
Target audience	Violent extremists Formers Prison/probation/judicial practitioners
Deliverables	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Work in prisons in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice. Talks with convicted terrorists, foreign fighters or supporters of terrorist organisations: radicalisation, disengagement, demobilisation. Methods are described above. 2. Assessment of possible radicalisation of inmates in prisons and other institutions such as schools, refugee camps, etc. 3. Disengagement for people on probation. 4. Activities with former foreign fighters, such as workshops and derad, as part of an exit-strategy to interact with society
Evidence and evaluation	<p>Written reports and assessments are drafted after every conversation with inmates/clients in prison or on probation. A study on extremism involving 50% of inmates in 2016/2017 has been finished, but not yet published. The publication will be published on the website of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Integration (foreseen for December 2017). The title is “Lebenswelten und Radikalisierungsverläufe von inhaftierten sogenannten Dschihadisten in Österreich. Eine Untersuchung von Personen mit Bezug zu terroristischen Vereinigungen aus dem Bereich der sogenannten politischen und dschihadistischen Salafiyya in Österreich.“</p> <p>Publications: https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Integration/Publikationen/Studie_Lebenswelten_und_Radikalisierungsverlaeufe_von_Dschihadisten_in_OEsterreich.pdf</p>
Sustainability and transferability	“de-radicalised” persons support DERAD and clients stay in contact with DERAD. Experiences are shared at conferences, seminars, workshops and via publications.

Geographical scope	Austria and EU and Europe
Start of the practice	2010 and 2013 (DERAD)
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN Exit June 2016
Relation to other EC initiatives	Contact via the Foreign Ministry, Ministry for Internal Affairs and OSCE with representatives of other NGOs and GOs. Regular interaction and exchange with German counterparts. Lectures and workshops in other countries, including Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Kosovo, Bosnia, Moldova, Spain, and Switzerland.
Organization	<i>DERAD - Netzwerk sozialer Zusammenhalt für Dialog, Extremismusprävention und Demokratie- English: DERAD - Network social cohesion, Dialogue, Extremism-Prevention and Democracy (EUISA Network) (and EMJD - Muslim Jewish Dialogue)</i>
Country of origin	Austria
Contact details	Bonygasse 27, Top 5, A-1120 Wien Moussa Al-Hassan Diaw +43 664 75 000 671 www.derad.at deradaustria@gmail.com
Last update	2016

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.5 <i>Team TER (Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals)</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>The nationally operating Team TER (Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals) helps the Dutch Probation Service prevent (further) radicalisation by Dutch probationers. It aims chiefly to disengage radicalised Muslims (mainly home-grown jihadi) from radical movements using a tailor-made probation approach, and to influence their behaviour. Push and pull factors are used to promote behavioural change and stimulate the process of reintegration into society. The main tasks are risk management and supervision, carried out in close cooperation with partners (judicial, prison, police and municipal authorities). The team is also supported by psychological and theological experts.</p> <p>The Dutch Probation Service engages with persons suspected or convicted of terrorism-related offenses such as rioting, recruiting and financing. Individuals suspected or convicted of offences like attempting to travel to or return from conflict areas or preparing an attack are referred to Team TER. In addition, Team TER engages with individuals who are suspected or convicted of other offences but are known to be involved in radicalisation- or terrorist-related risks.</p> <p>The team comprises 20 (internationally) trained probation officers specialised in relevant fields. They use regular probation methods of working in a judicial framework with mandated clients and make cognitive behavioural interventions.</p>
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation</p>
<p>Target audience</p>	<p>Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Violent extremists</p>
<p>Deliverables</p>	<p>There is a factsheet available (in Dutch), with brief information on Team TER for stakeholders.</p>
<p>Evidence and evaluation</p>	<p>Team TER is a learning community that is developing its own approach. The shared tacit knowledge of probation officers forms one of the main sources. Where there is insufficient expertise, or need for additional knowledge, extra support is sought. International cooperation is needed to assess whether treatment programmes are suitable for application in the Netherlands. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the target group presents diverse problems, and therefore, tailor-made interventions per individual are necessary.</p> <p>The involvement of science and education in this field of study and the translation into concrete methods applicable to the Dutch context (cultural, but also legislative and regulatory) are desirable. Of course, this also means that international research and expertise are employed by Team TER, and can be exchanged with other probation organisations.</p>

<p>Sustainability and transferability</p>	<p>We have plans to modify the methods of Team TER to accommodate the scope of broader groups of extremists (right-wing militants, anti-government ‘patriot’ groups, eco- and pro-animal radicals, etc.). A scientific article for a peer-reviewed journal has been published and a chapter in the Dutch probation method book is in preparation.</p> <p>To evaluate the extent to which this programme has succeeded in achieving its goals, Leiden University was asked to map the progress of the project in February 2013 and February 2014.</p> <p>A follow-up of this study is being carried out over the period of January 2016 and December 2017. This is expected in the fall of 2019.</p> <p>Schuurman, B., & Bakker, E. (2016). Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013-2014. <i>Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression</i>, 8(1), 66-85. Doi:10.1080/19434472.2015.1100648</p>
<p>Geographical scope</p>	<p>Netherlands</p>
<p>Start of the practice</p>	<p>Team TER was set up in 2012 with the development of the Dutch Approach.</p>
<p>Presented and discussed in RAN meeting</p>	<p>RAN P&P, 14-15 June 2016, Berlin Exit programmes and interventions in prison and probation</p>
<p>Relation to other EC initiatives</p>	<p>None</p>
<p>Organisation</p>	<p>The Dutch Probation Service is an independent organisation with the primary goal of shaping a safer society. The Probation Service is actively involved in the criminal justice process; when an offender is detained, it plays an advisory and supervisory role during the court session and the detention period. Judicial, municipal, prison and police authorities cooperate to prevent offenders from reoffending.</p> <p>Probation workers provide advisory services to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Judiciary, supervise conditional sanctions and measures, and implement alternative sanctions (e.g. community services). Dutch detainees abroad receive assistance from the International Office of the Dutch Probation Service. In supervision, probation workers continually monitor whether offenders are honouring the agreements made. In cognitive behavioural training, offenders’ motivation is increased, prosocial choices are encouraged and self-reflection is stimulated, so that behavioural change can be established.</p>
<p>Country of origin</p>	<p>Netherlands</p>
<p>Contact details</p>	<p>Address: Reclassering Nederland Vivaldiplantsoen 100 3503 RE Utrecht Netherlands</p> <p>Contact person: Ada Andreas</p>

	Email: a.andreas@reclassering.nl Telephone: +31 888042004 and +31 651040081 Website: https://www.reclassering.nl
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	.5.6 <i>Inclusion</i>
Description	<p>Inclusion is inspired by two existing programmes: EXIT Sweden and the Dutch cognitive behavioural programme Solo. We used the elements of each programme that appeared best suited to our target group. The key element of Solo is the participation of a so-called significant other (SO) in the reintegration process, while EXIT Sweden focuses on building a new identity outside the extremist network.</p> <p>Inclusion is an individualised, tailor-made programme that is elaborated during probation supervision. Inclusion’s chief aim of is to disengage radicalised Muslims (mainly home-grown jihadi) from radical movements.</p> <p>It consists of three modules.</p> <p>1. Practical help</p> <p>In the first stage of Inclusion, the trainer alone provides practical help. The participant draws a Plan for the Future, in which he or she defines goals. For instance, there may be housing, employment, or debt problems to be tackled. By meeting the material needs of the participant, the trainer gains their trust and establishes a working alliance. The participant learns new skills to boost their self-confidence. This will broaden the participant’s perspective and provide an opportunity to move away from the radical environment.</p> <p>2. Network approach</p> <p>At the same time, trainer and participant map the network of the participant: is there anyone in the former prosocial network (teacher, imam or friend, for instance) that the participant wants to get in touch with? If so, contact is made, and this SO then assists the participant with hands-on activities. If there is no SO available in the network, Inclusion provides a volunteer.</p> <p>The trainer also encourages participants to repair relations with a friend or family member, with support from the SO. Consultations can also be arranged with religious experts, e.g. an imam. By degrees, the participant is introduced into and included in society by expanding his network. The trainer continues to build a trusting relationship, and motivates the participant to achieve (behavioural) change.</p> <p>3. Cognitive behavioural training</p> <p>If the participant starts to use the ‘language of change’, Module 3 is launched. This involves nine categories of cognitive behavioural exercises:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • thinking patterns/attitude/behaviour • impulsivity • anger/frustration tolerance • locus of control • identity/vulnerability

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coping • (universal) values • (religious) meaning • social skills. <p>The trainer selects the themes that play a role in the life of the participant. If agreed by the participant, the SO may participate.</p> <p>In June 2017, Inclusion is to be tested by trained members of the Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals (TER) team of the Dutch Probation Service.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation Exit strategies
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Violent extremists First responders or practitioners
Deliverables	In 2016, the programme Manual of Inclusion was completed. We also produced a Working Book that includes the required training materials (URLs, pictures, puzzles, etc.). There is also a Factsheet available (in Dutch), containing brief information on Inclusion for our stakeholders.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>Inclusion is being developed in close cooperation with the TER team. Dutch experts were consulted, and extensive desk research carried out. Feedback was submitted continually in earlier versions of the programme.</p> <p>Although Inclusion is a new initiative, it is derived from two programmes that have theoretical bases (for literature on Solo, see Robinson (2007), Priestley & VanStone (2006) and Hankinson & Priestley (2010); for literature on EXIT Sweden, see Christensen (2015)). In assessing whether the programme structure of Inclusion is effective for radicalised Muslims, several questions need to be addressed:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Does the trainer succeed in building a trustful relationship with the participant? 2. Do the practical activities lead to increased community engagement? 3. Does the network approach lead to an improved relationship with a family member or friend? 4. Is the SO of additional value? 5. Do the exercises in Module 3 have a positive impact on the cognitive deficits of the target group? <p>In July 2017, we will conduct a pilot study to research the questions mentioned above. If Inclusion is positively evaluated, we will submit the programme to the Judicial Interventions Dutch Accreditation Panel in 2018. We are striving for a First Degree accreditation, i.e. 'Theoretically well grounded.'</p>
Sustainability and transferability	We have plans to modify Inclusion to accommodate the scope of broader groups of extremists (right-wing militants, anti-government 'patriot' groups, eco- and pro-animal radicals, etc.). Inclusion is originally designed for an ambulant setting (probation). If the

	programme is positively evaluated, it could be made suitable for the Terrorism Wings of the Dutch Prisons.
Geographical scope	Netherlands
Start of the practice	We will start with Inclusion in July 2017.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	We discussed Inclusion at the IMPACT-RAN workshop, on 10 and 11 November 2016. The workshop was held in Cambridge in support of training on how to elaborate the evaluation of radicalisation interventions.
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	<p>The Dutch Probation Service is an independent organisation with the primary goal of shaping a safer society. The Probation Service is actively involved in the criminal justice process; when an offender is detained, it plays an advisory and supervisory role during the court session and the detention period. Judicial, municipal, prison and police authorities cooperate to prevent offenders from reoffending.</p> <p>Probation workers provide advisory services to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Judiciary, supervise conditional sanctions and measures, and implement alternative sanctions (e.g. community services). Dutch detainees abroad receive assistance from the International Office of the Dutch Probation Service.</p> <p>In supervision, probation workers continually monitor whether offenders are honouring the agreements made. In cognitive behavioural training, offenders' motivation is increased, prosocial choices are encouraged and self-reflection is stimulated, so that behavioural change can be established.</p>
Country of origin	Netherlands
Contact details	<p>Reclassering Nederland Vivaldiplantsoen 100 3503 RE UTRECHT</p> <p>Dr Renée Henskens r.henskens@reclassering.nl +31 888042058</p> <p>https://www.reclassering.nl/</p>
Last update	2016 and before

Name of the practice	.5.7 <i>Risk assessment instrument in the Spanish prison context</i>
Description	This risk assessment instrument is specifically designed to be implemented in the prison context. It is considered a key part of the protocol on counter-radicalisation, and it complements the directives and actions on prevention and treatment of violent extremism.
Approach	Prison and Probation
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Violent extremists
Deliverables	<p>Forming part of the Spanish risk assessment approach, this instrument is currently implemented in Spanish prisons.</p> <p>It considers 12 factors on the risk of radical violence and 27 factors on the risk of recruitment and violent radicalisation. It also demonstrates a simple way to score the indicators (high, medium or low, depending on the intensity detected). The instrument puts forwards a number of suggested questions for each factor.</p> <p>The aim is to guide decision-making in terms of intervention and detect and evaluate variables that may indicate risk of actions in the field of violent radicalism.</p>
Evidence and evaluation	<p>The instrument does not provide a mathematical prediction of risk, but rather a qualitative and dynamic final evaluation. It has been implemented in several prisons, mapping risk factors on which further intervention is based. The indicators will be updated within a year to assess their effectiveness.</p> <p>Feedback from prison staff is taken into consideration, and a number of working groups focused on suggested improvements are planned. The General Secretariat of Penitentiary Institutions has a clear interest in external practices, as these may help in our work, guiding improvements and analysis of our own procedures, for instance.</p> <p>The instrument has been presented informally in RAN P&P meetings (e.g. in July 2018 in Brussels), but not in a formal study-visit or working group.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	<p>Although the above-mentioned instrument respects Spanish prison procedures and has been designed for this prison context, its indicators, defined target-groups (terrorists, recruiters and vulnerable prisoners) and scoring system are completely exportable/transferrable to prison contexts from other countries.</p> <p>The instrument calls for coordinated prison staff work, based on exhaustive knowledge of the inmate. It clearly requires close cooperation between security and treatment areas, but no other</p>

	complex operations are planned. This means that the assessment presented here is a long-term sustainable practice.
Geographical scope	It is implemented in all Spanish prisons holding terrorists and inmates under surveillance (due to their radical or extremist behaviour).
Start of the practice	The instrument came into use in February 2018.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	The instrument has not yet been presented in RAN meetings, but it has been discussed informally in some meetings, and a large number of European professionals have shown interest in its content and applicability.
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	The instrument is not linked to other EU initiatives. However, it is ultimately the result of both the recognition of our own needs and the involvement and co-leadership of Spain in the RAN P&P.
Organisation	The General Secretariat of Penitentiary Institutions (of the Ministry of Interior) is the organisation responsible for the prison sentences being served, offering facilities such as prison centres, penitentiary psychiatric hospitals, social insertion centres, open sections, mother units, hospital custody units and probation services. [Governmental institution]
Country of origin	Spain
Contact details	Address: General Secretariat of Penitentiary Institutions Vice-Directorate General for Institutional Relations and Regional Coordination Alcalá 38 28014 Madrid Madrid Spain Contact person: Rosa Rodríguez Diaz (Technical Adviser) Email: Rosa.Rodriguez@dgip.mir.es Website: http://www.institucionpenitenciaria.es/
Last update	2018

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.8 <i>From Personal Transformation to Positive Social Impact: IAHV Model</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>IAHV Approach IAHV advocates for a radically new paradigm of how we understand and deal with violent extremism. The approach is fundamentally human, situated in a broader peacebuilding framework, and tackles the psycho-social roots of the challenge. IAHV Peacebuilding programmes bring about a profound, self-sustaining transformation in attitude, mindset, wellbeing and behaviour of individuals and communities involved or affected by violence and extremism, inspire and train participants to use non-violent means to achieve legitimate needs, and mobilise them to become effective peacebuilders in their own communities.</p> <p>IAHV Methodology IAHV programmes use a comprehensive set of processes and tools facilitating physical, mental, emotional and existential changes, as such positively transforming wellbeing, attitudes, behaviours and relationships.</p> <p>Figure 1: IAHV model of intrapersonal transformation</p> <div data-bbox="406 985 1292 1702" data-label="Diagram"> <p>Peace: A New Existence 7 Dimensions of the Individual</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical: Stress Release, Relaxation, Energy Emotions: Healing, Empowerment, Well Being Mental: Trauma Relief, Discernment, Positivity Attitude: Tolerance, Empathy, Compassion Identity: Access to Shared & Broadened Identities Behaviour: Harm Reduction, Responsible, Proactive Existence: Life Affirming, Constructive, New Meaning </div> <p>IAHV uses a holistic approach to personal transformation that addresses the physical to deeply existential layers, transcending the strictly cognitive. On the physical level, it provides deep stress release and relaxation, increases energy levels and improves overall physical health and wellbeing. On the emotional level, it releases strong negative emotions, fosters more positive and life-supporting emotions and increases emotional resilience. On the mental level, it calms tension and worries in the mind, improves clarity of mind and concentration, reduces the impact of negative or traumatic memories, and fosters a more positive mindset.</p>

When individuals are able to release stress and negative emotions, calm their worries and expel tensions from the mind - and are thus positively established within themselves, it is reflected in their behaviour, relationships and outlook towards the world. Building on restored mental and emotional wellbeing, IAHV programmes apply a set of pedagogical methods and strategies (processes, knowledge, discussions, games, practical tools) to strengthen self-confidence, explore a broadened and shared self-identity, inculcate human values, improve non-violent conflict resolution, address issues of trust, fear, suspicion and hatred, reduce resentment, build connectedness and reinforce healthy attitudes and skills for peaceful co-existence.

On a behavioural level, this subsequently leads to a diminished need for negative coping strategies, improved communication and life skills to handle challenging situations, as well as a reduced inclination towards harmful behaviour towards themselves or others. This can manifest in reduced frequency and severity of violent incidents; criminal activity; substance abuse; aggression. Similarly, individuals feel more resilient against peer pressures, overwhelming emotions, discriminatory behaviours, intimidation or recruitment.

It is commonly understood that violent radicalisation happens at the intersection between an enabling environment and a personal trajectory. IAHV programmes focus explicitly on the personal and relational aspects involved, and to a lesser extent on social, political, or geopolitical aspects. Among the **psycho-social drivers of violent extremism**, as identified through research of best practices and approaches, IAHV addresses in particular the following:

Personal

- Frustration, sense of rejection, exclusion, isolation, humiliation
- Feelings in general (wish to provoke, despair, fear, hopelessness)
- Idealism and strong sense of justice
- Fascination for violence and fights
- Negative home/family background
- Disbelief in alternatives
- Identity questions or problems
- Lack of a meaningful purpose in life
- Search for simple ways to understand a complex world

Relational

- Negative or lack of positive personal experiences with certain groups of people
- Wish to belong to a group
- Interest in alcohol, drugs, or other group-binding factors
- Peer pressure
- Connection to a charismatic leader

Societal/Political

- Fear of multiculturalism or of certain groups of people
- Us-them paradigms
- Lack of brotherhood, sisterhood or belongingness to a community
- Lack of trust in others / society
- Real and perceived injustice

Global/Geopolitical

- Rapid changes in society
- Resentment of Western supremacy
- Feelings of inequity and injustice on global level, and a sense of humiliation
- Encroachment of modernity on 'traditional' values

- Highly symbolic conflicts on the global scene with broad repercussions

The strength of IAHV's programmes lies in the **integrative approach towards empowerment**, addressing different individual and relational aspects such as:

IDENTITY

- Broadened, diversified self-identity
- Reduce perception of discrimination and victimhood
- Foster self-esteem
- Foster sense of belonging and counter isolation

HEALING AND EMOTIONAL WELLBEING

- Release negative emotions
- Healing and relief of trauma
- Strengthen emotional resilience and coping capacity
- Foster positive emotions

EMPOWERMENT & RESPONSIBILITY

- Address injustice, engage for action
- Moving from blame to responsibility
- Acquainting with positive role models
- Strengthen action instead of reaction

MENTAL TRAINING

- Counter dichotomising, black and white thinking
- Foster critical thinking capacity
- Decrease worry and tension
- Foster broadened perception and open mindset

PHYSICAL HEALTH AND WELLBEING

- Deep stress release and strengthen stress resilience

PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE

- Raising awareness and skills on alternative of nonviolent strategies
- Develop alternative community

When our inner world is disturbed, our impact in society is more likely to be neutral or negative in terms of disengagement, frustration, anger, disappointment, radicalisation, disrespect, violence, depression or resistance. Individuals who are well-established in themselves, healed and empowered, are more likely to bring a positive contribution to different aspects of society and to play a peace-enhancing role in their communities and institutions. Healing and empowerment support individuals to develop interpersonally and inside communities, creating more inclusive relationships and greater community resilience to radicalisation and violence. In this process, IAHV fosters a strong, experiential foundation of universal human values to support more positive discernment and decision-making.

Restoring peace at every level well beyond the cognitive, IAHV programmes are deeply empowering, life affirming and truly holistic.

Working inclusively across affected populations and stages of radicalisation

IAHV's programmes to prevent and transform violent extremism and radicalisation are applicable across personality types, ideologies and contexts, and across all stages, from prevention to intervention, rehabilitation and reintegration. We work with all individuals and communities directly or indirectly, actively or passively affected by violence and extremism, including: former extremists, ex-combatants, militants, prisoner populations, gangs, convicted terrorists, radicalised youth, affected communities and relatives, social/youth / prevention workers, survivors of violence / terrorist attacks

Systemic approach in collaboration with ongoing initiatives

IAHV's expertise, combined with identified best practices from the field in an inclusive, integrative approach, can lay a strong psycho-social foundation to complement and strengthen ongoing initiatives.

Approach	Prison and Probation Exit strategies
Target audience	Victims of terrorism Violent extremists Formers
Deliverables	<p>IAHV programmes and training include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE)</u> for young people (aged 16 to 35, though this can be extended) at risk, in the earlier stages, or seeking re-entry from periods of radicalisation (16 to 22 hours): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - transforming the attitudes and behaviours of youths and young adults from at-risk to high-performing, responsible, confident and empowered populations; - ‘prevent’ and providing alternatives to radicalised narratives and destructive behaviour towards themselves and others; - practical tools and life skills for individuals to release stress, master their emotions, withstand radicalisation and peer pressures thereto, and solve conflicts using non-violent action. 2. <u>Youth Leadership Peacebuilding Training (YLPT)</u> providing intensive training to empower and mobilise youths and young adults (aged 16 to 35, though this can be extended) to become role models and the driving force behind the prevention and transformation of radicalisation and violence (7 to 10 days). In addition to PCVE, YLPT includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - physical, emotional, mental, spiritual and social empowerment; - hard and soft skills development, including: stress management, trauma-relief and healing, resilience, self-knowledge and self-management, creativity and innovation, communication skills, value-based leadership, team work, decision making, dynamism and entrepreneurship, interpersonal skills and volunteering spirit; - focus on individual empowerment and locally informed and owned peacebuilding and violence prevention strategies. 3. <u>Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (REX)</u>, including current and former extremists as well as war veterans, into society (16 to 22 hours). REX addresses psycho-social gaps in existing reintegration and DDR infrastructure, including but not limited to: post-traumatic stress; addiction; mistrust and alienation; depression, apathy, and perceptive disempowerment; victimisation and an inability to take responsibility for past acts or current behaviour; negative emotions such as anger, blame, and a desire for revenge; cognitive reliance on violence to achieve power or fulfil feelings of masculinity; and other identity challenges related to re-entry. In addition, the REX programme empowers participants to identify and achieve their goals in a non-violent way, helping them re-enter society as contributing and peaceful members. 4. <u>Healing, Resilience and Empowerment (HRE)</u> training for survivors, relatives and affected communities (8 to 12 hours):

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - stress and trauma management and healthy coping strategies, which can sustain improvements in quality of life. <p>5. <u>Self-Management and Professional Excellence</u> training for CVE / PVE workers (12 hours):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - introduction to the IAHV approach, methodology, case studies; - analysis and personal experience of the psycho-social factors at the core of rehabilitation, reintegration and transformation of extremism; - improved wellbeing, better clarity of mind and greater focus, increased stress resilience; - improved ability to manage challenging situations and people leading to improved professional and personal performance. <p>Ideally, each training programme is supported by a tailored 3 to 12-month follow-up period, in which participants engage in ongoing learning or implement local violence prevention projects.</p> <p>A description of our approach is available in the following brochure: http://peaceunit-iahv.org/services/preventing-and-transforming-violent-extremism-mobilising-youth-for-peace/</p> <p>An overview of video testimonials from participants: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCIYHStWX08wZysbOMsPNg2w</p>
<p>Evidence and evaluation</p>	<p>IAHV Practice-based evidence in 20+ conflict- and war zones:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 000+ fighters renounced violence (Kashmiri militants, Naxalite terrorists, FARC rebels, Kosovo Liberation Army veterans, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, militants in Assam, Maoists in Nepal). - Colombia breakthrough in peace process with FARC June 2015. - Prisons worldwide: rehabilitation programs for 400 000 prisoners and staff. - Rehabilitation and reintegration of 5 000 criminals, gang members and ex-prisoners in Copenhagen. - Rehabilitation and reintegration of youth gangs in Panama and Mexico. - Healing, Resilience and Prevention of Extremism for 18 000 war affected children in Lebanon and Jordan (EU project). - Reduced PTSD symptoms in US war veterans. - Iraq Trauma Relief and Women Empowerment since 2004. - Reduced stress and trauma for 150 000 trauma-relief beneficiaries worldwide (Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, India, US, Balkans, Kyrgyzstan, Sri Lanka, Northern Caucasus and Afghanistan). - 85% suicide reduction in Kosovo prisons <p>Scientific research on IAHV techniques</p> <p>The core techniques used in IAHV Programmes are Sudarshan Kriya & Practices (SK&P), which include gentle stretches (yoga postures), specific breathing exercises, and cognitive coping and stressor evaluation strategies. The central component of SK&P is SK, which is understood to use specific breathing rhythms to eliminate stress, support the various organs and systems within the body, transform overpowering emotions, and restore peace of mind, thus supporting the whole mind-body system. Independent research suggests SK&P result in rapid and sustainable reduction rates of PTS (65%), clinical depression 68-73% (mild, moderate and severe), anxiety 73% and stress (reduction cortisol and lactate levels), whilst increasing optimism, calmness, concentration and recovery from stressful stimuli. A University of California and Los Angeles (UCLA) study concluded, “the [IAHV] program can promote mental health, potentially</p>

	<p>protecting from harmful coping behaviours and risk behaviour”, as it showed a reduction in impulsive behaviour among adolescent participants. For an overview of 60+ internationally peer-reviewed research articles on SK&P, see: www.aolresearch.org</p> <p>Anecdotal Evidence In 2012, IAHV offered a one-month rehabilitation and reintegration training course to 240 militants in Assam, many of whom had belonged to different extremist groups since an early age. In addition to the IAHV core programme, participants engaged in vocational training and training in organic farming to earn their living in a non-violent way. 100% of the participants felt their lives changed for the better, with many renouncing violence, taking up agriculture and becoming willing to contribute to the sustainable and peaceful development of their communities: “I found a lot of enthusiasm and determination to lead a new life. I had a lot of physical and mental strain but just after two days of doing the Sudarshan Kriya and other practices, I can sit on the ground, and sleep soundly at night. I have a new zest to live life.”. “Coming here, I feel a lot of belongingness and respect for others. It is because I was given the same respect and welcomed with belongingness. I now recognise the struggle I was going through mentally. It seems I have found a tool to solve my problems. I can now see a way ahead. I have some land back home. I would like to take up organic farming.”</p> <p>As one hard core recidivist said after following IAHV’s Prison SMART programme, “it is as if I feel an anchor inside me now that prevents me from slipping down the same destructive path”.</p> <p>A mother of a foreign fighter in Belgium testified after doing the IAHV programme: “I learned to accept the situation, to live with it. I am able to forgive myself and to forgive my son now.”</p> <p>For more case studies, see http://peaceunit-iahv.org/services/preventing-and-transforming-violent-extremism-mobilising-youth-for-peace/</p> <p>Peer Review: IAHV’s presentation in the YF&C Meeting was positively evaluated</p>
<p>Sustainability and transferability</p>	<p>IAHV’s approach is to empower individuals and communities to become self-reliant, create self-sustaining change and reduce dependency on external support. IAHV empowers individuals and communities with knowledge, skills and tools to improve their own physical, mental and emotional wellbeing, and to create the change they want to see themselves. In the initial stage, certified IAHV trainers pass on the techniques, skills and knowledge to participants, who can benefit themselves or be trained to disseminate them further in their local contexts. This inherently self-sustainable approach strengthens local resources, as illustrated by the numerous examples of IAHV programme participants who have continued to become IAHV trainers themselves. In addition, through its specialised training for CVE-PVE professionals, IAHV raises awareness in the sector about the IAHV approach in order to identify where it can be integrated to provide the most added value in a multi-agency approach.</p> <p>The costs involved are dependent on local needs, programme selection and resources, ranging from free introductory sessions to intensive seven-day programmes, with an average price of €300/participant for a 20-hour programme.</p> <p>One Yazidi youth, filled with fury and hatred for the brutalities IS had inflicted on his family and people, including the kidnapping and rape of his own sister,</p>

	<p>and for the crimes against humanity which he had been documenting as a human rights activist, was ready to take revenge and join the militias fighting against IS. However, since his friends invited him to a peacebuilding workshop and later an IAHV Youth Leadership Peacebuilding training course, he now gives stress release and resilience workshops in a camp in Dohuk for hundreds of displaced people and inspires them to join the Citizens Peace Movement of Iraq.</p> <p>In Denmark, former gang members, criminals, drug addicts and prisoners are training and supporting thousands of others in and outside prison, following the rehabilitation journey they themselves underwent via Breathe / Prison SMART programmes. Grateful for their ‘new lives’, they are committed to preventing others from going down a destructive path and supporting them as they turn their backs on a life of crime, violence, stress and disillusion. As one prisoner in the UK remarked, “I spent my whole life trying to destroy society. After doing the Prison SMART program, I now want to spend the rest of my life contributing to society.”</p> <p>IAHV’s sister organisation Art of Living Foundation, located in the ghettos of Panama City, was approached in 2008 to conduct a 20-month rehabilitation and empowerment programme for 11 gang members. They had joined a gang in order to help provide income for their families and security from rival gangs. Caught up in the vicious cycle of violence and crime as a way of life and without education, parental support or other options, they underwent a profound transformation during the IAHV programme. Before long, the former gang members became known as the ‘Youth for Change’ for their service in orphanages and their mentorship to younger children. One ex-gang member poignantly remarked, “We used to behave even worse than them. Now we’ve changed and we come to teach them that there can be a change. All of them deserve a chance, just as we had too. One of us could have died with all these problems, we could have gone to jail, I don’t know, but if we can change and take advantage of that, I think everybody can do the same. We have to stretch out our hand to help other people who also deserve a chance. We can teach them to change as a person, and to shift their mind, to become a good person and not to fix things only with bullets but to see there are different ways.”</p> <p>One former militant from Assam testified, “My fight was for the people. So maybe I have no regrets. But I realised that violence is not the path. I am now determined to build a strong harmonious community. I want to go back and resolve conflicts in my region, now that I am at peace with myself.”</p>
Geographical scope	Denmark, Belgium, Lebanon, Jordan, India, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Colombia, Nepal, Mexico, US
Start of the practice	The Prison SMART Rehabilitation training programme started in 1992. Since then, many other programmes have developed, as illustrated above.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	Presented at the YF&C Meeting on Strengthening Community Resilience in London, 29-30 June 2017
Relation to other EC initiatives	No formal relation.

Organisation	<p>International Association for Human Values (IAHV)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-profit, United Nations-affiliated organisation with special consultative status with ECOSOC. • Founded in 1997 in Geneva, Switzerland, by Sri Sri Ravi Shankar and other global leaders. • Mission: to build sustainable and inclusive peace by promoting and supporting the development of human values in both the individual and societies on a global scale. • Headquarters: Geneva. Branches in around 20 countries. Works in partnership with Art of Living Foundation (1981): active in 155 countries, reached hundreds of millions of people. • Largely volunteer-based organisation <p>IAHV's programme on Preventing and Transforming Violent Extremism is managed by the IAHV UK branch, which runs the global Peacebuilding Programmes for IAHV. IAHV UK Charity nr: 1103261</p> <p>Financing: A 3-year IAHV project on preventing extremism among war-affected children in Jordan and Lebanon is currently being implemented with support from EIDHR (Global Call)</p> <p>IAHV programmes in different countries are funded by private donations, trusts and foundations, corporate and governmental funds.</p>
Country of origin	<p>IAHV is registered in Switzerland. Its most active branches in Europe are the Netherlands, Germany, UK, Belgium, Denmark and Italy</p>
Contact details	<p>Address: Bad Antogast 1, 77728 Oppenau, Germany Contact person: Dr Katrien Hertog Email: Katrien.Hertog@iahv.org.uk Telephone: 0044 740 5638795 Website: www.peaceunit-iahv.org</p>
Last update	<p>2018</p>

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.9 <i>Training of on-site referee trainers (ORT) on violent islamist radicalisation awareness in detention</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>The ORT training of trains all correctional staff in awareness of violent radicalisation.</p> <p>Initial sessions are intended as a refresher for basic knowledge on radicalisation, mental manipulation and procedural points of reference regarding tracking and description. More comprehensive knowledge is available to staff working in specialised units via continuous training.</p> <p>Training involves lectures by multidisciplinary experts, PowerPoint presentations and a pedagogical video. It also covers theoretical content on radicalisation and pedagogy courses.</p> <p>The video was designed by the L'école nationale d'administration pénitentiaire (ENAP) communications unit, with the help of internal staff and external experts.</p> <p>Experts are chosen according to their knowledge of the subject (university recognition, publication of their practice on inmate management). The ministry has not officially decided on an expert list, but calls upon experts who work with national institutions related to this area.</p> <p>Target Audience Correctional intelligence officers and trainers, gathered in two groups.</p>
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation</p> <p>Training for first line practitioners</p>
<p>Target audience</p>	<p>Prison/probation/judicial practitioners</p> <p>Law enforcement officers</p> <p>Kies een item.</p>
<p>Deliverables</p>	<p>68 trainers & correctional intelligence officers were trained (2016). Currently, no training is foreseen for 2017.</p>
<p>Evidence and evaluation</p>	<p>To date, feedback has shown positive results from the ORT, although no further information is currently available.</p>

	A test may be carried out at the end of the training in order to deliver a certificate.
Sustainability and transferability	<p>The training has been expanded to the non-custodial sector as well. The methodology of training ORTs is transferred to other topics (motivational interviewing, risk assessment, restorative justice...)</p> <p>The training methodology was validated by the Ministry. The training will be developed and continued, potentially via the use of tools such as VERA-2R.</p>
Geographical scope	National level
Start of the practice	Started in 2015
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with EPTA and EuroPris.
Relation to other EC initiatives	
Organisation	Ministry of Justice
Country of origin	France
Contact details	Mrs Nathalie Perrot, head of training at the ENAP Nathalie.perrot@justice.fr
Last update	2016 and before

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.10 <i>Training courses on violent radicalisation and proselytism in prison</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>The key objectives of the training are to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) provide an overview of Islamic culture through lectures by both university professors/experts and cultural mediators; 2) increase awareness of violent extremism and the proselytism signals that can be detected early within prisons, using specific indicators/tools; 3) further the use of cultural mediators inside prisons; 4) encourage information-sharing among different professionals (penitentiary police, educators, social workers, etc.) working in different prisons on how to deal with radicalisation, so as to identify the best approaches and practices; this is done using case studies during working group activities. <p>The speakers were selected on account of their knowledge and specific experience/background. An agreement between the Penitentiary Administration and the Board of Italian Universities on tackling radicalisation has also been signed recently, promoting common actions to tackle the phenomenon.</p> <p>The training is focused mainly on the early detection of the radicalisation and proselytism dynamic inside prisons. It covers how to recognise relevant signs and improve the information-sharing network, also involving cultural mediators.</p> <p>The present training is in line with the Council of Europe guidelines on radicalisation and violent extremism; two similar courses have been run previously, the first in 2010 and the second in 2012-2013. Both focused on international terrorism and drug trafficking.</p>
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation</p> <p>Training for first line practitioners</p>
<p>Target audience</p>	<p>Prison/probation/judicial practitioners</p> <p>Educators / academics</p> <p>Health practitioners</p>
<p>Deliverables</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ‘Frontal’ lessons 2. Viewing of topic-related videos, followed by discussion 3. Case study (working group)
<p>Evidence and evaluation</p>	<p>During the working group activities, participants cooperated consistently; they shared good practices they had experienced and drafted common operational models.</p>

	<p>In some cases, classes were not well balanced in terms of diverse professionals: the number of penitentiary police staff was too high compared with the number of other professionals. In future, at least 30 % of those present will be non-police staff.</p> <p>Each trainee received two questionnaires (one at the start of the course and one at the end) to evaluate the course itself, in accordance with expectations and real staff needs. The head of each training course also filed a report evaluating the entire activity.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	<p>This training has been tailored for the prison and probation context, so would need to be adapted for use in other contexts.</p> <p>This training is funded by the Ministry of Justice, and is planned to run through the whole year; there is also an EU-funded project on the same topic ('Raising awareness and staff mobility on radicalisation in prison and probation services' (RASMORAD), under the Justice Programme), with dedicated training for P&P staff.</p>
Geographical scope	<p>This training has been delivered in the seven prison training academies of the Italian penitentiary administration. These are responsible for training prison staff around the country.</p>
Start of the practice	<p>This training started in September 2015 and was completed in June 2017.</p> <p>The courses were attended by approximately 4 000 prison staff.</p>
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	<p>This practice was collected in collaboration with the European Penitentiary Training Academies (EPTA) and the European Organisation of Prisons and Correctional Services (EuroPris).</p>
Relation to other EC initiatives	<p>The Penitentiary Department is also involved in two projects funded by the EU, both focused on training prison and probation staff in dealing with radicalisation in prisons. These projects are TRAI n TRAINING (Justice Fund) and TRIVALENT (Horizon 2020)</p>
Organisation	<p>Ministry of Justice</p>
Country of origin	<p>Italy</p>
Contact details	<p>Emails: carla.ciavarella@giustizia.it and marco.capitani01@giustizia.it</p>
Last update	<p>2018</p>

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.11 <i>Information management to prevent radical escalation</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>This Italian approach combines three parallel elements: (1) security and (2) rehabilitation, framed under the (3) rule of law (represented by surveillance judges and courts).</p> <p>Respect for the various duties, responsibilities and functions of the penitentiary police as well as those of the rehabilitation bodies (educators, psychologists, experts, etc.) under the supervision of surveillance judges, grants an appropriate level of independency, equality, proportionality and complementarity to counter-radicalisation policies. This limits – as far as possible – administrative decisions on matters concerning the rights of inmates and their equality before the law, regardless of their professed religion, faith or ideology.</p> <p>To ensure information gathered within Italian prisons is analysed efficiently, a Central Unit for Investigations (Nucleo Investigativo Centrale (NIC)) within the Ministry of Justice, Department for Prison Administration, Office of the Head of the Department, has the task of centralising all information collected from local branches, and analysing it in relation to particularly serious crimes such as organised crime, international and domestic terrorism and any threat to public security.</p> <p>The monitoring is based on three levels of classification: (1) High (monitoring); (2) Medium (<i>attenzione</i> (from the Italian word for ‘attention’)); and (3) Low (reporting).</p> <p>The NIC analysis on the radical and terrorist subjects, shared with the National Prosecutor Office to Counter Mafia and Terrorism and the General Direction for Treatment, is then given to the Committee of Counter Terrorism Strategic Analysis (CASA). CASA was established in 2004 by a Decree from the Ministry of Interior as part of the National Plan to Counter Terrorism, within the framework of the Crisis Unit (Decree 83/2002). The Committee brings together all four law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the intelligence services (in particular DIS, the departments of internal and external security (AISI and AISE, respectively)) under the premises of the Central Office of Preventive Police (Ministry of Interior). The group meets on a weekly basis to share information and analyse data before composing specific and detailed risk analyses. Combined with the NIC’s investigative efforts, this analysis centre makes it possible to match information from within Italy with information coming from other sources and countries, and to provide LEAs with an appropriate level of information at local level.</p> <p>The following principles are central to the monitoring activities carried out by Italian authorities for radical inmates.</p> <p>The flow of behavioural, non-forensic and non-judiciary information is kept separate from the treatment element: the two elements are complementary but do not influence each other, because all prisoners are equal before the law and have the right to access the same services. In line with L.354/75, only surveillance judges (i.e.</p>

	<p>not LEAs or intelligence services) can approve and modify rehabilitation programmes.</p> <p>To this end, data from monitoring are only gathered, used and shared with a preventive aim and from a security perspective.</p> <p>The monitoring cover not only critical events, but also the inmates' daily routines, including fixed and codified procedures.</p> <p>Information and output from central analysis (by NIC or CASA) does not flow back to local level, unless there is a request for closer monitoring.</p> <p>All penitentiary staff have a duty to provide information concerning radical phenomena (non-forensic and non-judiciary data) from the prisons to the prison director, who conveys the information to the competent central offices. Conversely, information concerning potential crimes (forensic and judiciary information that forms the basis for investigations) is transmitted by the judiciary police department of the penitentiary police to the competent judiciary authorities.</p> <p>To conclude, the system rests on an accurate understanding of the interplay of different pieces of information from various information sources, within the framework of the Italian constitutional architecture. It is also crucial to balance fundamental rights with security by respecting different roles and competences.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners
Deliverables	<p>Several procedures are in place to ensure coherence and consistency in information management.</p> <p>D.1 'Situation Room'. Created in 2003, this room is a cyber link, also in form of an application, connecting the periphery and the centre, with the main aim of registering all critical events. These include non-forensic and non-judiciary data coming from prison observation, as well as information received from the local penitentiary institutions, which are conveyed and analysed in real time at central level. As events have evolved, a special category has been created for critical events linked to proselytism and radicalisation.</p> <p>D.2 Modification of indicators. Thanks to GDAP 0248805/2016, the Department of Prison Administration simplified its previous system based on classical 'indicators of radicalisation' as foreseen in the old EU 'Manual on Violent Radicalisation'. The new strategy focuses mostly on two main indicators: 'change' and 'isolation', and requires the proactive participation of all prison staff (GDAP 385582/2015).</p> <p>D.3 Integration of observation with ICT tools. Periodic behavioural reports for inmates under the radicalisation radar are managed through system SIAP/AFIS 2.0. They connect local and central levels. Requests concerning inmates' classification levels from external administration (DIGOS, ROS, etc.) need to be authorised by the Judiciary Authority, but are also available through the backdoor of SIDET WEB 2, available for both the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior.</p> <p>D.4 Training (https://www.traininghermes.eu/). An online training platform, jointly developed by the Italian, Latvian and Romanian Ministries of Justice, in cooperation with Hochschule für den öffentlichen Dienst in Bayern, Guardia Civil, Spain, and Agenfor</p>

	International, is available to train all staff on different aspects of radical phenomena within prisons and probation. The LMS contains seven modules for blended delivery and a complete manual.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>Key Indicator 1: Number of attacks and casualties. Italy has approximately 59 000 inmates, 20 000 of whom are third country nationals (corresponding to 34 % of the prison population). Some 11 000 inmates come from mainstreaming Muslim countries. Although this is a critical situation, aggravated by logistical and financial problems, Italy has not registered any attack or damage owing to religiously inspired terror.</p> <p>Key Indicator 2: Administrative prevention measures. Thanks to the multi-agency information system, several administrative preventive measures were adopted by the Italian Ministry of Interior, which led to the expulsion of 147 individuals.</p> <p>Key Indicator 3: Equal rights. Thanks to the separation between ‘intelligence-led’ activities, on the one hand, and rehabilitation programmes in line with Article 15 of Penitentiary Law, under the jurisdiction of surveillance judges, on the other, about 30 % of inmates under observation for radical behaviour engage with social cooperatives or participate in training courses and/or laboratories (cooking, editing, IT, gardening, crafts, tailoring, acting, maintenance, etc.). About 30 % participate in school courses (elementary, post-elementary and high school); 40 % are assigned in rotation to jobs managed by the penitentiary administration. About 10 % do not participate in rehabilitative activities (percentage >100 %, because a number of inmates are employed in more than one activity at the same time, only a small percentage). The recidivism rate for inmates under observation for radical behaviour who follow standard rehabilitation programmes has decreased by approximately 50 %.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	The practice, or part of it, including specific deliverables, can be transferred to any country in which the juridical architecture foresees a relevant role for the judiciary as part of prison surveillance.
Geographical scope	The practice is implemented in Italy and the indicators are taken from the Triveneto Administration, covering three Italian regions: Veneto, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli Venezia Giulia.
Start of the practice	May 2004
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	The practice was reviewed during the RAN Study Visit on 26-27 October 2016 to Padova and Venice, and then during the RAN P&P Meeting in Riga.
Relation to other EC initiatives	MindB4Act, Derad, Training Aid, ISDEP
Organisation	The Penitentiary Administration, part of the Ministry of Justice.
Country of origin	Italy
Contact details	Address: Ufficio ispettivo e del controllo Dipartimento Amministrazione Penitenziaria Italy

	Email: ufficioattivitaipettivacontrollo.dap@giustizia.it Telephone: +39 666592336/7
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	.5.12 <i>Training for the prison sector</i>
Description	<p>The radicalisation awareness training modules are developed for professionals that could potentially encounter radicalising persons in their day-to-day work in Dutch prisons, and for managers who are key contacts for these professional. The training takes one (beginner) or four (expert) days.</p> <p>Some prison professionals tend to encounter 'professional shyness' when addressing subjects related to radicalisation. The main purposes of the training are to 1) create awareness of the phenomenon of radicalisation (including its scope and the current threat level) and the infrastructure for reporting suspicions within the prison 2) make professionals aware of their personal opinions regarding radicalisation and how these could affect their behaviour and 3) remove any fears that could hold professionals back from acting when encountering individuals that are potentially radicalising by making them aware of their skills and showing them how to use them.</p> <p>Although the training is developed for the prison sector, it is delivered to a broad range of public sector professionals that could potentially encounter radicalising persons in their work, for example for Dutch municipalities, social welfare organisations, immigration agents, mental healthcare professionals, youth workers and so on.</p> <p>The trainers are experienced professionals with several years' work experience in the field of radicalisation. Trainers that are hired on a freelance basis.</p> <p>In the training, a PowerPoint, several short film fragments (to illustrate certain phenomena) and interactive training exercises are used, sometimes using an actor. Participants also receive a workbook with additional information.</p> <p>The training modules are specialised in religious (jihadist) radicalisation. The focus during the training is mainly on professional skills, and in particular cultural mediation. Information-sharing networks and signalling radicalisation are however also addressed, in line with the theoretical insight that radicalisation is an erratic and often non-linear process.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation Training for first line practitioners
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners Authorities
Deliverables	Face-to-face training
Evidence and evaluation	<p>Insights from different academic disciplines have contributed to the training module, such as psychology, sociology, political science, public administration and even law. University professionals, specialists from the field and specialists from the National Counter Terrorism Coordinator contribute to the training modules.</p> <p>The modules are currently evaluated by an external commission of experts, as well as by participants.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	<p>The continuity of the training depends on funding from the Dutch prison authority.</p> <p>The training is transferrable to other countries and sectors other than penitentiary training.</p>
Geographical scope	The Netherlands
Start of the practice	2015

Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with EPTA and EuroPris.
Relation to other EC initiatives	
Organisation	Originally, the National Counter Terrorism Coordination (NCTV) of the Ministry of Security and Justice was the owner of the training modules and awarded a contract for their development to a variety private companies. In 2015, the Rijksopleidingsinstituut tegengaan radicalisering (ROR) adopted the original training programme and continued to develop it, adding additional training modules in the process.
Country of origin	The Netherlands
Contact details	Johan Cats, Projectleider j.cats@dji.minjus.nl ror@dji.minjus.nl Mobile: 0031 (0)6 1557 3192 Telephone: 0031 (0) 8807 27000 or 0031 (0)88 07 27060 http://www.dji.nl and www.tegengaanradicalisering.nl
Last update	2016

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.13 <i>NeDiC -Network for Deradicalisation in Corrections</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>NeDiC is a staff unit in the Hessian Ministry of Justice that is responsible for the coordination and supervision of CVE practices in the Hessian penal system. NeDiC’s responsibilities are organised around four pillars: 1) <i>Identification</i>, 2) <i>Prevention</i>, 3) <i>Deradicalisation</i>, and 4) <i>Coordination</i>.</p> <p>For the <i>Identification</i> pillar, ‘structural observers’ are a central tool for gathering prison intelligence . These experienced and specially trained correctional officers have the sole task of monitoring and gathering information about all extremist prisoners (Eps) as well as about all members of organised crime groups in their respective penal institution. Structural observers share their insights with the management of their respective penal institution, NeDiC and the security agencies (i.e., the Hessian Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Hessian Criminal Police Office). They also act as knowledge multipliers and represent the first point of contact for correctional staff interested in questions pertaining to radicalisation and extremism. Currently, 11 of Hesse’s 16 penal institutions have one structural observer each.</p> <p>Another important aspect of <i>Identification</i> is raising awareness among correctional staff of Eps’ motivation, behaviour, and indicators of radicalisation.</p> <p>Staff training courses are tailor-made for different audience groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • correctional officers and correctional officers-in-training; • prison management staff; • specialist correctional officers (‘structural observers’); • specialist prison staff, e.g. psychologists, teachers, social workers; • lawyers and legal practitioners. <p>The correctional staff are trained in detecting and identifying extremist indicators as well as certain types of Eps, such as sympathisers of extremist groups, extremist recruiters and ideologues, or prisoners who are at risk of radicalisation. Moreover, correctional staff receive training in intercultural competence and cultural mediation, providing a foundation that enables them to distinguish between moderate religious practices and extremist activism. Training courses are taught by the members of NeDiC, by experts from the Hessian Criminal Police Office, by experts from the Hessian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, as well as by deradicalisation experts from certain NGOs.</p> <p>Finally, training in state-of-the-art risk assessment instruments (VERA-2R, RADAR-iTE) for a number of correctional psychologists has been provided. These risk assessment instruments are used in the various penal institutions; a standardised regime for when and how to apply them is currently in development.</p> <p>With regard to the pillar <i>Prevention</i>, NeDiC aims at improving interdisciplinary cooperation in order to enable a constant flow of information between correctional staff, NGOs, imams, the Hessian</p>

	<p>Ministry of Justice, the Hessian Criminal Police, and the Hessian Office for the Protection of the Constitution.</p> <p>From the perspective of dynamic security, increased observation by structural observers as well as the generalist staff, acts as a preventive measure for the formation of extremist groups, as it allows the relocation of Eps to different wards or prisons. Case conferences concerning Eps take place regularly, involving the security agencies.</p> <p>An indirect but important means of prevention is the accommodation of prisoners' religious need. Under the coordination of NeDiC, Hesse comprehensively provides basic pastoral care and freedom of religion for Muslim prisoners. 15 German-speaking imams with appropriate security clearance work in Hesse's penal system. By engaging the prisoners in religious dialogue, they can correct religious misconceptions. Furthermore, NeDiC 49roject49l an exchange of experiences between correctional imams at regular intervals.</p> <p>With regard to the pillar Deradicalisation, it should be noted that NeDiC views disengagement and desistance from violent extremism as the primary goal of correction, the long process of deradicalisation being of secondary concern.</p> <p>NeDiC coordinates interventions for Eps and supports Hesse's penal institutions in applying their existing interventions effectively for Eps. Among others, these interventions include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reduction of individual radicalisation factors; • individual and group-based 49roject49lization programmes (e.g. by the NGO <i>Violence Prevention Network</i>); • anti-violence training; • psychotherapy; • teaching of democratic values. <p>For the Coordination pillar, NeDiC acts as a single point of contact and a single focal point for all gathered knowledge and competences across all the different projects.</p> <p>Its responsibilities include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • policy-making and administration of individual issues pertaining to Eps and members of organised crime; • coordination of prevention and deradicalisation programmes; • issues regarding the pastoral care of Muslim prisoners; • the exchange of information about prisoners with security agencies and the organisation of inter-agency case conferences ('round tables'); • the education of correctional staff. <p>NeDiC fosters communication within and between penal institutions, security agencies, legal authorities, the Hessian Information and Competence Center Against Extremism, all relevant Hessian Ministries, the German Bundesländer, the German Federal Government, international organisations (e.g. EU), NGOs, and the scientific community.</p>
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation</p>

	Training for first line practitioners
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Authorities Violent extremists
Deliverables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Face-to-face training • Workshops • Advanced training programmes • Video and audio • E-learning platform for intercultural competence (SESAM, a software originally developed by the German Federal Criminal Police Office and adapted for the penal system by the Hessian Ministry of Justice)
Evidence and evaluation	<p>There has been no formal evaluation of NeDiC as a whole.</p> <p>However, the following activities are considered by practitioners to have been particularly successful:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • raising awareness of symbols, codes, terminology, and networks of extremists, allowing staff to respond quickly to new developments; • improving staff’s understanding of different extremist ideologies; • teaching staff how to differentiate between moderate religion and extremism; • raising awareness of the need to counter grievances perceived by Muslim inmates. <p>Both significant effort and time are needed to successfully reach out to the target group and to create further strategies to tackle this phenomenon. Ongoing and regular training, a fruitful exchange of ideas between prison staff, scientists and experts, and greater experience with Eps all help to constantly improve the training methods and NeDiC’s procedures.</p> <p>All training courses are evaluated in a standardised manner. Data on participant satisfaction and learning impact are evaluated and documented. The results are checked and rated using a balanced scorecard. The results are then published once a year in ‘personnel development reports’ and ‘advanced training reports’.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	<p>Methodologically, NeDiC could be transferred to other sectors beyond corrections, although certain training programmes are only suitable for correctional staff.</p> <p>NeDiC serves as a best practice method in Germany. One obstacle for adopting some of its methods in other areas of Germany is that corrections are a matter for individual state governments. The various Bundesländer also have very different problems with regard to Eps, as well as different organisational arrangements.</p> <p>Due to an increase in returning foreign fighters, Salafists and (homegrown) terrorists, it is assumed that NeDiC will remain a</p>

	permanent fixture in the Hessian penal system for the foreseeable future.
Geographical scope	Hesse, Germany
Start of the practice	2011
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was originally collected in collaboration with EPTA and EuroPris. The submission of the updated version was suggested during the course of a study visit of NeDiC and Hesse by RAN P&P in June 2018.
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	
Organisation	NeDiC is a staff unit in the Hessian Ministry of Justice of the Bundesland of Hesse in Germany. [Governmental institution]
Country of origin	Germany
Contact details	<p>Hessian Ministry of Justice Address: Luisenstraße 13, 65185 Wiesbaden, Germany Website: https://justizministerium.hessen.de/</p> <p>NeDiC Head of Division: Contact person: Mr Uwe Röhrig (until August 2018), Mrs Clementine Englert (from September 2018) Email: Uwe.Roehrig@hmdj.hessen.de / Clementine.Englert@hmdj.hessen.de Telephone: +49 611 32 2824</p> <p>NeDiC specialist for Islamic Studies / Social Scientist / Cultural Geographer: Contact person: Mr El Hadi Khelladi Email: ElHadi.Khelladi@hmdj.hessen.de Telephone: +49 611 32 2886</p> <p>NeDiC psychologist, specialist for risk assessment and intervention: Contact person: Mr Dr Kim Stalbovs Email: Kim.Stalbovs@hmdj.hessen.de Telephone: +49 611 32 2892</p>

Name of the practice	.5.14 <i>Identification of violent extremism and radicalisation in Finnish prisons</i>
Description	<p>Prisons are a fertile soil for radical thoughts. The terrorist attacks in Europe over the last six years (2012-2018) have reinforced the perception of the role of prisons as some kind of producer for the radicalisation that leads to terrorism.</p> <p>In nearly every serious attack in Europe there has been an assailant or designer with a criminal background, and in many cases they are former prisoners. In prison and probation services, it is important to identify at the earliest stage radicalised prisoners and also those inmates who are possibly vulnerable to radicalisation processes.</p> <p>The starting point for violent radicalisation in Finnish prisons was exposure to ideology with extremist features. Exposure is most commonly caused by another prisoner or prisoner group. Charismatic leaders among the prisoners are trying consistently to radicalise other inmates. Some of them act as leaders, some followers, and others use extremism in their own criminal pursuits.</p> <p>The aim of this 18-month-long project was to detect and identify radicalisation among the prison population. Early detection prevented radicalisation processes and helped to identify individuals at risk. Prisons are closed and controlled environments, and therefore they offer special opportunities to detect radicalisation and make an effective intervention through assessment.</p> <p>The approach: included prison sentence planning, risk assessment and safe placements. It also enabled efficient collection of information on imprisonment, which in turn facilitated cooperation across different networks, as well as information exchange within the correctional institution and with other actors.</p> <p>Training for prison and probation staff was provided in most of the Finnish prisons and probation offices and for The Training Institute for Prison and Probation Services' students.</p>
Approach	Prison and probation Training for first-line practitioners
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers
Deliverables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommended practices for the Finnish Criminal Sanctions Agency, a prison and probation organisation. Guidelines for managing violent extremism and radicalisation in prisons. • Staff training. • A form for staff to use to report violent extremism.

Evidence and evaluation

The project has developed working methods and staff training programmes on identifying radicalisation as well as individuals at risk. Those individuals identified were guided to support and exit facilities.

Dynamic security in prisons, multi-agency cooperation and prison intelligence activities are the key to identify and prevent the phenomenon. Early identification of radicalisation provides the possible situation to break the process.

The following were identified:

- During the project, 109 prisoners with links to violent extremism and radicalisation were detected; they included religion- and political-based extremism.
- Only three of those prisoners were suspected for terrorism-related crimes.
 - 75 inmates were related to radical Islamism
 - 26 inmates were related to extreme-right/neo-Nazi movements
 - 8 inmates were related another kind of extremism
 - Approximately 10 to 15 cases were classified as very high risk
- Most common findings during the project were:
 - ideological violence, physical, threats and hate
 - ideologically violent groups with a hierarchy, in prisons
 - positive attitude towards terrorism
 - celebration for terrorist attacks
 - recruiting for radical groups and gangs
 - links to international terrorism
 - production and use of extremist materials
- Based on project findings, the greatest threat for prison radicalisation in Finland was related to prisoners who were exposed to radical Islamism / Salafi jihadism. Prisoners detected were mainly located in southern Finland, but observations are constantly growing from all Criminal Sanctions Agency regions.

The information gathered has resulted in changes to many decisions on safety placements for prisoners with links to violent extremism and radicalisation. This enables organisations to respond to prisoners' individual needs.

- Information exchange with different authorities improved significantly during the project.

During the project, Finnish Criminal Sanctions Agency staff from 16 prisons, 7 prison intelligence units, 11 probation offices, 2 evaluation centres, 1 psychiatric prison hospital and 2 prison hospitals were trained. This amounts to an estimated more than 400 officials, including prison officers, prison management, prison social workers, nursing staff, psychologists and pastors.

Training lectures were provided to Finnish police and also to different NGO partners, including religious community representatives.

Feedback from training and lectures was entirely positive, and staff were very motivated to participate.

- Increased resources:
- The Criminal Sanctions Agency invested the budget appropriation for the project amount of EUR 75 000. The Finnish Ministry of Justice

	awarded the Criminal Sanctions Agency an additional EUR 378 000 for the consolidation of operations that were used in the project.
Sustainability and transferability	For the project policies to be applied in countries other than Finland, existing legislation must be compatible. Programme costs depend on the scope of the targeted group.
Geographical scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training for the project has been provided across Finland. • The programme establishes definitive actions for the entire Finnish Criminal Sanctions Agency organisation.
Start of the practice	1 August 2016. The project ran until 28 February 2018.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	<p>IMPACT Europe – Radicalisation Awareness Network Training Event, 10-11 November 2016, Cambridge (UK), Countering violent extremism, interventions, evaluation</p> <p>RAN MS Workshop ‘Deradicalisation Exit Facilities’, 9 December 2016, Munchen (DE)</p> <p>RAN P&P study visit, 11-13 July 2017, London (UK)</p> <p>RAN P&P study visit, 7-8 June 2018, Hessen (DE)</p>
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	<p>The Criminal Sanctions Agency is a governmental organisation comprising a Central Administration Unit, three criminal sanctions regions in Finland and an Enforcement Unit. The Training Institute for Prison and Probation Services is also part of the Agency.</p> <p>The Criminal Sanctions Agency has 26 prisons. Prisoners serve their sentence either in a closed prison (70 %) or in an open institution (30 %). Prisoners considered more likely to adapt to freer conditions than to conditions in closed prisons are placed in open institutions.</p> <p>Vantaa Prison Vantaa Prison was established in 2002; it carries out pretrial detention and transports prisoners.</p> <p>The prison has 185 prison places. More than 9 000 prison transportations were carried out in Vantaa Prison in 2011. The average number of prisoners in 2015 was 205. It also has a Unit of the Psychiatric Prison Hospital.</p> <p>Personnel and activities Vantaa Prison employs about 140 people. The prison has profiled its activities, particularly as raising motivation for prisoners, reducing drug abuse and training for imprisonment.</p> <p>The project for identifying violent extremism and prison radicalisation was based in Vantaa Prison.</p> <p>Project financing Provided by the Criminal Sanctions Agency Central Administration.</p>
Country of origin	Finland
Contact details	Siltaniitynkuja 2

	01260 Vantaa Finland Jouni Holappa jouni.holappa@om.fi +35 8504325798 http://www.rikosseuraamus.fi/en/index/units/prisons/vantaaprisson.html
Last update	2018

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.15 <i>E-learning: Understanding and Addressing Extremism in Prisons and Probation</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>This resource has been developed for all HMPPS staff working with extremist offenders – especially those considered vulnerable to extremism.</p> <p>The two-part e-learning package can be accessed on the internet. The training comprises two courses, ‘Understanding and Addressing Extremism in Prisons and Probation’ and ‘Developing Dialogues Toolkit Training’. Each course comprises two modules, each of which includes a final knowledge check at the end. Learners are required to score a minimum of 80 % to pass each e-learning course.</p> <p>Each module may take up to one hour to complete. Users can stop and save their progress if they are unable to complete a module in its entirety, and may return to it later. We would recommend that when possible you complete each module in one sitting to optimise learning. It can be used a refresher for staff who have had face-to-face DD training. The e-learning enabled us to reach a larger number of staff.</p> <p>Methodology used The tool was designed to enable staff to build their confidence and competence when responding to concerns about extremism.</p> <p>It seeks to provide staff working in prisons and probation with an understanding of the reasons why individuals engage in extremism and commit extremist offences, and to introduce skills and strategies for countering / responding to extremism in their roles.</p> <p>For staff in relevant roles, there are also modules to develop an understanding of the concepts underpinning the Developing Dialogues (DD) Toolkit and how it should be delivered. Developing Dialogues (DD) is used with individuals for whom concerns have arisen over their possible or apparent interest in, or engagement with, ideas, groups or causes deemed extremist in nature.</p> <p>It is based on the psycho-social theories underlying extremism interventions and assessments.</p> <p>Relation to initiatives / theory The first part of the course was developed from scratch. The second part is based on a face-to-face DD training event. The training was developed in conjunction with the learning and development team within the HMPPS, which is specialised in the development of training packages.</p> <p>Target audience / beneficiaries All HMPPS staff in roles that put them face-to-face with offenders, but especially those working with those considered vulnerable to extremism / radicalisation and those members of staff in extremism roles. It has been designed to enable staff to build their confidence and competence in responding to extremism concerns.</p>

	Staff have to completed ASPECTS (prison staff) or WRAP 3 (Probation staff) face-to-face extremism awareness training before they complete this training.
Approach	Prison and Probation Training for first line practitioners
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners
Deliverables	Online course
Evidence and evaluation	This package was only launched in March 2017, so feedback is not yet available. Completions will be monitored. Evaluation is scheduled.
Sustainability and transferability	It is not reliant on funding and will continue unless it is decided to discontinue. It will need to be updated to ensure that it is up to date and remains relevant, reflecting changes in the nature of extremist offenders in the UK. This could be used outside the UK but would have to be amended in view of operational practices only relevant in the UK context.
Geographical scope	England and Wales
Start of the practice	2017
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with EPTA and EuroPris.
Relation to other EC initiatives	
Organisation	<i>Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS)</i>
Country of origin	United Kingdom
Contact details	Hannah.thompson@noms.gsi.gov.uk
Last update	2016 and before

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.16 <i>Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2-revised (VERA-2R) Pressman, Rinne, Duits, Flockton (2016)</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2-Revised (VERA-2R), is specifically designed, via the structured professional judgment (SPJ) approach, to analyse the risk of violent extremism. The first VERA was developed in 2009 and arose from the increasing need to assess the danger and risk posed by ideologically motivated violent individuals. Existing risk-assessment instruments, used to assess risk factors associated with common forms of individual violence, were not – and are still not – sensitive to known characteristics of terrorists and violent extremists.</p> <p>The first VERA was introduced by Pressman. The indicators used in the protocol were based on existing knowledge of violent extremists and terrorists, and were integrated into a structured professional judgment methodology. VERA was introduced by Pressman as a consultative approach. Following feedback from terrorism experts, national security analysts, and law enforcement operatives working on terrorism offences – as well as the application of VERA with convicted terrorists in high security prisons, VERA was revised as the VERA-2. Reliability and validity data (Pressman & Flockton, 2012) were also integrated.</p> <p>The current VERA-2R is a revised and enhanced version of the VERA-2, made possible through literature research. VERA-2R uses more specified dynamic indicators known to be consistent with the radicalisation process to violent extremism. The status of these risk indicators and risk-mitigating indicators can change over time at an individual level. The monitoring of these indicators at successive points in time permits the establishment of risk trajectories that are crucial for assessing, increasing or decreasing risk at an individual level.</p> <p>VERA-2R can be used as a supplementary approach by psychologists and psychiatrists with knowledge of violent extremism. It can also be used by analysts of security and intelligence services, forensic social workers, including social rehabilitation professionals, and police forces or others tasked with assessing people suspected of violent extremist or terrorist criminal offences. Users must be trained in the methodology and interpretation of VERA-2R before using it. They must also understand the role and effect of ideologies that justify the use of violence, of behavioural indicators and of the impact of digital and other communication systems. In addition, assessors should be familiar with the risk indicators relevant to violent extremism, the criterion definitions, and the advantages and limitations of the VERA-2R approach.</p> <p>VERA-2R contains 34 indicators specifically related to violent extremism. They are divided between five domains: Beliefs, attitudes and ideology; Social context and intention; History, action and capacity; Commitment and motivation; and Protective / risk-mitigating indicators. There are 31 additional indicators based on the</p>

	<p>scientific literature about general violence, radicalisation, jihadism and terrorism. They are divided between five domains: Criminal history; Personal history; Radicalization, Personality traits; and Psychiatric characteristics.</p> <p>The assessor should use all objective information available in rating the indicators. Each VERA-2R indicator has criteria for three levels of rating (low, medium, high), consistent with other SPJ risk-analysis instruments. For reasons of standardisation, the user must carefully read and apply the operationalisations for each of the three risk levels. The final professional judgment is based on the weighting of all available information and data related to the risk indicators. The final decision is <u>not</u> made based on a numerical overall score.</p>
Approach	Training for first line practitioners Prison and Probation
Target audience	Law enforcement officers Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Authorities
Deliverables	<p>The instrument is presented in an elaborate handbook. The handbook comprises an introduction to the subject, academic contributions, methodological guidelines and limitations, information on reliability and validity of the instrument, and of course the instrument itself. The instrument consists of an assessment form in which all indicators are clarified by lead-questions, operationalisations and scientific relevance.</p> <p>A standardised and two-day training course is required to use the instrument. Further requirements are frequent usage of the instrument and structural refresher days. For the Netherlands the training and refresher days are developed and organised by the NIFP.</p>
Evidence and evaluation	<p><u>Performance measures:</u> Concept validity and user-friendliness and content validity are continuously examined. Construct validity was measured with a group of convicted violent extremists matched to a group of violent, non-ideologically motivated offenders. VERA-2R, used in combination with a legal system that applies definitions in line with the risk indicators, demonstrates deductive validity. Predictive validity is very difficult to measure with risk assessment instruments.</p> <p>Security and law enforcement agency officers in many European, Asian and North American countries have been trained in VERA 2 and VERA-2R.</p> <p>In the Netherlands, risk-profiles of terrorist detainees are created based on the VERA-2R. It must be used by Dutch forensic psychiatrists and psychologists in pre-trial forensic mental health assessments. It is also used by the specialised Dutch Probation Service. It is evaluated positively by all of these professionals, as well as the Dutch national government. This evaluation has led to the policy decision to use VERA-2R analysis for every new prisoner charged with a terrorist offence.</p> <p><u>Evaluation and Feedback:</u> Since the publication of the original version of VERA in 2009, continuous feedback has been provided by psychologists and</p>

	<p>psychiatrists, analysts at national security and intelligence services, and law enforcement officers. Users are satisfied that the expert instrument is up to date. More than 90 % of those originally trained in its use have requested extra training for colleagues or other personnel. Implementation and refreshment meetings in the Netherlands show that the instrument is needed, relevant and usable.</p> <p><u>Peer review:</u> In 2013 an independent study of the validity and applicability of the VERA was published by researchers in the United Kingdom (Beardsley & Beech, 2013). They demonstrated that the VERA risk factors can be applied with the same accuracy to both terrorists operating independently and those operating in groups, independently of the spectrum of ideological motive. The research indicated that most of the operationalisation makes the VERA factors easily applicable. Moreover, VERA is a useful risk-assessment instrument for content validity and user validity. Beardsley and Beech (2013) also reported that the protective VERA items are also important for precise identification of extremists, and for identifying individuals who are less inclined to carry out terrorism in the future. They suggested that VERA-2R might be very useful in prisons where violent extremists are incarcerated, where the impact of programmes needs to be assessed, where decisions about early release need to be made, and where Countering Violence Extremism (CVE) programmes are required. Although further research is recommended, most of the elements in VERA are rated as ‘relevant and important for risk assessment’. The VERA-instrument is open for feedback and all feedback is used for continuous improvement.</p>
<p>Sustainability and transferability</p>	<p>Implementation experience in the Netherlands and implementation science shows that availability and usability of a risk assessment tool on violent extremism and training programmes can be ameliorated by adaptation to different judicial contexts.</p> <p>Implementation measures must therefore relate to understanding of identifying needs, interactions on best practices, assessing fits, and preparing organisations, staff and resources, before and during training, installation and implementation.</p> <p>The Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP) has obtained a Justice grant (August 2017) to introduce use and implementation of VERA-2R in 2017-2019 to the prison and probation services in six or more European Member States (Austria, France, Germany (Länder), Sweden, possibly Spain and Slovakia, in addition to Belgium and the Netherlands). The tool will be tailored to specific needs and uses. Exploration, training and implementation meetings with management and staff of European criminal justice agencies will take place.</p> <p>The NIFP will develop a standardised European database of convicted and deceased violent extremists and terrorists and their extremist acts. This database can be used to analyse and support the identification of the most critical risk factors of violent extremism, and risk specification for possible sub-groups of violent extremists and terrorists. This has relevance for effective policy and professional judicial practice related to potential violent extremists and terrorists. This will be done in cooperation with the department</p>

	of conflict management of the University of Bielefeld, Germany and the prison service of Belgium.
Geographical scope	<p>Officers of security, criminal justice agencies and law enforcement agencies in European, Asian and North American countries have been trained in using VERA 2 and VERA-2R. The instrument can be used to support European professional staff in these agencies.</p> <p>The instrument is being used and implemented in the Netherlands and Belgium within the criminal justice system (prison-terrorist wards, specialised probation service, specialised forensic mental health assessment, police).</p> <p>The NIFP will introduce use and implementation of VERA-2R in the prison and probation services of six or more European Member States, tailored to specific needs and uses.</p>
Start of the practice	<p>Development and implementation is an ongoing process in European countries. The first version of the VERA was developed in 2009, second in 2012, current VERA-2R in 2016. Training always precedes implementation. Implementation measures are now included. Implementation depends, among other factors, on organisational logistics. Two examples for the Netherlands:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summer 2016 was the starting point of the risk-profiles for terrorist detainees. That has led to structural implementation for all new terrorist detainees starting from January 2017. • The police, forensic psychologists / psychiatrists of the NIFP and Dutch Probation Service were trained in the instrument throughout 2016.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	Presentation at RAN P&P meeting on 26 November 2015, penitentiary institute (PI) in Vught, the Netherlands.
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	<p>Legal entity: The Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP) is the Dutch centre of expertise for forensic psychiatry and psychology. It is a national service of the Ministry of Justice, incorporated in the Dutch National Agency of Correctional Institutions (DJI). The NIFP provides independent psychiatric and psychological expertise (diagnosis, care and advice) for children, juveniles and adult detainees in the Netherlands. The NIFP advises the judiciary on suspects, establishes high-quality forensic diagnostic assessments, sound and equal psychiatric care and treatment for detainees, and carries out scientific research, and education and training for professionals so that they may develop, obtain and promote professional forensic standards.</p> <p>Infrastructure: The NIFP has the expertise in developing and handling forensic datasets. The NIFP has know-how on transferring and implementing research findings into the practical field of forensic psychiatry and psychology, and professionals in prisons and probation services. Since the attack on the Dutch qQueen in 2009 and the shooting spree in a shopping centre in Alphen in 2011, expertise has been gained on extremist attacks, psychiatric autopsy and incident-handling in a public space and within the family.</p>
Country of origin	The Netherlands

Contact details	Address: Herman Gorterstraat 5 - 3511 EW Utrecht NLD Contact persons : Dr Thomas Rinne, Dr Nils Duits Email: t.rinne@dji.minjus.nl ; n.duits@dji.minjus.nl Telephone: 088 071 0240 Website: www.nifpnet.nl
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	.5.17 <i>Seminar and training for prison staff</i>
Description	<p>During the one-day seminar, prison staff should increase their understanding of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, especially radicalisation in prison and the processes of radicalisation. The seminar also provides an overview of Islamism and Salafism, right- and left-wing extremism and relevant groups in Austria; moreover, it covers indicators of radicalisation, and procedures to follow once radicalisation has been detected.</p> <p>The seminar is divided into three units, with teachers and speakers specially qualified in this area from the prison services, the Network for Social Cohesion, Dialogue, Extremism-Prevention and Democracy (Netzwerk sozialer Zusammenhalt für Dialog, Extremismusprävention und Demokratie) (DERAD) and the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counter Terrorism.</p> <p>The target audiences are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • prison staff (further training) • prison staff in vocational training (basic training and prison officers in service). <p>The short seminar currently forms part of further training for volunteers, and is a compulsory component of basic training. An ‘advanced’ programme lasting 2 to 3 days is planned, for those wishing to pursue further training. Since November 2016, around 900 members of staff have benefited from the training.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation Training for first line practitioners
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners
Deliverables	Face-to-face training. The training started in November 2016 – although a one-day seminar is very short (in order to respond to the many questions raised by participants), it is nevertheless sufficient to raise participants’ awareness. It was developed from scratch, and is not linked to other initiatives or theories.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>Training evaluation was held at the end of January 2017. Feedback from participants has been positive: they appreciate the information about Salafism/Islam/the radicalisation process, because knowledge on these subjects has thus far been very limited. This part of the seminar is considered a real highlight.</p> <p>The speakers from the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counter Terrorism were also particularly appreciated: their information was up to date and provided participants with a comprehensive picture of the Agency’s strategies. Feedback received on this subject led to an extension of the time provided for the DERAD and Federal Agency presentations.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	The structure of the practice is suitable for other countries, or for training in other sectors. The religious content is suitable for everyone.

Geographical scope	Austria
Start of the practice	November 2016. The training practice is ongoing.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with the European Penitentiary Training Academies (EPTA) and the European Organisation of Prisons and Correctional Services (EuroPris).
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	Ministry of Justice in Austria
Country of origin	Austria
Contact details	Emails: erich.hubmann@justiz.gv.at and martin.hoffmann@justiz.gv.at
Last update	2018

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.18 <i>Train-the-Trainer for future prison officers</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>The curriculum of the National School for Training of Prison Agents Tîrgu Ocna (Romania) covers the following topics. The time allotted for each is in parentheses.</p> <p>Radicalisation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - theoretical approaches (100 minutes) - radicalisation as a process (100 minutes) - factors that influence radicalisation (200 minutes) - specific features of radicalisation in the penitentiary system (300 minutes) - internal and external sources of radicalisation of detainees (300 minutes) - the behaviour of radicalised inmates in detention (800 minutes for theoretical introduction/debate, and 400 minutes for practical activities) - the detention regime for radicalised persons (400 minutes for theoretical introduction/debate, and 200 minutes for practical activities) - measures taken for preventing risky situations associated with the radicalisation of inmates (400 minutes for theoretical introduction/debate, and 200 minutes for practical activities) - programmes for deradicalisation and disengagement (300 minutes) - preventing delinquency and terrorism in penitentiary environment (200 minutes) - religious assistance of persons deprived of liberty and taken into custody of the National Administration of Penitentiaries (100 minutes). <p>Training is delivered by the internal staff of the National School for Training of Prison Agents Tîrgu Ocna, Romania.</p> <p>Resources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - human: teacher(s), students - equipment: laptop, video projector, flipchart, whiteboard - materials: course support - venue: classroom, simulator room.
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation</p> <p>Exit strategies</p>
<p>Target audience</p>	<p>Prison/probation/judicial practitioners</p> <p>The training is intended for students attending the National School for Training of Prison Agents Tîrgu Ocna, Romania. After graduating, these students may apply to become prison officers.</p>
<p>Deliverables</p>	<p>The main training output is threefold: face-to-face training, course books and practical application.</p>

	<p>Each year, the National School for Training of Prison Agents organises and hosts a number of conferences. Attendees are specialists focusing on radicalisation who have received training via different projects (e.g. the one mentioned above, titled 'Enhancing the capacity of the penitentiary system to develop the human resources of the penitentiary administration').</p> <p>Moreover, the curriculum of the National School for Training of Prison Agents Tîrgu Ocna, Romania, which is approved by the Romanian Ministry of Justice, includes a theme on radicalisation, taught in the Penitentiary Psychology module.</p>
Evidence and evaluation	We are currently using practical examples taken from different foreign penitentiary systems; our emphasis is on the preventive aspect of actions taken by penitentiary systems.
Sustainability and transferability	The training practice might be suitable for other countries as well.
Geographical scope	Romania
Start of the practice	The project began in 2015 with a project titled 'Enhancing the capacity of the penitentiary system to develop the human resources of the penitentiary administration'.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with the European Penitentiary Training Academies (EPTA) and EuroPris.
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	Yes
Organisation	Governmental institution National School for Training of Prison Agents Tîrgu Ocna, Romania
Country of origin	Romania
Contact details	Contact person: Manuela Frăngu, Deputy Director Email: manuela.frangu@anp.gov.ro
Last update	2018

	<p>.5.19 <i>Terrorist Wing Vught</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>Since 2006, the Netherlands has had a specific prison regime that places those who are charged with terrorist activities, convicted of terrorist (-related) activities and / or showing signs and behaviour of radicalisation in prison, in a special wing. This means that they are (physically) separated from other prisoners. The special wing is referred to as the ‘terrorist wing’ (TW).</p> <p>At the time of writing, in summer 2017, the Dutch TW encompasses six different departments, located in two separate prisons. Five of these departments are located in the penitentiary institute (PI) in Vught. The main approach of the terrorist wing in Vught is to organise a healthy prison climate that promotes effective reintegration by paying attention to: safety and security, contact and relations with staff, contacts outside of prison, a sense of autonomy for the prisoner, physical well-being and a purposeful way in which to pass days.</p> <p>Once a prisoner is placed on the TW, a tailor-made approach is applied. Both in terms of safety and security, as well as for reintegration interventions.</p> <p>For safety and security reasons, a differentiation is made between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - males and females; - type of ideology; - whether prisoners are leaders, followers or criminal opportunists. <p>In addition, a thorough assessment takes place to identify in which of the five departments the prisoner is best placed. This assessment is done by collecting all available information, psychological assessments, observations on the prisoner’s behaviour, and using the VERA 2R tool which enables a professional judgement.</p> <p>The five departments that together make up the TW in Vught have different security levels and different types of prison populations, allowing for tailor-made and differentiated placements within the TW.</p> <p>Reintegration interventions and activities are also tailor-made, based on the above-mentioned assessment and continuous repetition of those assessments. In general all prisoners in the TW have 32 hours a week for activities outside of their cells. These activities can be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - outside time; - leisure activities such as cooking or playing games; - psychiatric and psychological care; - work (in this case either in the garden or doing laundry); - contact with external partner organisations (family support, life coaches, detention support); - educational activities (e.g. a classical Arabic course is under development). <p>For all prisoners in the TW, a tailor-made care plan is developed and all are periodically assessed by a psycho-medical team.</p>
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation</p> <p>Exit strategies</p>
<p>Target audience</p>	<p>Violent extremists</p>

	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Authorities
Deliverables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The director of the TW often gives presentations and shares experiences with Dutch stakeholders, as well as other authorities and prison services outside of the Netherlands. - The TW in Vught is developing a structured outline of its working methods.
Evidence and evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - An extensive evaluation, involving a broad range of stakeholders, was conducted in 2014 on a political initiative. The key recommendations were to differentiate between prisons in the TW, to offer a tailor-made approach and to include a new risk assessment tool VERA 2R. All recommendations have been implemented. - In 2010, researcher Tinka Veldhuis evaluated the Dutch approach to TWs; Vught was also included. Many changes have taken place since this research was conducted. https://icct.nl/people/ms-tinka-m-veldhuis-msc-research-fellow/
Sustainability and transferability	Other EU countries are experimenting with special wings for terrorist and extremist offenders (e.g. United Kingdom, France, Belgium). The approach is transferable to other prison systems but the success of this approach is highly dependent on the prison climate and environment in general.
Geographical scope	The Netherlands
Start of the practice	2006
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN P&P - working group study-visit to the TW in Vught in 2015 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_visit_pi_vught_2611_en.pdf
Linked to other EU initiatives or EU funding	No
Organisation	<p>PI Vught is one of the largest prisons in the Netherlands, to which many offenders who are difficult to handle or treat in other Dutch prisons are transferred.</p> <p>In total Vught prison has eight different regimes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. detention centre; 2. prison (also houses offenders with life long sentences); 3. a facility for habitual offenders; 4. a unit for prisoners whose assessment resulted in instructions for long-stay detention under hospital orders, but who have not yet been

	<p>placed in such regime (for offenders with life sentences who no longer receive treatment);</p> <p>5. intensive specialist care for unstable offenders who cannot be handled anywhere else;</p> <p>6. two units of penitentiary psychiatric centres for mentally ill offenders. All offenders/patients who are difficult to treat and sensitive in terms of media exposure are placed here;</p> <p>7. maximum security facility for offenders who could have the means and opportunities to escape, and who represent a safety risk for the public;</p> <p>8. terrorist wing (TW).</p> <p>[Governmental institution</p>
Country of origin	Netherlands
Contact details	<p>Address: Lunettenlaan 501, 5263 NT Vught</p> <p>Email: informatie.pivught@dji.minjus.nl</p> <p>Website: https://www.dji.nl/locaties/penitentiare-inrichtingen/pivught/index.aspx</p>
last update	2018

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.20 <i>Train-the-trainer awareness training and resource persons</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>In each of the 98 institutions in Denmark there are designated 'resource persons' who have undergone specialised training by the national security unit and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service.</p> <p>The resource persons are tasked with providing awareness training for staff locally and ensuring close support and sparring in the identification, assessment and tackling of extremism issues.</p> <p>This addresses the problem of under-/over reporting of extremism concerns and the issues around handling violent extremists in a prison environment or on probation.</p> <p>Training for resource persons is an initial 2-5 day course with a 1-2 day follow-up training session twice a year. (estimated cost: €30 000). Training given by experts from different authorities and universities.</p> <p>The awareness training is a 1.5-hour event held in conjunction with regular staff meetings to keep costs at a minimum and is based on a PowerPoint slideshow.</p> <p>The train-the-trainers and locally appointed resource persons concept aims to build trust and confidence locally. It can be stressful for individual staff member if they feel 'alone' with their concerns and acting on them. The training provides awareness and guidance – and introduces a collective understanding and vocabulary. Additionally, it provides for a cross-professional, local assessment of a concern, which greatly helps the national security unit in handling and assessing cases of concern.</p> <p>The training focuses on all levels of radicalisation – from minor concerns to dealing with convicted terrorist offenders.</p> <p>The awareness training has been used for a decade, but the concept of resource persons was introduced in October 2016.</p> <p>The training combines cultural sensitivity, human rights, intelligence, case studies, psychology, sociology and procedural guidance.</p> <p>The beneficiaries of the training sessions are prison guards, social workers, management, staff – all employees.</p>
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation</p> <p>Training for first line practitioners</p>
<p>Target audience</p>	<p>Prison/probation/judicial practitioners</p>

	First responders or practitioners
Deliverables	Face-to-face training and introduction to a handbook and guidance manual.
Evidence and evaluation	The course has not yet been evaluated, but the number of monthly reports of concern have been greatly reduced, and the quality of referrals has gone up. We learnt from participants that hands-on knowledge is most in demand.
Sustainability and transferability	The programme requires external funding (currently government funding for 3-4 year periods at a time). It is considered to be transferable to other contexts and countries.
Geographical scope	Denmark
Start of the practice	The awareness training has been used for a decade, but the concept of resource persons was introduced in October 2016.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with EPTA and EuroPris.
Relation to other EC initiatives	
Organisation	<i>The national security unit and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service.</i>
Country of origin	Denmark
Contact details	Morten Hjørnholm morten.hjornholm@kriminalforsorgen.dk
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	.5.21 <i>Multi-disciplinary teams in Romanian prison system</i>
Description	<p>By decision of the General Director of the National Penitentiary Administration in 2015, multidisciplinary teams were set up in most units in the prison system to increase awareness and recognition of and develop a response to potential radicalisation-related threats and events.</p> <p>Although radicalisation is not an issue in Romania at the time of writing, early recognition and prevention is key. It will help manage financial and human resources, should an event of this type occur.</p> <p>The teams underwent a dynamic learning process, with training sessions, online specialised training courses, and study materials provided by officers from the National Penitentiary Administration. More materials will be developed in due time.</p> <p>Teams comprise one officer from the relevant department (or the detention section chief), one psychologist (or social worker if a psychologist is not available) and one officer from the crime and terrorism prevention department.</p> <p>Although there have not been any cases of radicalisation in the Romanian prison system to date, timely recognition of early indicators is vital: the team must prevent radicalised inmates from progressing to become violent radicalised actors.</p> <p>The process involved three steps, as explained below.</p> <p>Step 1. Teams learn introductory information on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) general and specific information about Islamism, and the religious assistance process of Islamic inmates; (b) the radicalisation process: early warnings and intervention. <p>Step 2. Teams disseminate the information learned in Step 1 to prison staff working in direct contact with prisoners (security and regime department, social reintegration staff and medical staff).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Step 3. Teams apply and complete the training course at http://www.coursera.org/learn/terrorism online.
Approach	Prison and Probation
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Violent extremists

Deliverables	<p>Experts developed 11 themes to introduce teams to radicalisation concepts. These themes were uploaded onto the e-learning platform, and related training was provided.</p> <p>The themes are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. radicalisation: a theoretical approach 2. radicalisation as a process 3. factors that influence radicalisation 4. radicalisation in the penitentiary system 5. internal and external sources of radicalisation of inmates/detainees 6. behaviour of detainees radicalised in detention 7. prison/detention procedures for radicalised inmates 8. prevention measures for at-risk situations related to radicalised detainees 9. deradicalisation and disengagement programmes 10. crime and terrorism prevention in the penitentiary environment 11. religious assistance for inmates detained in the custody of the National Prison Administration.
Evidence and evaluation	
Sustainability and transferability	<p>The costs of developing training themes are minimal, and the training could be useful for many practices. Publishing the radicalisation themes on the e-learning platforms costs nothing, and all prison workers have access to the platform.</p> <p>There are accommodation costs to consider for the training sessions.</p>
Geographical scope	Prisons in Romania
Start of the practice	March 2015
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	In RAN / IMPACT meetings in Cambridge (10-11 November 2016) and Utrecht (26 April 2017)
Relation to other EC initiatives	
Organisation	The National Penitentiary Administration is a governmental body that is subordinated to the Ministry of Justice. The National Penitentiary Administration is financed by the government.
Country of origin	Romania
Contact details	<p>Address: Bucharest, Maria Ghiculeasa 47 street</p> <p>Contact person: Daniel MOSOIA</p> <p>Email: daniel.mosoia@anp.gov.ro</p> <p>Telephone: +4.0737.007.344</p> <p>Website: www.anp.gov.ro</p>

Name of the practice	.5.22 <i>The manifestation of extremism and radicalisation inside Czech prisons</i>
Description	<p>The manifestation of extremism and radicalisation inside Czech prisons is an educational course about extremism and radicalisation. The course is divided into three sections, over three days.</p> <p>The first day focuses on the manifestation of right-wing extremism, not only in society, but mainly in prison. Left-wing extremism is also addressed.</p> <p>The second day focuses on the practising of faith inside Czech prison facilities, and cooperation in relation to violent extremism and radicalisation with other European countries.</p> <p>The third day focuses on the radicalisation process inside Czech prisons, identifying the possibility of a radicalisation process inside prison, factors that help explain the radicalisation process and recognising signs of radicalisation.</p> <p>The course includes case studies and practical examples (white power music, videos, photos of extremist tattoos, etc.). A certificate of attendance is provided to participants.</p> <p>The course targets the prison staff, but it is expected to be rolled out to the probation and mediation service, as well as the police.</p> <p>The course is delivered by lecturers from the prison service, the police, the National Centre against Organised Crime (NCOZ) and the police academy. Elements of sociology, law and penology are used.</p> <p>This course is the first specific educational programme for prison staff in this area.</p> <p>Lecturers are uniformed staff, civil employees - educators, pedagogues, psychologists, middle management, high management - directors of prisons and employees from the General Directorate of Prison Service.</p>
Approach	Prison and probation Training for first-line practitioners
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners Authorities The model is applicable in other different security bodies and relevant institutions - e.g. facilities for the detention of foreigners, refugee centres, educational environments, healthcare facilities and hospitals
Deliverables	The training is face-to-face. The main task is to increase knowledge of extremism, and to prepare participants for using the analysis tool for monitoring extremism and radicalisation

	<p>processes in Czech prisons. A staff handbook about extremism and its symbols is currently under development.</p> <p>The cooperation with the Czech Technical University in Prague, Faculty of Biomedical Engineering, has been developed in order to support the project in pedagogical and research areas.</p> <p>The course has been supported by the specific two courses focused on the interpretation of criminal tattoo symbols and the connection between the criminal world and terrorism. The course is open for all members of security areas.</p>
<p>Evidence and evaluation</p>	<p>Attendees are more able to identify incidences of violent extremism in prisons, they are more sensitive to the first signs of a radicalisation process, and they know who the contact persons are if they have concerns about inmates, etc.</p> <p>A challenge has been attention spans as the educational blocks are relatively long. Certain topics have to be explained in depth as many participants have no prior knowledge.</p> <p>The course has an evaluation component that includes a questionnaire. The questionnaire is focused not only on the evaluation of the course itself, but also the lecturers and the course material. The course is evaluated internally after each session (as of June 2017 it has been evaluated seven times).</p> <p>The most important findings are the demand for further increasing knowledge about extremism and radicalisation, and the importance of highlighting experiences from other countries. The need for a handbook as an analytical tool for use inside prisons has also become clear.</p> <p>By August 2018, 11 courses have been delivered and more than 450 participants were educated. The feedback from the participants and the management of Prison Service is solely positive. Participants evaluated the course as very professional, useful and with practical impact.</p>
<p>Sustainability and transferability</p>	<p>Only limited financial resources are required to run the course. The main costs are accommodation for participants, subsistence, and travel between Prague and the various prisons. The course requires a projector, microphone, speakers, a PC and course material.</p> <p>A contract has been signed with lecturers for delivering the courses.</p> <p>The course could potentially be transferred and adapted to other contexts.</p> <p>As mentioned above, special variations of the course are prepared and organised at present time for different state and public facilities.</p>
<p>Geographical scope</p>	<p>Czech Republic</p>
<p>Start of the practice</p>	<p>The course could potentially be transferred and adapted to other contexts.</p>

Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with EPTA and EuroPris.
Relation to other EC initiatives	The course has become a basis for the processing CEPOL course Radicalisation in Prison Facilities. The CEPOL course took place in Prague from 24-28 September 2018 with the participation of experts on radicalisation and extremism from different EU countries. The integral part of the CEPOL course is the guided excursion in the Czech prison facility located in Prague.
Organisation	The Police of the Czech Republic in cooperation with the Prison Service of the Czech Republic and Academic sphere.
Country of origin	Czech Republic
Contact details	<p>Dr Barbora Vegríchtová, PhD, MBA Czech Technical University Faculty of Biomedical Engineering Department of Health Care Disciplines and Population Protection barbora.vegrichtova@gmail.com</p> <p>Ondrej Kolar Prison service okolar@vez.sve.justice.cz</p>
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	.5.23 <i>Basic training for correctional officers</i>
Description	<p>Each of Norway’s regional Correctional Services has designated resource persons, who have taken part in training, briefings and information sharing activities under the auspices of the Norwegian Directorate of Correctional Services (KDI). The training provided to these resource persons is supervised and/or conducted with the assistance of the Supplemental education department at the University College of Norwegian Correctional Service (KRUS), as well as independent external subject matter experts and cooperating services (e.g. the police). These resource persons train some prison staff in their regions - the scope of this is not yet documented.</p> <p>The Supplemental education department at KRUS is responsible for various training programmes for correctional services staff. This training is conducted under the auspices of the KDI - with the assistance of the partners mentioned above. For 2017, the courses were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • radicalisation that may lead to violent extremism, basic course, two days, two courses scheduled for 2017 - open to applications from all staff in the correctional services; • radicalisation that may lead to violent extremism, experience sharing from prisons, two days, one gathering scheduled for 2017 - closed sessions; radicalisation - gatherings for resource personnel - steps 1-4, two days - four gatherings planned for 2017 - closed sessions; • lectures/training at KRUS and/or in prisons, external units on demand; • lectures/presentations at external functions; national and international seminars and conferences. <p>In addition, since 2015, all correctional officers receive, as part of their 2-year basic training programme, approximately 20 hours of specific education, training and lectures related to radicalisation and violent extremism. This is conducted by the Department of studies at KRUS. The following paragraphs focus on this training.</p> <p>The content relevant to radicalisation and violent extremism within the 2-year programme for correctional officers is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • radicalisation, phenomena, definitions, terms - thematic overview (1 hr); • prevention of terrorism in society (Tore Bjørge perspective) (2 hrs); • forms of violent extremism and terrorism (1 hr); • radical Islam (2 hrs); • radicalisation in prisons (1-2 hrs); • seclusion (from society) - and the adverse effects it may have in terms of radicalisation (1 hr); • mini casework “Ismail” (6 hrs) - focusing on applied usage of the handbook;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • cultural awareness in general, concepts and theories (2 hrs) - supporting subject; • understanding religion in prison (2 hrs) - supporting subject; • foreign inmates (2 hrs) - supporting subject. <p>The training is designed to raise awareness among the participants of concepts and theories such as radical, extreme, terrorist, radicalisation processes, various forms of violent extremism and terrorism, and the prison as an arena for radicalisation - and deradicalisation.</p> <p>Islam, or rather radical Islam, is also an emphasis in the training - emphasis is given as staff are generally poorly equipped to handle issues of religiosity and Muslim identity issues and may thus confuse piety and religiosity with radicalisation. As such, the training is designed to enable staff to be more comfortable in dealing with cultural and/or religious diversity, with a special emphasis on Muslim inmates.</p> <p>The training seeks to empower staff to, within existing structures, recognise some overall signs of radicalisation and deal with inmates of concern.</p> <p>The training is cross-disciplinary, using perspectives from political science (security studies), Islamic studies, anthropology, sociology, criminology - linked to the general and overall framework/curricula for the education of correctional officers as such.</p> <p>It is pivotal for KRUS that the training is based on contemporary research and/or experiences from the field. Most lectures are based on theoretical contributions and/or KRUS-initiated ongoing research in the field of radicalisation, Muslims in prisons, social exclusion, etc.</p>
Approach	Prison and probation Training for first-line practitioners
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers
Deliverables	Plenary lectures, mini-group assignments (for the Ismail mini casework, 6 hours) and Q&A sessions.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>General feedback from prisons shows that this type of training is assessed as very constructive in dealing with the issues of radicalisation and extremism. The training is, however, too fractured and should ideally be conducted in a focused time period instead of over 2 years.</p> <p>The training has thus far only been evaluated as part of the larger-scale evaluation of the semesters for correctional officers following training. Feedback on relevance and quality has been positive, and as the staff following training are not considered to have a lot of experience, they may not actually grasp the extent of this relevance.</p> <p>One part of the training (Ismail mini casework) has been thoroughly evaluated using a statistical survey tool. In short, the results show that this type of casework is very effective when training staff for</p>

	work with radicalisation and extremism, and that the learning outcome is very high. However, there are quite large variations between prisons due to the fact that some prisons require staff to attend KRUS during the coursework, while others do not.
Sustainability and transferability	Most of the training is done by in-house experts. Thus, costs for training correctional officers during their basic 2-year programme are covered by KRUS' Department of studies' own internal budget.
Geographical scope	Norway
Start of the practice	Spring 2015. Mini casework Ismail since spring 2017.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	This practice was collected in collaboration with EPTA and EuroPris.
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	The Supplemental education department at the University College of Norwegian Correctional Service (KRUS).
Country of origin	Norway
Contact details	Department of studies: Dr David Hansen david.hansen@krus.no
Last update	2018

Name of the practice	Training modules for prison staff
<p>Description</p>	<p>The training modules focus on radicalisation and deradicalisation mechanisms in Austrian prisons. They are intended to raise awareness among prison staff and empower them in the field of intervention and prevention. The length of the modules varies according to the target group.</p> <p>The training is tailored to the situation in Austrian prisons; the focus is on dealing with violent extremist offenders or possible radicalised prisoners. After the training, participants are able to identify signs of radicalisation and are aware of the exact procedure to follow for violent extremist offenders in Austrian prisons.</p> <p>During the one-day seminar, the following areas are covered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • an introduction to radicalisation • radicalisation, extremism and terrorism • radicalisation in prison • the radicalisation cycle • Islamism and Salafism – a (historical) overview • right-wing and left-wing extremism and other active groups in Austria • indicators of radicalisation • the exact procedure to follow if radicalisation is suspected, or when dealing with violent extremist offenders. <p>The three-lesson seminar includes input from:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • trainer(s) from the prison service • speaker(s) from an NGO working in Austrian prisons, the Network for Social Cohesion, Dialogue, Extremism-Prevention and Democracy (Netzwerk sozialer Zusammenhalt für Dialog, Extremismusprävention und Demokratie) (DERAD) • representative(s) from the Directorate-General of the Prison Service and Preventive Detention/Dep. Care and Services (occasional attendance). <p>The intervention targets are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • prison guards (further training) • prison guards currently in training (basic training or other) • prison staff (social workers, psychologists, educators, medical staff, pastoral care staff, etc.).
<p>Approach</p>	<p>Prison and Probation Training for first line practitioners</p>
<p>Target audience</p>	<p>Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Health practitioners First responders or practitioners</p>
<p>Deliverables</p>	<p>Training modules for prison staff Handouts</p>
<p>Evidence and evaluation</p>	<p>Training content is adapted based on feedback.</p>

	<p>Questionnaires rate satisfaction with regard to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • trainers • content • material and handouts • the seminar's goals • time allotted to content.
Sustainability and transferability	<p>Adaption would be straightforward, because most of the content is identical for every other country in Europe (definitions and overviews of Islamism, Salafism, extremism, indicators of radicalisation, etc.).</p> <p>After the training, participants are more sensitive to indicators of radicalisation and are aware of the significance of their observations and perceptions.</p>
Geographical scope	Austria
Start of the practice	November 2016
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN and IMPACT Europe training event, 10-11 November 2016
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	<p>Strafvollzugsakademie is the Austrian Prison Service Academy, and the ministry of Justice is the responsible authority.</p> <p>The academy is responsible for basic training and further education of Austrian prison staff.</p>
Country of origin	Austria
Contact details	<p>Address: Wickenburggasse 12 1080 Vienna Austria</p> <p>Contact person: Gerhard Pichler</p> <p>Email: Gerhard.pichler@justiz.gv.at</p> <p>Telephone: +43 1404033930</p> <p>Website: http://www.justiz.gv.at/</p>
Last update	2018

Radicalisation Awareness Network



2018 Edition